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ABSTRACT
This study is basically a search for a framework of con
cepts and economic theory which can usefully be applied to
resource analysis*

This search has led the writer to examine

the ways in which men at different times have viewed themselves
and their relation to the physical environment.

The ideas of

the anc lent Greeks, of the early eighteenth century economists,
and of certain modern economists are examined.
Part I shows the need for the conceptual framework sought.
In this part, the views of a selected group of modern economists
on the relationship between man and nature are examined and an
overall conceptual framework for resource analysis is found to
be lacking.

This part is not a comprehensive survey of modern

economic theory on the subject, but simply the presentation of
concepts at successive levels of generalization.
Part II traces the earliest Greek philosophical formulations
of natural process and the orientation of man in relation to na
ture .

The Greek development of basic thought forms for handling

relationships, the organic, the evolutionary and unlimited, and
the balanced and circulatory, are related to various stages in
the development of thought concerning the degree of free agency
and initiative exercised by man in dealing with nature to his
own advantage.

The analytical form and methodological formula

tions of Aristotle are examined in considerable detail as the
summation of Greek thought and method in socio-economic analysis.

In Part III, eighteenth century thought on nature and man is
sketched to show the continuing influence of the ideas developed
by the ancient Greeks on economic analysis*
The repeated expressions of similar patterns of abstract
thought in varying ways related to general economic and histori
cal conditions suggests the usefulness of further study of
nineteenth century thought in terms of the continuity of the
basic lines originating with the ancient Greeks*

vi
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INTRODUCTION
Natural resources are generally described in terms of the
particular field of inquiry in which they are being investigated*
The economic analysis of such resources must build to some ex
tent upon these descriptions from other fields and at the same
time explain the relation of resources to human beings.

How

ever , people have a variety of ideas about themselves and about
what is significant.

For this reason, attempts at abstract

theory have tended to generalize human and natural processes,
encompassing almost all human opinions and almost all natural
views*
One must bounce like a ball between the two dilemmas of
the abstract and general principles on the one hand which are
too far removed from the pressing realities of individual prob
lems to be practically useful;

and on the other hand, the overly

limited and descriptive treatments of specific problems.

The

danger of generalization is that it becomes abstract and may
lose touch with changing problems.

It requires an accumulation

of loosely inclusive formulations which may become unintelligible
in attempts to achieve general applicability.

On the other

hand, the overly specific approach often leads to a general as
sumption of precision and exactness which is in fact applicable
only to a single set of isolated facts at a given time and
place.

,

The field of resource analysis may be illustrated by the
following example.

Assume that an individual, A, has a

2

specific use, B, for fuel wood, C.
lunch, with C, wood.

A wants to cook B, his

Here is a human desire, an isolated use

for a predetermined purpose, and a specific object or substance
which will satisfy the combined^desire and use.

We may say

that the A element is human nature, social science, psychology,
or subjectivist economics.
nology, or custom.

The B element is engineering, tech

The C unit is nature or natural resources.

The last unit, however, is defined by the first two, and the
first two are limited by each other and the last.

This simpli

fication serves to illustrate the definition of resources
which has been assumed in this study;

that is, that resources

for the purpose of economic analysis are not merely substances
or raw materials existing in nature as such.

Rather, the re

source is the relationship as defined by human purposes and
customs of raw materials to human society.
Part I of this study outlines the views of several recent
theorists in the field of economics on value theory as applied
to resources.

This portion of the study is neither a survey

nor an exposition, but rather in the nature of a
for ideas and problems.

Search

v :

It does not purport to be inclusive

of all important economic theory concerned with the subject.
The purpose was rather to find representatives of basic view
points at successive levels of generalization*

Part I is

justified mainly because of its great personal value to the
author in working out perspective and in illustrating the need
for more precision in defining the borders of economic theory

3

in the area of the theoretical bridge between the social and
the physical world.

This section serves to illustrate the

fact that the theoretical foundation of resource analysis has
been left to follow as a secondary conclusion of theories di
rected at other problems, and that the field has not been
adequately considered in formulations of value theory.
Part IX is a cursory survey of early Greek thought re
lating to nature and ultimately to economic problems and re
sources.

The purpose of this section is to show how the Greeks

worked out basic forms for treating nature and how they con
sidered economic relations generally as a part of nature.

Much

time is spent in this section in tracing the basic natural
philosophy of the Greeks and in presenting evidence of their
economic and scientific development.

This was deemed neces

sary because of the common notion that the ancient Greeks were
sterile and superstition ridden in science and lost in moral
deduction in social fields.

It appears tc the author that the

simplicity and lucidity of Greek thought offers a useful
vantage point from which to view static equilibrium analysis.
Part III deals with certain economists of the eighteenth
century primarily from the point of view of their transmittal
of the classical Greek heritage of naturalism and rationalistic
analysis into the new industrial economy of that century.

It

serves to illustrate the idea that economic theory on such
problems as development, scale, rent, and capital accumulation
are all dependent upon a basic assumption of the nature of the
resource relationship.

PAST I
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The concept of "resource analysis" as a logical focal point
around which to study economic problems proceeds from the as
sumption that the validity of economic theory may be judged by
the soundness with which it explains human activities in relation
to purely physical processes.

The consideration of resources

over long periods of time is related to more and more modern
decisions, both those made by executives of multimillion-dollar
corporations making plans in terms of twenty- and thirty-year
estimates, and in the decisions of specialists in the economic
development of "backward" countries#

Economic decisions are

coming to be more and more concerned with measurable material
quantities and reserves*
Joseph L. Fisher has suggested that material resources are
something more than mere physical setting, but rather "an im
portant instrument for economic development":
In partnership with the labor force, capital equip
ment, and the other major factors of production, natural
resources form at once the base and an important instru
ment for economic development* Regions and nations
cannot go far beyond the resources which they have within
their own borders or over which they are able to assert
economic control. Resources, therefore, set the basic
material framework, especially over the long run, for
economic development and for national security.i
Generally, the impact of natural resources has been kept

Fisher, Joseph L., "The Role of Natural Resources,"
in: Economic Development, Principles and Patterns, edited by
Harold F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195^), PP» 39-^0.
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well in the background of most theory regarding economic prob
lems, except where the material variables have been approached
as the sole consideration and economic relationships function
ally ignored.

She classical British political economists let

rent tneory serve as an oil slick, filling the troughs and
crests of the physical environment, and providing a glassy
smooth foundation for social and political analysis.

The com

plexities which face the student of resource analysis were pre
sented in an editorial in Economic Development and Cultural
Change as quoted by Harold F. Williamson as follows:
Even a casual glance at the existing literature
reveals not only the ajbsence of a satisfactory theory
but also the absence of agreement as to which of the
many problems apparent to the observer are important
for study. The research worker seeking pathways to
adequate theory finds no blazed trails, but instead a
veritable jungle of vicious circles, obstacles to
change, and necessary (but never sufficient) precondi=tions to economic growth.2
It would seem useful to examine the assumptions and under
lying the point of contact between economic theory and current
systems of describing and dealing with the material or physical
properties of the world around us.

This approach to the problem

involves economic value theory at a point where it can be kept
in touch with physical measurement and quantitative estimates.
The importance of relating specialized economic analysis to gen
eral economic theory was stressed by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk in
the following passage:
In a theory of any range and any difficulty there
are points which by reason of some casuistical pecul-

2
Economic Development. Principles and Patterns, op* cit.,
p. 17*
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iarities or other. are not always quite easily
explained, even when the general principle which
will give their solution is already known} and,
so long as tho3e points are not distinctly traced
back to the general principle, they stand like so
many living objections to its correctness. As it
happens, there are a good many such points in the
two theories so closely connected — that of value
and that of capital.3
Similarly, Harlan L* McCracken noted the importance ofrelat
ing

diverse specialized fields to fundamental value theory in

the area of business cycles :
The past two decades have brought forth a vast
number of books and articles on business cycles and
price movements. • • The views presented have been
highly divergent, and in many instances distinctly
contradictory. A partial explanation of this situa
tion would seem to lie in the fact that many have
proceeded directly to an analysis and explanation
of price movements and business cycles without recog
nizing that these phenomena are definite problems(in
applied economic theory, especially value theory.*’'
The following pages will illustrate a more generally vague, but
theoretically similar situation in the area of resource analysis,
&ncL

for nri £ibstr£Lct thsorsticsl

of idsss upon

which a systematic organization of the field can be developed.
The first reaction may well be that such a problemdoes not exist.
However, even a cursory survey will illustrate the area of con
cern, and the potentials of its investigation.

I

II

III

■ ! ! II I

I I

II

■ III

3
Bohm-Bawerk, Eugen von, The Positive Theory of Capital
(New York: G. E. Stechert & Co., 1930), p. xvi.
if
McCracken, Harlan L., Value Theory and Business Cycles
(Second Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book *Co*, 1936), p. vii.
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Value Theory in Some Current Definitions of Economics
Explanations of the important elements to be included in
the scope of economics have varied from one historical period
to another as "actual” problems of the "real'* world were viewed
in different perspectives*

To Adam Smith, the setting was an

orderly, bountiful, but niggardly nature, the problem was pro
duction, and the perspective the well-being of the nation;
hence, political economy*

To a modern economist in the subjec

tivist tradition, interest is focused upon the economic success
of individuals, the setting is the exchange economy, and the
problem is that of distribution to keep individual interests
from conflicting with the health of the exchange economy*

Or,

the subject of concern may be the health of the exchange economy,
and the problem how to achieve this without injury to the indi
vidual interests participating in the exchange economy*

From

either point of emphasis, it is obvious that modern economics
has gotten further away from nature’s bounty and the well-being
of the nation and therefore from the importance of peT capita
physical quantities*

The presumption that national interest

and per capita wealth are automatically taken care of by seeing
to the economic health of the individual and the exchange process,
however, has not been conclusively demonstrated.

The study of

individual relationships in the exchange economy without consider
ation of the material elements on which these relationships are
based fails to recognize a vital aspect of economic analysis*
Until the physical basis of the exchange system is included in

8

economic analyses of the exchange system, a valid theory of
5
value cannot be formulated*
Resource values cannot be analyzed in terms applicable in
the natural sciences unless some workable assumption regarding
the relationship between exchange values and physical life pro
cesses and material elements can be accepted*

Such a value

theory would incorporate external increments and decrements and
would have the prerequisites of a theory of value applicable to
a dynamic system*

However, as long as economic values muBt be

defined solely in terms of exchange values, a static equilibrium
system is unavoidable, and value theory cannot include an ex
planation of change*
y u u u x u ¥ c i 'D j

u v c r

For example, in the heredity vs. environment
— 1

— ^

jL ru a o c

u c v u ra u u o o

xuuxtxum cu

u^uaT A V A )

4 ^

-l a

we postulate that individuals create their own environment insofar
as it affects their development and that environment determines

C

Northrop commented on the importance of value theory as fol
lows: "A similar study of a contemporary treatise, such as Wicksell's
Lectures on Political Economy (comparing it with J. S. Mill*s work
on value theory) reveals an important shift of emphasis. The ini
tial chapters treating of the basic principles of the entire science
have the title 'The Theory of V a l u e U p o n this point such diverse
economists aB Menger, Wlcksteed, Schonfeld, Pareto, Marshall, Hicks,
Knight and even Marx are in agreement. As Professor Robbins has
put it, 'The most important propositions of economic analysis are
the propositions of the general theory of value . . . no matter
what particular 'school' is in question and 'no matter what ar
rangement of subject matter is adopted*' These considerations in
dicate that the development of contemporary economic theory has re
sulted in the shift of the concept of value from the status of a
secondary concept, dealing only with one portion of the science,
to that of the primitive or basic concept of the entire science•"
(F. S. C. Northrop, "The Impossibility of a Theoretical Science of
Economic Dynamics,'* The Quarterly Journal of Economics * Vol. LVI,
Nov., 1941, p. 3.)
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heredity, we are in the same position*

Value theory becomes a

pure choice of where you want to get on the merry-go-around, and
nochange can be explained by

such a value

theory*

This is the

essence of static analysis*
Alfred Marshall's place in economic theory as the exhaustive
analyst of economic problems of the firm in the industry and his
prestige as the modernizer of classical British political economy
constitutes a good starting point for a brief survey of twentieth
century value orientations toward natural resources*

Marshall de

fined economics as follows:
Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind
in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part
of individual and social action which is most closely
connected with the attainment and with the use of the
material requisites of wellbeing* Thus it is on the one
side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more im
portant side, a part of the study of man. For man's
character has been moulded by his every-day work, and
the material resources which he thereby procures, more
than by any other influence unless it be that of his re
ligious ideals.6
Of importance in this passage is the interchangeable use of
the terms "wealth" and "material resources*"

Wealth is a concept

which must be defined in terms of the attribution of importance by
human beings, not material measurement*

Wealth may be defined as

that which is considered^useful and attracts attention, value, or,
in more conventional terms, is.^scarce enough to achieve a position
in the exchange economy*

Marshall was not uh&ware of this problem

and expressed himself concisely in terms of demand (how much a
thing is wanted) and supply (how much there is of it) and price

Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics (Eighth Edition,
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 193677
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(the point at which these two factors equilibrate).

In an ex

change economy, of course, equilibration takes place in a market
for a price, and so Marshall dealt with demand prices (prices
offered by various demandants) and supply prices (the cost of
supplying various quantities)•

Since costs are things incurred

by people, not by nature, cost of supply is a concept which can
be defined only in terms of social or exchange measurements.

In

his famous Appendix I, Marshall recognized the usefulness of a
closed or internally defined system in economic analysis but^i,
acare that the technique can only be valid in static analysis,
warned against the inclusion of naive dynamics in such formulations:
But the greatest objection of all to his (Jevons*)
formal statement of his central doctrine is that it
does not represent supply price, demand price and
amount produced as mutually determining one another
(subject to certain other conditions), but as deter
mined one by another in a series. It is as though
when three balls A, B, and C rest against one another
in a bowl, instead of saying that the position of the
three mutually determines one another under the ac
tion of gravity, he had said that A determines B, and
B determines C.?
While Marshall was quite aware that economic availability
can be defined in terms of mutually interacting aspects of the
exchange economy, he did not consider this formulation of value
to be inclusive of a dynamic process of economic development*
Erich Zimmerman's recent work furnishes an illustration of
the results of carelessness with value theory applied to natural
resources.

He stated Marshall's static definition of the rela

tionship of material resources to the economy, and although he

.

7Ibid.. p. 819
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recognized the obvious fact that the economy is a constantly
changing and developing thing, proceeded to deal with resources
in terms of this static definition, as a neutral, inert mass
significant only insofar as a dynamic culture gives it being:
The land surfaces may be fixed, but nature as a
factor in resource development is not fixed. The
totality of land surface is as irrelevant to the study
of the availability of resources as is the totality of
matter and energy in the universe. What counts is the
function and meaning, to man, of land and all other
phases of nature,®
This passage is a statement of supply cost in non-technical or
broad cultural terms.

Although Zimmerman was aware of the dy

namic development of the western European and North American
economies, he is satisfied to define the value base of resources
in terms of Marshallian concomitance, which is a static system
designed to avoid the fallacy of incorporating a dynamic as
sumption through the back door of some casual notion external
to the area of rigorous investigation,

Zimmerman tends to de

pend oh technology as the motive force .in economic development
and perceives that the independent characteristics of natural
processes influence the "efficiency" of technology, but he does
not contradict his approach to resource values as static, inert
’’neutral stuff" awaiting economic reality as a result of a dy
namic culture.

Moreover, he advanced no other theory of economic

dynamics.
Zimmerman's purpose was, of course, the accumulation of an

8

Zimmerman, Erich W., World Resources and Industries (Revised
Edition, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951) > p* S5»
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encyclopedic amount of information on raw material reserves and
industrial requirements*

However, without a theory of resource

values as they relate to a dynamic economy, such a study can
only be descriptive and not predictive of potentialities*

The

technological dynamic has been developed and will be discussed
below with reference to Ayres and White, but no author has yet
detailized just how such a dynamic expresses itself in terms of
available capital, labor force, and expanded availability ex
cept in terms of a social surplus of measurable physical material
proportions*
Marshall's dictum regarding static analysis and the problems
of a dynamic value system should be kept well in mind by the ad
herents of his simplified static supply-demand definition of price
value in partial equilibrium, or static firm-industry analysis:
But nothing of this is true in the world in which
we live* Here, every economic force is constantly
changing its action under the influence of other forces
which are acting around it* Here changes in the volume
of production, in its methods, and in its costs are ever
mutually modifying one another; they are always af
fected and being affected by the character and extent
of demand. Further, all these mutual influences take
time to work themselves out, and, as a rule, no two in
fluences move at equal pace. In this world therefore
every plain and simple doctrine as to the relations be
tween cost of production, demand and value is neces
sarily false: and the greater the appeainance of
lucidity which is given to it by skillful exposition,
the more mischievous it is* A man is likely to be a
better economist if he trusts to his common sense and
practical instincts, than if he professes to study the
theory of value and is resolved to find it easy*9

9
Marshall, op* cit** p* 368*
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Marshall was not specifically concerned with resource
analysis, but if we consider his statement that "changes in .the
volume of production • • * and in its costs are ever mutually
modifying one another," it would seem fair to assume that he
would never have attempted a dynamic theory of economics based
solely on the human elements of the exchange economy*

Such

phenomena as dry and wet weather cycles, rich pockets in mineral
veins, and erosion are dynamic elements which greatly affect
quantity and costs in production and, unless one assumes an
all-knowing predicting mechanism in the economy which can reduce
these items to insignificant variables, the natural resource base
cannot be regarded as "neutral" or static.

When a functionally

perfect discounting mechanism is assumed to be operative in
society, the "exchange economy" becomes an insulated, static set
of relationships, and the material surroundings are thus excluded
from analysis, except insofar as there is a constant economic
relationship expressing their proportional place in the general
equilibrium of exchange*

This brings us to a discussion of what

is termed "modern economic theory."
Philip H. Wicksteed was a basic influence in the development
of modern marginal analysis*

His rich background in the Greek

and Latin intellectual heritage gave him a unique position as a
recognized classical scholar with a clear grasp of the essential
problems being treated by subjectivist theory.

In a paper on

the scope and method of political economy Wicksteed defined the

14

economic problem as follows:
The economic organism • • • of an industrial
society represents the instrumentality whereby every
man, by doing what he can for some of his fellows,
gets what he wants from others* It is true, of course,
that those for whom he makes or does something 5may* be
the same from whom he gets the particular things he
wants* But this is not usual* In such a society as
ours the persons whom a man serves are usually in
capable of serving him in the way he desires, but
they can put him in command of the services he re
quires, though they cannot render them* This is ac
complished by the instrumentality of money, which is
a generalized command of the services and commodities
in the circle of exchange; "money" being at once a
standard in which all market prices are expressed,
and a universal commodity which every one who wishes
to exchange what he has for what he wants will accept
as a medium, or middle term * .
It is clear that Wicksteed was concerned primarily with the rela
tions of the individual to his counterparts in the exchange economy,
regardless of the processes and sources resorted to by individuals
in the "circle of exchange" to acquire material goods*

It is the

choices that are available after the fact of acquisition and the
process of exchange itself which were Wicksteed*s concern*

Thus,

things have value in terms of the average view of the market,
and such considerations as the most intelligent appraisal or the
most advanced scientific understanding have no value except as
potentially acceptable to the average mind in the market*

This is

a static view which incorporates change as discounts in terms of
the static present*

Whatever its shortcomings, however, this

view of economics sufficiently encompasses the perspective and
static problems of day-to-day business to have had a vigorous

10Wicksteed, Philip H*, The Common Sense of Political Economy*
Vol.II (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd*, 1935), P» 773*
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Influence In modern commercial countries*
At this point, Wicksteed's description of the foundation
of the value base of the theory initiated by the Jevons-Austrian
School is useful:
Now Jevons's great discovery, like so many others,
was nothing but a discovery of the obvious; for it was
the discovery that whereas human wants are sometimes
capable of complete satisfaction, and sometimes of
gradual assuagement, in any case the relative urgency
with which they demand further gratification is af
fected to the extent to which they have already been
satisfied* So that a slice of bread and butter is not
of the same significance in comparison with other things —
if one has had nothing to eat for several hours, and if
he has Just enjoyed a hearty meal*
Walras in Switzerland, Menger in Austria, and Jevons
in England were all of them without knowledge of each
other's work, erecting a theory of value upon this ob
vious but strangely neglected principle, which bases
economic thought on the broad experience of daily life
and the psychology of choice between alternatives*H
This view of value introduces material quantities only in terms
of the amount desired by the individual from the exchange economy,
already economically available, and value is the relation of the
fractional desire or quantity to the total of desire and quantity
in the "circle of exchange*"

With this view of value, quantita

tive relationships lose their significance as bases for evaluation*
Value exists in terms of the exchange economy, and although it is
expressed in terms of price (dollars per pound), the economic
significance of such price is the relationship of this price to
other prices in the total economy, and not the number of pounds

11 Ibid.* pp. l--25_
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available*

Value will not distinguish between a lowering of

price because of a decrease of desire or effective demand for
the goods in question, a technological innovation which improves
efficiency of production, or a discovery of a natural deposit
which increases availability in the absolute sense of physical
measurement*
Time and space are general or abstract physical measurements
and are therefore equally irrelevant from the point of view of
exchange value based upon subjective desire and market supply*
The ingenious way of treating time used by the Austrian School
as a discount in terms of present market conditions avoids the
necessity of a dynamic theory by incorporating the average indi
vidual's anticipation of dynamic change.

However, this dis

counting of futurity in terms of the present gives depth to a
static formulation and meets many of the needs of short-term
commercial considerations as long as changes are not too precipi
tous*
This relational approach to value has furnished the impetus
for mathematical formulations of involved relationships and re
finements by the use of statistics*

In this approach, the com

parison of statistics is the significant element, and over a time
period, statistics must be weighted in terms of an index or base
period so as to abstract the relationship, which is based on
averages.

Simultaneous empirical data of changes is laid out in

such a process, changes in relations, but this is frequently
relegated to economic history*
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This theory of value, even with the use of statistics,
by defining only relationships, leaves no room for the inclusion
of physical measurement of quantities as such in economic analysis*
However, if the classical value theory discussed above is incor
porated with casualness toward theoretical consistency and basic
value premises, price and physical characteristics can be classed
els

synonymous, thus bridging the gap between scientific analysis

and natural dynamics on the one hand and the economic process on
the other*

An example of this approach to the economics of

natural resources is contained in the work of Ciriacy-Wantrup
which combines economic analysis with a scientific knowledge of
the problems of physical processes:
According to common usage, one may differentiate three
broad classes of resources: material, cultural, and human*
This trinity corresponds to the trinity of 'factors' of
production — land, capital, and labor — as used commonly
in economic texts* The former terminology has this ad
vantage: it is frankly general and is not affected by the
many specific connotations that have been attached to
•land,’ 'capital,' and 'labor* in the course of their his
tory . . • This study, however, deals explicitly only
with natural and to a smaller extent 'tangible' cultural
resources* The latter are producer and consumer goods
that are durable over a period of utilisation.^2
Ciriacy-Wantrup here isolates the physically measurable elements
of economic society, except population, and treats them as the
important quantitative elements underlying problems of resource
analysis.

It might be said that health and population Eire also

dependent upon these physical underpinnings, regardless of the
exchange structure through which they are manipulated*

12

Ciriacy-

Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V*, Resource Conservation* Economics
and Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952)', pp.
29-50.
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Wantrup attacks the problem by abstracting hie structure from
the bridge between culture and the physical nature of the human
being found in psychological constants or eithical values, on
the one hand, and from the bridge between human beings as cul
tural products and the "real world" on the other hand:
Our preliminary objective, therefore, is agreement
about the meaning of *conservation.* The attempt will
be made to separate the economic and technological as
pects of conservation from ethical, metaphysical, and
other considerations* It will appear that the concept
'conservation' can become neutral in terms of value
judgements (wertfrei) and a highly effective tool in
economic analysis.13
Ciriacy-Wantrup uses the exchange relationship concept of
economics as a basis of his conservation analysis.

At most, the

exchange relationship can only treat natural properties in terms
of availability from the perspective of exchange, not as quantities
in terms of physical measurements of quantities.

In the static

instant, there is an established correspondence between an ex
change value and a given quantity, and the static discount system
of future expectations in terms of present knowledge and accepted
exchange patterns is presumed to anticipate dynamic changes in
society and in nature.

By failing to recognize the limitations

of his basic formulation of value problems in relation to eco
nomics as it pertains to physical realities, Ciriacy-Wantrup finds
himself in the position of explaining why his discount statics
of economic relations do not square closely with physical formu
lations.

He seeks to avoid the difficulty by resorting to the

13Ibid., p. 20
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dubious notion that applicable theory can exist without its
validity controlling specific formulations, or conversely, that
valid theory can only be formulated if abstracted so far from
concrete problems that its details cannot be applied:
Universal historical, as well as geographic, validity
could be obtained by choosing an appropriate level of
abstraction* On the other hand, if an attempt is made
to apply economic theory to the solution of real prob
lems of public policy, the degree of concreteness re
quired necessarily limits validity historically as well
as geographically*!^
The concept of a "level of abstraction" is one of a frame
work for deductive analysis*

It is a formulation of a static

equilibrium within which elements are deductively or mathematically
derived.

The problem of validity in terms of the concrete problems

of economics in public policy is limited by the lack of coinci
dence of static theoretical formulation with a dynamic culture
and a dynamic physical world*
Although Ciriacy-Wantrup focused current economic theory and
its discount approach to time spans upon a thoroughly studied for
mulation of the equivalent physical potential of natural resources,
his underlying value theory does not resolve the hiatus between
pure empiricism as expressed in German historicisa and the pure
theory as expressed in the Austrian tradition*

In practice, he

glosses over the material value problem, and equates price with
value and the potentials of materials with their current prices*
This is perhaps an adequate and functional working hypothesis for

1^Ibid** p. 24.
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business usage, but it provides no orientation for analyzing
long-term processes and change.

A clear understanding of the

value assumptions upon which a theoretical view is founded and
its thorough vertical integration is a prerequisite for the useful
application of theoretical formulations to apparently parallel
problems.
Some Current Expressions of Value Theory as They Relate
To Physical Resources
Marshall limited his discussion of technical economics to
the business enterprise and took cash profit for granted as the
objective of economic decisions.

Wicksteed moved away from the

idea that any such narrow area could be demarcated, and tended
toward a position that the important element is the relationship
between the area influenced by the individual's choice and the ef
fect of his choice on his chosen purpose.

In Wicksteed's view,

economics is the study of the individual's relationship with the
exchange economy.

Thus we have a change from Marshall's approach

in terms of a material or quantitative weighing of remunerations«
As we have seen, Marshall viewed wealth as physical necessities
and their value was closely related to price in his theories.

The

outlook of the economy and the physical realities had to be pre
sumed to be in functional harmony.

Competition was trusted to

eliminate all materially unnecessary price or value-contributing
factors within institutional limitations.
Wicksteed, on the other hand, withdrew from any commitment to
material or quantitative consistency, and limited the area of his
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inquiry to the achievement of relatively more or less of what
was desired from the exchange economy*

He viewed the exchange

economy as the social mechanism for dealing with the wants of
individuals from nature, a mechanism beyond individual influence
which is neutral toward the relative importance of aspirin, beef
steak, pearls, and stage plays, but only providing such goods in
the amounts which people demand*
Wicksteed's general formulation is that value is imparted
to goods in exchange by individual desires, and the exchange
economy is a social thing which equates goods in terms of the
current aggregate of individual desires and amounts available*
The quantity® available are products of the social structure for
getting scarce goods, and the aggregate of goods available is in
terms of the techniques and institutions and scale of desires*
The individual, however, has no control or influence over these
larger elements, and so he operates solely in terms of his de
sire;

the social structure and its interpolation of the physical

world are beyond his grasp, and that of all his neighbors as indi
viduals*

The circle of exchange is also made up of individuals,

all trying to adapt to the anticipated and expressed desire of the
aggregate of individuals who are exercising choices and expressing
desires*

Thus, the source of material quantitative expressions in

the economic area is in the pattern expressed by the order of
wants*

Any quantitative element or change is effected by the in

dividuals who make up the aggregate of desires which control the
pace and relative values of the exchange economy*
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This perspective does two distinct things to economics.
First, it lifts value theory from concern with anything hut rela
tive strength of desires and economics becomes the application of
these values in the area of effective individual choice as it
pertains to the neutrally reciprocating exchange economy.

This

is the expression of a psychological key to the area of economies.
Moreover, quantitative elements must be explained as psychological
quantities.

Any theory of economic change, therefore, must be in

terms of psychological change rather than measurable in terms of
abstract physical measurement.

Such an approach provides little

room for resource or geographic analysis.

Change remains statically

defined within this system since the changeable element in human
desires is a product of culture or social training or it involves
psychological autogenesis, neither of which are the concern of
this view of exchange economies.

A second limitation of this view

of economics is that it circumscribes the field to the variations
influenced by free will or choice.

Secular trends are hardly the

concern of the individual except insofar as he knows or anticipates
them and can profit from or protect himself against them.
The projecting of subjective economics into general national
economic problems involves a detailed body of institutional assump
tions and measures, but does not advance toward a theory of re
sources except in terms of deliberate planning for a stated purpose*
One of the most thorough and well-oriented statements of the
theoretical framework of what has come to be considered "modern
economics" has been made by Lionel Robbins.

His careful develop-
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ment of his assumptions and his clarification of the value base
of his economic theory are worth quoting as representative of the
most academically popular theoretical base in Europe and the
United States today.

Robbins defined the “field of economics as

follows:
The Economist studies the disposal of scarce means*
He is interested in the way different degrees of scarcity
of different goods give rise to different ratios of valua
tion between them, and he is interested in the way in
which changes in the conditions of scarcity, whether com
ing from changes in ends or changes in means — from the
demand side or the supply side — affect these ratios*
Economics is the science which studies human behavior
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which
have alternative uses*^5
Robbins attributes this view of economics also to Menger, Mises,
Fetter, Strigl, and Mayer*

He continues:

The conception we have rejected, the conception of Eco
nomics as the study of the causes of material welfare,
was what may be called a classiflcatory conception • • •
The conception we have adopted may be described as
analytical * It does not attempt to pick out certain
kinds of behavior, but focuses attention on a particu
lar aspect of behavior, the form imposed by the influence
of scarcity.-*-®
When Robbins expresses the interest of economists in scarcity,
whether from "the demand side or the supply side," he is not con
fused about supply.

He does not treat supply as a common term

for economic supply and for material relationships*

In Robbins*

view, supply is the relationship between an available amount, re
gardless of how or why it is available, to the amount wanted for

Robbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science (Second Edition, London: MacMillan and Co*, 19^5T,
p. l f S *
l6Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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a given end.

Scarcity can change if the amount wanted changes,

or the end changes, or the amount supplied changes, but supply
has no existence apart from a given state of wants and ends,
and it is therefore not a measure or analysis of material re
sources independent of these other variables*

It is a factor

which can be measured in terms of an external standard of
measure, but its economic significance is neutral to such
changes:
For it is not the materiality or even material means
of gratification which gives them their status as eco
nomic goods; it is their relation to valuations. It
is their relationship to given wants rather than their
technical substance which is significant.1?
And further:
So long as we remain within the ambit of any defini
tion of the subject-matter of Economics in terms of the
causes of material welfare, the connection between eco
nomics and the technical arts of production must remain
hopelessly obscure.
But, from the point of view of the definition we
have adopted, the connection is perfectly definite.
The technical arts of production are simply to be ■
grouped among the given factors influencing the rela
tive scarcity of different economic goods.1®
Bobbins' view is narrowly static.

Change is recognized and

studied when it appears, but the possible sources of change, shifts
in wants of behavior patterns, on the one hand, or technological
innovations or discoveries on the other, are external givens and

17Ibid. , pp. 21-22
l8
Ibid., p. 33.
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are considered as factual raw material at any instant of time.
It is interesting to contrast Bobbins' views on value theory
and his definition of the field of economics with those of Clar
ence Ayres.

Ayres' work is in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen,

with a thoroughly oriented application of John Dewey's instrumental
ism in value theory.

Professor Ayres agrees with the modern trend

referred to by Northrop previously, and makes this comment about
TQ
value: "Economics is nothing if it is not a science of value."
Ayres is primarily interested in an explanation of economic change
and explicitly rejects the area of detailed relationships in the
closed, static circle which Bobbins defines as the field of eco
nomics:
If the things that people value are just the things
those people happen to value, then demand means nothing
beyond the bare fact that that is what is demanded, and
price means nothing more than the particular money-ration
at which something or other happened to be bought and
sold: and the whole economic 'system' of modern society
is no system at all and means nothing but that such is
the way things happen to be whenever they happen to be
that way.^0
Ayres is not concerned with an individual maintaining his position
in relation to the exchange structure by an understanding of the
workings of these circular truisms;

his interest is in physically

measurable quantity and in the structure of social change.

He

does not view the institutional framework as a constant in relation
to the physical requirements of the technological process.

He

wrote:

Ayres, Clarence, The Theory of Economic Progress (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 19^*0 ? p.~208.
2°Ibid.,
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We have learned that such technical innovations
come about as a result of the physical character of
tools whicht like all physical objects, are capable
of being combined. We know with certainty that inno
vations and discoveries are combinations of tools,
instruments, and instrumentally manipulated materials:
and that the more tools there are, the greater is the
potentiality of technical invention and discovery*
Thus we have learned that this process of technologi
cal innovation is the dynamic force in social change.21
The apparent disparity between the views of Ayres and Robbins

22

on the nature of economic value and the subject matter of the
science may be clarified by a passage from Robbins' discussion
of history:
History is the epiphenomenon of technical change.
The history of tools is the history of mankind* Now,
whether this doctrine is right or wrong, it is certain
ly materialistic, and it is certainly not derivative
from Economic Science as we know it. It asserts quite
definitely, not only that technical changes cause
changes in scarcity relationships and social institu
tions generally — which would be a proposition in
harmony with modern economic analysis — but also that
all changes in social relations are due to technical
changes — which is a sociological proposition quite
outside the limited range of economic generalization.
It definitely implies that all changes in ends, in
relative valuations5 are conditioned by changes in the
technical potentialities of production . ■ • There are
no autonomous changes on the demand side. What changes
occur are, in the end, attributable to changes in the
technical machinery of supply. There is no independent
'psychological' (or, for that matter, 'physiological')
side to scarcity. No matter what their fundamental
make up, be it inherited or acquired, men in similar
technical environments will develop similar habits and
institutions. This may be right or wrong, pseudoHegelian twaddle or profound insight • . • It is a
•21Ibid.. p. .211. . .. ..
^ I t is clear that many disagreements in theory are dif
ferences in the subject matter under discussion combined with a
lack of communication between the parties. Robbins* revised edi
tion appeared in 1935* with reprints in 1937, 19^0, and 19^5*
Ayres' book appeared in 1 9 ^ .
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general statement about the causation of human motive
which, from the point of view of Economic Science, is
completely gratuitous. The label ‘Materialism* fits
the doctrine. The label 'economic* is misplaced. 23
As pointed out earlier, both Zimmerman and Ciriacy-Wantrup
enlarged their treatments of economics from land, labor, and
capital to include natural resources, population, and culture.
Robbins was quite clear in identifying technology as a generali
zation of supply, but was vague about whether he considered supply
an economic or a material property, and whether supply is supply
price or physically measured tonnage in terms of physical com
parisons.

In his view, technology is a cultural utilization of

material properties, and that which is technological about tech
nology is a coalescence of material and cultural properties into
a meaningful unit.
Marshall drew this circle in a shrewdly non-commital manner
by saying that when demand adjusts to supply and supply is ad
justed to demand (with price as the expression of and active in
fluence on both), that the causation involved may be illustrated
by three balls in a bowl mutually determining one another's posi
tion.

His was a static formulation for purposes of limited

analysis*

In his view, supply is obviously economic supply and

not material supply, and the same is true of the material or re
sources involved in the technologist's definition.
culturally available material.

Material is

The culture is prescribed by its

technology, and the culture and the technology determine the
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Robbins, op. cit•, pp.
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materials available and their significance) and the materials
available and the culture create the technology.
dynamic.

This is not

It is a static formulation which generalizes across

the lines of accepted disciplines, which tends to make it immune
from criticism.
A dynamic theory requires an explanation of genesis.

If

culture or values are created by technology, then what created
technology?

Not culture?

Lacking a theory of spontaneous or

mystical creativity, we are led to inquire about the usual treat
ment of the material environment as a neutral backdrop and the
similar treatment of the two major abstractions of the material
setting, time and space.

Are they neutral uniformities, or do

we just consider them so for the purposes of building static
formulations for long periods and over large areas?

Other tfiews

of cultural process indicate that these questions may be worth
investigating.
As it happens, the study of general cultural phenomena is
located in the discipline of anthropology, so let us glance at
what writers in this discipline have to say.

The technological

determinist point of view is represented in this field in the
work of Leslie A. White.

White's position is clearly one of

cultural determinism and, fundamentally, technological determin
ism.

Despite his anthropological background and studies of

comparative culture, his formulation gives no working bridge be
tween economics and materials except in his more self-conscious
formulations.
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White's views are in striking contrast to the environ
mentalist perspective of the early twentieth century represented
by Ellsworth Huntington and Ellen Churchill Semple.

These

two authors approached human behavior as a mechanical expression
of physical process.

Their view was that the potential and the

nature of economic development are expressed in the nature of
the physical environment, and that with time, the mechanical
interaction of physical elements produces a given technology
and pattern of social adjustment to the surroundings.

White's

disagreement with environmental determinism is seen in the fol-
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See Ellsworth Huntington, ^orld-Power and Evolution (New
Haven: Tale University Press, 1920). In his preface Huntington
wrote: ,
"Every aspect of human knowledge must be considered in
its relation to both space and time." In Civilization and Climate
the problem of the effect of physical environment upon human
progress was discussed in its relation to space. It was shown
that the distribution of civilization upon the earth's surface
is closely in harmony with the distribution of climatic energy,
which he considered the most important factor in physical environ
ment. In World-Power and Evolution he considered the same problem
in its relation to time. Huntington postulated causal sequence
whereby climate controls mental activity and health, which in turn
control technological innovation and business cycles. This idea
is criticized in Douglas H. K. Lee's recent work, Climate and
Economic Development in the Tropics (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1957).
See also Ellen Churchill Semple, Influences of Geographic
Environment (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911)* She states her
method of approach in. the preface as follows: "If these peoples
of different ethnic stocks but similar environments manifested
similar or related social, economic, or historical development,
it was reasonable to infer that such similarities were due to
environment and not to race." (The emphasis here is on environ
ment in opposition to heredity, rather than in opposition to
cultural traditions).
For an historian's view of the influence of space on his
torical development, see James C. Mai in., Essays
Historiography
(Lawrence, Kansas: James C. Malin, 19^6), especially Chapt. I,
"The Turner-Mackinder Space Concept of History."
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lowing:
The technological system is basic and primary*
Social systems are functions of technologies and phil
osophies express technological forces and reflect social
systems. The technological factor is therefore the de
terminant of a cultural system as a whole* It deter
mines the form of social systems, and technology and
society together determine the content and orientation
of philosophy. This is not to say, of course, that
spcial systems do not condition the operation of tech
nology, or that social and technological systems are
not affected by philosophy. They do and are* But to
condition is one thing; to determine, quite another *25
Here we have a formulation of three elements that can each
be viewed as elaborations —

supply price to technology, demand

price or institutions to social structure, and equilibrium price
or value to philosophy —

dealt with in terms strikingly similar

to Marshall’s billiard balls in a bowl.

Marshall took issue with

Jevons’ chain of reasoning from the demand end, but refused to
indicate an end or beginning to the circle.

White seems to close

the circle, but leaves a mark where he started just to show that
there was a starting point.

The convenience of this is seen in

the following remarks by White:
One came eventually to understand that the deter
minants of culture lie within the stream of culture
itself; that a language, custom, belief, tool or cere
mony, is the product of antecedent and concomitant
cultural elements and processes* In short, it was dis
covered that culture may be considered, from the stand
point of scientific analysis and interpretation, as a
thing sui generis as a class of events and processes
that behaves in terms of its own principles and laws
and which consequently can be explained only in terms
of its own elements and processes. Culture may thus

^White, Leslie A., The Science of Culture (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Co., 19^9)♦ p. 3^6.
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be considered as a self-contained, self-determined
process: one that can be explained only in terms of
itself.26
White here has frankly stated a closed or static system for analy
tical purposes suggestive of Bobbins* foundation for abstracting
a science of relationships rather than one of quantities*

White's

use of "antecedent and concomitant" does not include history
since he treats culture as causing the "antecedents" to begin
with.

However, the gnawing reality of the material world breaks

into this concomitance to be the causative factor of the sui
generic system.

White stated:

We can now formulate the basic law of cultural
evolution: Other factors remaining constant, culture
evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita
per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the in
strumental means of putting the energy to work is
increased. «oth factors may increase simultaneously
of course.27
Here is an analysis of an external force, physical energy,
which influences the significance of the causative factor, tech
nology.

Technology is the measure of, or process of harnessing,

material for human purposes.

Per capita energy is a product of

the amount of energy which can be produced under a given state of
knowledge (efficiency) and the amount desired (effective demand)
on the one hand, and the amount of material energy available in
nature to be produced under a given state of knowledge and tech
nology (supply), on the other.

26lbid.. p. xviii.
27Ibid., p. 368-369.

We thus find ourselves right back
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to the pitfall that Marshall left for himself by not directing
attention to the nature of supply.

Is energy to be considered

physical materiality in terms of physical potential, or is it
the amount called forth by a given level of technology and want
from a neutral averaged physical backdrop?

White alludes to an

apparent forceful element impinging upon the cultural process
from the outside world as a generating force to spark the "selfgenerating” technology;

however this appears to be a neutral

generality of the material process, energy.

Equally as good a

case could be made for the abstract generalities of the physical
world dealt with in terms of time, or geographic space.

If effec

tive culture or technology combined with culturally or technically
available energy is to provide the motive power of culture, we are
offered nothing but a ride on the same merry-go-around, another
tautology.
If, on the other hand, we are offered a source of impetus to
culture or economic growth from the physical nature of material
reality in its purely natural characteristics as it comes in con
tact with human Culture, we have a broader ambit of investigation.
This would require a study of the- elements of the physical pro
cesses as something more than vague averages, or "neutral stuff"
in Zimmerman's terms and "energy" in White's.

It is impossible to

ignore the vast developments in the realm of understanding of the
inherent properties of physical matter, and the formulation of
processes in the organic geographic environment which have per
mitted fertilization of crops, plant breeding, weather forecasting,
and intricacies in industrial chemistry beyond the grasp of the

33

ordinary citizen.

The changes resulting from such developments

have had a striking impact upon costs of production and manpower
requirements.

They have also created demands for goods that

hitherto did not exist in the quantity or quality presently avail
able.

Any theory that is not flexible enough to allow for possi

bilities which lie undiscovered in nature will fail to anticipate
some of the most fundamental influences on our economic life*
The ultimate question in any science involves the issue of
methodology and assumption.
technf

The methodological question involves

\es of discounting personal background and cultural pre

conceptions.

Techniques are needed for observation and verifica

tion* analysis and correlation* classification and generalization
These are basically problems of epistomology* or the problem of
knowledge as a process.
^he problem of assumption is generally treated in one of
three different ways.

One is to assume a fixed, immutable body

of natural principles of material relationship whose discernment
is possible and projectible, permitting breakthroughs in under
standing and prediction of the behavior of natural phenomena.
This view can often include semi-mystical concepts of natural
law.

Another is to assume an infinitely changing developmental

process of which we can get glimpses and form generalizations
which must be used timidly until we recognize a more inclusive
and more complex process, or until our generalization is found
to be invalid as a result of a shift in the character or direc
tion of the process.

A third view is to reject any assumption

3h

about the nature of reality and to rely solely upon what is
definitely demonstrable in laboratory experimentation on the
assumption that reality is knowable only in terms of the pro
cess of human knowledge, or learning process.

In this view,

the learning process itself is the only reality we can count
on.

This latter is a metaphysics or ontology which rejects

the usefulness of any assumptions concerning reality beyond
immediate, or almost immediate, verification.

It is the gen

eral outlook of positivism and much modern thought.

There are,

of course, many other mentalistic and idealistic perspectives
with which human beings have approached the problem of learning
and the definition of the significance of learning.

However,

the only purpose of this discussion is to point out that the
commonly used notions of dynamic and static, objective and sub
jective, true and false, general and specific, are quite variable
in meaning, depending on one's basic view of the character of
human propensities for inquiry, and the nature of the subject
matter of inquiry.
Some Economists' Views on Space and Location
The political and economic significance of space as an ab
stracted element of many important considerations has been recog
nized since the time of the Greeks.

Along with other concepts of

interest to the resource analyst, spatial problems have been in
corporated into various theoretical formulations, but space in
the abstract has a more unyielding and stricter halo of notions
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surrounding it, and has not blended as smoothly into economic
considerations as have such concepts as supply and land.

Space

was treated in classical British political economy as an aspect
of land and dealt with as a property of linear uniformity of
gradation in classical rent theory.

Simultaneously, von Thunen

in Germany used a much more involved theoretical framework in
which space was considered a physical basis for economic rela
tionships with abstract patterns of influence of much higher
significance•
Since the early nineteenth century, however, the level of
intricacy in commercial relationships has tended to keep abstract
material considerations oftt of the mainstream of economic theory.
Not the least of these causes has been the commercial usefulness
of static formulations and the lack of emphasis on space in terms
of changes or possibilities for changes in relationships.

Space

in its linear form, distance, combined with time costs of speed,
has been considered as a barrier in transportation and analyzed
as a cost of transport.

However, the social structure of the

transportation system in western industrial countries is generally
more flexible and deserving of more attention than pure spatial
considerations.
In general, space has been translated into economic costs
of distance and time.

In a statiU- evaluation, a cost is a certain

number of dollars, and can be added or averaged with no regard
for its derivation.

However, In considerations of comparison be

tween locations, the relationship between costs which are the
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result of different phenomena are a matter of concern*

First,

the character of the costs as fixed or variable production costs
or as marketing costs has a bearing on establishment decisions
from the pure dollar-total basis and the nature of projected
changes in the business structure*

Moreover, the relationship

of different types of costs to others in various industries
has been the basis of classification.

Economists have gone be

hind pure cost to isolate categories of costs with distinct
patterns or characteristics, such as wages, rent, interest, and
costs of land and capital*

Sent or land and space value has

been treated as a less fluid factor in short-term commercial
analysis*

Since it is highly susceptible to demand considera

tions in urban realty analysis, it has been treated simply as a
cost with little further interest*
An example of one of the most mature treatments of space
from the perspective of economic theory is Melvin L. Greenhut's
recent work in which he surveys the literature and analyzes the
theoretical assumptions which are required consistent with cur
rent economic theory.

Greenhut applies "modern economics" as

Bobbins defines it to spatial problems of location of industry,
including both production and market area concepts:
In the physical sciences, the laws on conservation,
such as of mass energy, are regularly being fulfilled.
Apart from subject matter properties, this fulfillment
is due to the fact that the boundaries in which this
general field of investigation is contained have appar
ently remained constant. But quite clearly because the
boundaries of spatial economics (i.e. wants in space)
do not remain constant, the framework for this field of
study fails to make possible any obedience to the laws
of conservation. At first glance, this condition suggests
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the need for a broadening of the basic postulates
of economic science, which would serve to enable at
least a greater generality in findings than otherwise
would exist.
.Notwithstanding the above consideration, we will
find that advantage exists in not presenting our
general theory on the basis of broader postulates,
i.e., maximum satisfactions. To the contrary, the
theory to be presented is mathematically formulated
and is described in such terms that it will be kept
in step with traditional presentations which argue
that satisfactions are an end and analysis of profit
as a means to he end is all that economic science
contemplates

I

Greenhut defines economic space as space made meaningful by
wants.

He is prepared to accept the treatment of wants in terms

of their price expression alone since this is amenable to formu
lating the relationship between cost expressions of wants and
cost formulations of economically weighted space.

To deal with

maximization of all types of possible satisfactions and all
possible want-satisfying, socially meaningful characteristics
of space would complicate the picture, but he recognizes that
the problem of total wants related to total significance of
space would be no advance over the relationship between dollarwants to dollar-characteristics of space:
The reason for not formulating our general theory
on a postulate of maximum satisfactions lies in the
fact that though such postulate offers generic validity
to our science, this condition alone would not make
economics dynamic. To the contrary, economics would
remain static . . . Present levels of knowledge and
method thus suggest gain only in pointing out the de
ficiency of our current approach, which has now been
done; it does not encourage yet a reformulation of
our thinking and change in basic principles. It

28Greenhut, Melvin L., Plant Location in Theory and in
Practice, The Economics of Space (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina P r e s s 193^), pp. 283-284-.
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follows that the general theory presented here is
only such and nothing more; it does not offer pre
dictability of future locations.
^he nature of Greenhut*s formulation as one of relation
ships between factors derived from summaries of data combined
under given assumptions is consistent with the most advanced
theory and is the more valid for its recognition of limitations*
A body of relationships is more general than the specific quan
tities of the elements involved*

In other words, 50 percent

is a more general concept than half a dozen or two out of four;
and is consequently more useful, but the generality is based
upon the assumption of a static foundation.

To be dynamic and

to give predictability, the elements of the relationship must
be predictable in trend, and this involves a knowledge of the
relevant controlling factors.

However, deduction of generaliza

tions from facts derives relationships for the purpose of useful
application and is an important aspect of any science*

Yet,

this is a deduction from observable data as it is already
understood*

The process of moving in the other direction toward

further understanding is induction and it requires comparability
in kind and in sequence of time in order to derive formulations
of fact, which then must be carried deductively into systems of
analysis and application*

This process tests coherency and sug

gests more consistent formulations, errors in perspective or ob
servation, or inconsistencies in assumptions of external reality.

^Ibid., p* 284
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The general concern for pushing investigations into broader
analysis was expressed by Perroux several years ago:
This example * * . has the object only of estab
lishing a rigorous distinction between ’geometric*
space and ’economic* spaces. While the latter are,
by definition, the proper fields of our discipline,
they are also those which have been the least direct
ly and deeply studied* Space has probably given rise
to technical literature less precise and less exten
sive than time; however, our science possesses
numbers of mathematically developed studies on the
localisation of an economic unit of activity con
sidered with respect to cost and price, insofar as
they are dependent on space. But it does not
possess, to my knowledge, a central study on the
’illusion of localization,' which shows clearly that
localization in banal space from the point of view
of cost and price is only one aspectftof the diffi
culties of our analysis and policy.5
Perroux suggests a much greater complexity than cost and
price of distance in the analysis of economic space, and hints
at the deeper factor of the nature of the relationships between
banal space, or geometric space, and economic or socially eval
uated space.

He further suggests that the history of the western

European development may well have been fundamentally chctx*aster 2-Zed
by a successful free play of individualistic intuitions result
ing in the evaluation of space beyond the grasp of the mathematics
31
or economic theory of the times.
The notion of mere distance may suggest to us that abstract
space can be treated in terms of time, but a moment's reflection
will recall the fact that linear distance involves a rapid geo-

30
Perroux, Francois, "Economic Space: Theory and Applications,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 6*f, No. 1, Feb., 1950* P* 92.
51Ibid., pp. 102-103.
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metric multiplication of area, and that geographic area presents
factors of infinite variability, even within a static framework,
whereas the very essence of static analysis is the freezing of
time to avoid variability.

The potential of further analysis

of spatial phenomena in relation to the clarification of eco
nomic problems of general theory was suggested in more classical
terms by Friedrich:
To summarize, land rents, advantages due to favor
able locations of industry in relation to raw material
deposits and market areas appear to be variable func
tions of the location of industry which are in turn
variable functions of dynamic (or creative) factors,
such as the development of raw material resources,
transportation facilities, or increases in population
which determine economic development in the long run.
An adequate theory of location seems bound to enrich
the theory of land rent and thereby perhaps carry reprocussions into other aspects of the theory of value.
Although Friedrich does not make the distinction between economi
cally-defined space and materials and geometrically or banailydefined space in terms of modern economics (which defines outward
from the circle of economic exchange), he is aware of the identity
of spatial problems with those of raw materials and technology
which must arise, in large part,, from their physical or material
dimension, since their economic dimension is stressed in terms of the common denominator of price, which excludes any further
detail or characteristic of consideration.
This whole subject of the material character of things po
tentially economic has been in the province of the field of

Friedrich, Carl J., author of the introduction and trans
lator of Alfred Weber's Theory of the Location of Industries
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 192977 PP» xxxiixxxiii.

geography for centuries.

However, within the past century and

a half, a rather strong interest in the interrelationships be
tween human beings and the physical world has been injected into
the schools of geography, springing from the German culturehistory tradition.

In highly oversimplified terms, the American

trend has been to approach human considerations in relation to
the earth from the point of view of the natural sciences.

Thus,

human activity and physical earth tendencies can be considered
in interaction just as one might study the habits and effects
of the social insects —

the bees, for example —

as contributing

strongly to the "natural" environment as it is, and yet developing
primarily in response to their demands through evolution, random
mutation, and environmental selection.

In recent years, however,

the trend has been in the direction of specific study of the
physical setting of specific types of economic activity.

This

area of investigation has come to be called economic geography.
Without becoming involved in a methodological discussion
regarding the problem of a generic base or point of departure
for the field of geography generally, it is sufficient to point
out that human geography has been in search of a valid methodo
logical unit of physical study in relation to man as opposed
to the social or economic search for a valid methodological unit
or value theory for an approach to human problems.

Classical

economists struggled toward a science of the material as it could
be judged by the society, but despairing of the future of such a
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line of investigation, and with the mastering of the problems
of underproduction of historically accepted necessities of life
around the middle of the nineteenth century, modern economists
have turned away from this problem and concentrated upon the re
lation of the individual to the exchange system, and the general
balance and health of the exchange system itself, taking physical
adequacy for granted.

There is, therefore, a void between

western economic theory and the problems of backward countries,
since the problems of underproduction have not yet been solved
in these areas.
From the point of view of economic geography, which is pri
marily being studied and administered by geographers with limited
graduate training in economics, there is difficulty in adapting
economic theory to the factual material being accumulated from
their descriptive and historical perspectives.

Strained attempts

to adapt modern economic theory or to slur over the disjuncture
between economic theory and economic geography is increasingly
difficult as the valuable information of the geographer is being
increasingly sought and used by corporate and public agencies in
development programs, both domestic and foreign*

This problem

was expressed by an author with a doctoral degree in geography
who is professionally employed by a firm of consulting engineers
in a recent article in a journal devoted to geographic data per
taining to economic matters.

The paper is more bibliographically

comprehensive, but meditatively characteristic, of much recent

k3

literature in economic geography.
One of the paradoxes of contemporary geography is
the disparity between the number of substantive contri
butions to economic geography and the conceptual progress
of this branch.33
Ballabon surveys the problem by indicating that the economic
geographer has been looking primarily to the economist for theory.
He misses the dualism between physical and social analysis which
comprises a major part of the difficulty by not showing the dis
juncture between measurement in the physical sense and conceptual
form for relationships in the social sense.

The latter is essen

tially a form of value theory.
Of the three basic steps of selection, measurement,
and . . . the third and most significant step, the estab
lishment of spatial relationships between data, is,
however, very elusive. This is particularly unfortunate
as significant progress in establishing a body of prin
ciples in economic geography depends upon the repeated
recording of relationships between comparable bodies of
data. While some of the difficulty is directly related
to problems of selection and measurement, a major problem
is raised by the concept of spatial relationship.3^
Although economic geographers may be looking toward economic
theory for a conceptual framework which will provide a common
ground, the trend in modern economics is to ignore the existence
of the problem in its more comprehensive form, classical rent
theory.

This tendency is expressed in the following discussion

by Joan Robinson dealing with broad conceptual problems of general

Ballabon, Maurice B., "Putting the 'Economic' Into Economic
Geography," Economic Geography, Vol. 33* Ho. 3* July, 1957* P* 217•

^Ibid., p. 221.
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social and economic concern as well as details for private
business analysis:
The essence of the conception of rdnt is the con
ception of a surplus earned by a particular part of a
factor of production over and above the minimum earnings
necessary to induce it to do its work* This conception
of rent, both verbally and historically, is closely
connected with the conception of 'free gifts of nature.'
The chief of these free gifts of nature (of which the
essential characteristic is that they do not owe their
origin to human effort) is space, and for this reason
they have usually been referred to simply as 'land' —
land being understood to comprise all the other 'free
gifts' besides mere space • • • The whole of the earn
ings of land in the economist's sense is rent in the
economist's sense, for it follows from the definition
of the free gifts of nature that they are there in
any case, and do not require to be paid in order to
exist.35
This line of argument takes the British classical tradition
through its Marshallian detailization and, while keeping the
phrasing that one would presume directs attention to the physical
character of. the economic base, blends it with the modern trend
of defining outward from the center of meaning.

Although natural

"surpluses" do not have to be paid in order to exist, what is
the impact of a slight change in understanding which, with a
single stroke as it were, changes the volume of the surplus ten
fold?

Does the value of the understanding, the value of the

"land," or the cheapness of the product increase?

How?

Why?

The trend in economic theory has been to abandon this issue
as social organization and government became the most involved
and critical phase of our daily and yearly economic lives, but

^Robinson, Joan, The Economics of Imperfect Competition
(London: McMillan Co*, Ltd., 193*0 » P» 102.

this is possibly a temporary phase in economics.

The possibility

of the future is for more concern with material quantity, tech
nological output and of developments in heavily populated areas
whose material needs are short of the moral standards of the
world.
Simultaneously, private industry has acquired a grasp of
the impact of economic "breakthroughs” in understanding and in
vention, and is increasingly interested in correlating physical
research with commercial decisions which are being made in
purely economic terms.

The necessity of a value scheme which

has functional validity for institutions such as corporate
interests and nations with domestic and world obligations can
not be passed off on the supposition that economics is a static
problem which only involves thinking in terms of what we have,
and dealing with the future in terms of the average customer's
mental discount of possibilities which he has hardly the train
ing to inquire about, much less understand.
The Time Problem in Economic Theory
The most fundamentally established extra-social measurement
or physical process in terms of which economists have habitually
thought has been time.

Time is actually a measurement in terms

of an astronomical process, namely the revolution of the earth on
its axis, producing days, and its rotation around the sun, pro
ducing years.

The value and significance of this extra-social

measurement is at once obvious and involved.

It becomes a common

term for comparison, and is at the same time a constant or a
neutral element for measurement of different items.

Although

we quite casually compare distances in economics in terms of
cost of transportation and equate those with similar costs,
we would not attempt to equate time to a crop yield.

For

example, where the average annual yield is thirty bushels of
grain to the acre, we cannot refer to a yield of twenty bushels
as two-thirds as long as a yield of thirty, economically speaking*
The obvious reason is that time is external to all mundane
variables with which we deal, and therefore is actually neutral
in itself, whereas most other physical processes with which we
are concerned vary markedly from place to place and year, to year
at the level at which we are interested in them.
These variables in the realm of physical resources have
usually been approached by economists in terms of a social measure
ment which derives its terms from internal preconceptions, and is
thereby inherently static.

However, the progress in dynamic

comparisons has been made by equating these physical processes
to time and combining these measurements with social appraisals
made in terms of time also.
The working out of the relationship of time as an external
measurement of social and physical factors and the social signi
ficance of time in terms of rates and quantity to absolute or
external time is a much more involved problem than is apparent
at first glance.

Just as writers such as Perroux deplore the

use of. banal space without weighting it in terms of the involved

*f?

social significance it holds, historicist economists have long
urged the analysis of trends in terms of changes over time and
the inapplicability of concise theoretical formulations from
one time period to another, and from one place and circumstance
to another during the same abstract time period.

This idea has

found its way into even the most deductive forms of current eco
nomic theory.

F. Zeuthen, an economist > in the modern Austrian

and mathematical tradition, has the following to say about the
difference between the social and the abstract physical aspects
of measurement:
In economics one will often attach importance to
certain quantitative properties and relations, such as
magnitudes and price. These are fully capable of de
.
scription in formulae or figures, but without the
multitude of other attributes to be found in real life.
If we undertake such a formalization, we shall be better
able to draw conclusions from the said quantitative
properties, often in themselves very complicatede If
one does not in this way facilitate the work for one's
self, but tries to find the quantitative connection at
the same time as one thinks about all the other proper
ties of the things, such as all the individual character
istics of persons or subjects involved, it becomes
difficult-both"for one's self and for others to control
which Conditions are included in the original and with
what weight; it is also difficult to determine whether
or not emotions have influenced the result. As an ad
vantage of the strictly formal way of expression,
Morgenstern emphasizes that it makes away with the ob
scurities and contradictions inherent in the 'material
mode of expression.*36
And further:
Besides the abstract and displaceable time scale,
which is applicable to a series of production processes,

36

Zeuthen, F., Economic Theory and Method (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955) 1 P» 9*
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or to an abstract calculation of interest, where the
starting point may just as well be the year 1200 or
1900 or 1980, it is necessary in economics, as empha
sized by Johan Ackerman, to reckon with the actual
historic scale of time, where each period and each
year has its special stamp, dependent on the total
economic, political and cultural situationC1the calen
dar scale')37
Although the first of these two passages does not clearly dis
tinguish between social and physical measurement of material
quantities, i.e., price or pounds, it quite clearly emphasizes
the necessity of abstracting them from the complex of involved
process for analytical purposes.

However, when discussing the

question of time, the same author is lucid about the importance
of a neutral external abstraction.

The contradiction implicit

in this problem must be clarified in order to develop a theory
of natural resource analysis which is more than a description
of scientific and industrial measurements and quantities based
on current prices and processes.
^he problem of the inherent static character of internally
defined or socially defined social measurements has been reviewed
as it pertains to equilibrium and space problems.

Here, however,

we have an instance where an author who defends the static ab
straction to avoid the interference of detail in regard to
"magnitudes and price," simultaneously rejects the usefulness of
an external idealized measurement which is made to order for
mathematical abstraction in favor of the complexities of inter

57Ibid., p. 12.

nally defined social comparisons which defy precision.

One

might be inclined to ask why space could not be defined as a
temporal magnitude in terms of economic costs of time required
to traverse it and then no longer to be subject to treatment
with the "material mode of expression," and require treatment
which brought out the "special stamp" of each interval of time.
But the special stamp is quite similar to the material mode
whose complexities we just escaped.
The confusion here should demonstrate that the concept of
"time" is not just a neutral, abstract physical measurement•
Time is neutral only as a socially constructed concept of a
neutral common term for purposes of mathematical comparison in
the sense in which Zeuthen asserts for "magnitudes and price."
Time in the sense of physical reality is not neutral, but is a
physical measurement of constant change.

Although it is a cur

rent concern of philosophy and physics whether time has any ab
solute meaning, or whether it is nothing more than a human con
cept of measurement with meaning resting only in the human mind,
it is certainly not a neutral aspect of material reality.

The

popular concept that natural scientists believe in constants
rather than use them where the variations are not of significant
to the problem at hand is reflected in a current comment by a
thoroughly oriented representative of the historicist point
view.

©S'

Regardless of this alleged misconception of the natural

38
Cohen, Morris R., Studies in Philosophy and Science (New
York: Henry Holt & Co., 19^9)» pp. 215 and 233 on "Einstein's
Theory of Relativity."
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sciences, Leo Rogin's criticism of the mathematical and deductive
approach to economics should be enlightening:
The natural sciences articulate the concept of a
constant nature* which finds its empirical reference
in the uniformities manifested in the heavens and in
the materially isolated setting of the laboratories*
The purist type of economic theory proceeded to an
analogous concept of a constant, a stationary economy.
But what is the empirical reference of the theory?
Is it possible that the reference of this type of
theory is also the value-charged context of human
history, and that what appears to be a retreat into
objectivity is a retreat into s t e r i l i t y ? 2 9
The only explanation for the enduring concept that natural sci
ence deals with material uniformity is the widespread publicity
which the field of physics has received in recent decades.

The

fact that elements in astronomy and physics can be considered as
constants for practical purposes is a commentary on the tremen
dous time differential between human events and astronomical
events.

As soon as one suggests that a laboratory dog or a

feeder pig be held constant during several years of experimenta
tion, the unreality of this whole notion is clear*

The non

neutral and evolving character of the real world is apparent
in all the life sciences, from the study of influenza viruses
to the study of coastline characteristics*
The problem of analyzing the meeting point of the social and
the physical in economic theory was approached to a remarkably
clear degree in the area of time analysis by Eugen von BohmBawerk in his analysis of productivity over time and the source of

7Q

Rogin, Leo, The Meaning and Validity of Economic Theory
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 195f>) ? pp* 11-12.
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interest.

Bohm-Bawerk approached the problem of the relation of

man to nature with a clear consideration of the basic setting
of his formulation.

He conceived human beings as physical or

ganisms in a physical world of great complexity with vast numbers
of forces and tendencies.

He brought this basic ontology or

metaphysics to bear on economic theory in his treatment of time
and the productive process as it influenced the exchange economy
through the market and the forces controlling exchange:
Man’s role in production is much more modest. It
consists simply in this — that he, himself a part of
the natural world, combines his personal powers with
the impersonal powers of nature, and combines them in
such a way that under natural law the co-operation re
sults in a definite, desired, material form. Thus,
notwithstanding the interference of man, the origin of
goods remains purely a natural process. The natural
process is not disturbed by man but completed, inas
much as, by apt intervention of his own natural powers,
he supplies a condition which has hitherto been wanting
to the origination of a material good.
If we look more closely at the way man assists ma
terial process, we find that his sole but ample contri
bution consists in the moving of things. fPutting
objects in motion’ is the idea which gives the key to
all human production and its results; to all man's
mastery over nature and its powers . . . And this is
so simply because the powers reside in the objects*
Now when man by his physical powers — the power of
moving things — is able to dictate where the objects
shall be, he obtains a control over the place at which
a natural power may become effective; and this means
broadly a control over the way and over the time in
which it may become effective
And:
The same considerations which show us the kind of
mastery man has over nature show us at the same time
the measure and the narrow limits of his mastery.^"1
Bohm-Bawerk, op. cit.. pp. 12-13*

^Ibid*. p. 15.
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Bohm-Bawerk1s principle of the "rou^i-about process of pro
duction” is developed in this same work and rests on this basic
approach to nature and resources.

The idea he presents is that

the longer the planning period over which a modicum of human
influence can be organized, the greater the control, and there
fore the more productive the effort will be per unit of time
spent.

He is quite explicit about the source of human influ

ence in nature being a result of man's ability to play one
natural force against another and to handle delicate balances
or critical reactions in such a way as to control how, when, and
where material reactions take place.

All these powers are multi

plied at a great rate by the less direct, or long-range approach,
the "round-about" approach.

This is the theory in the time dimen

sion that is dealt with as "economies of scale" in a lateral or
current quantitative level.
Moreover, Bohm-Bawerk carried this analysis further by dis
tinguishing between fact and social tendency.

The "Agio" of

psychological dominance of the present over the future leads the
exchange system to chronically undervalue the productive potential
of nature at any given state of the arts, and therefore the more
intelligent or daring achieve success by tapping the surplus pro
duced by the differential between the market view and the real
potential of nature, which may be exploited by lengthening the
planning period.

From the point of view of resource analysis,

this is a view which recognizes a static, self-defining circle of
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exchange but it incorporates a theory of progress* or a dynamic
based on the theory that an infinitely productive nature can be
tapped for a surplus which rewards the individual who breaks out
of the static equilibrium of exchange values which is always
tending toward tradition and habit.

This increment, interest

on capital, is a material product which can be brought into the
economy above and beyond the current gross material product,
rather than a market charge for the rent of money or exchange
value.
Inherent in this view is the idea that resource-value is
different from and exceeds market price.

This is a natural poten

tial theory of value subject to realization by the farsighted
through the round-about process of production.

It is a concept

of value outside the equilibrium of the market which he approached
in terms of utility.

His idea of the uniformity of utility ex

pressing itself through price laterally, from commodity to com
modity and vertically through time is a static concept of a
socially-defined equilibrium or closed circle of social values:
Applied to the competition of different classes of
wants this leads to the principle of harmonious satis
faction; by which is meant that, in all branches of
wants, satisfaction reaches down to the same level of
importance, so that, over the whole field, the unit of
goods procures the same marginal utility .
'
And further:
But we employ the very same principle of harmonious
satisfaction, for the same reasons, to regulate the com
petition between the wants of various times.^5
^2lbid., p. 413.
^ i b i d . , p. 4l4.

5k

This theory of the harmonization of utilities between different
goods in terms of their comparative want-satisfying qualities
and their harmonization over time periods into the future in
terms of their curve of decreasing importance to the subjective
reactions of the collective which composes the market is an in
herently static analysis.

It is the same concept involved in

all equilibrium analyses where economics is analyzed in terms
of the wants which create value and the supply which responds
to that same value, value or price being the expression of the
two factors and also their measure.
The possibilities of carrying the material analysis of
creative value in the "round-about process of production" into
its implications where differential creativities may exist on
both a lateral and temporal plane and an analysis of the details
of absorption of the material surplus into the economy constitute
an interesting and stimulating point of departure for resource
analysis in terms of the uniform abstraction of time.

The further

elaboration of this type of analysis into the lateral dimension
of space and economies of scale as another form of dynamic tech
nique and its relation to time offers a challenging field of in
vestigation.
The interesting aspect of Bohm-Bawerk's analysis is that he
approached natural process through his theory of capital, whereas
classical British political economists approached it in terms of
rent theory, and neo-classical British economists used a concept
of rent and quasi-rent as a definition of surplus without distinction
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between the potentially different sources of surplus —
product or social right.

physical

As long aSprice is equated to value

within a closed circle of analysis, there can be no economic
distinction between an increase in legal rights, of control over
the common term of exchange, money, and an increase resulting
from a physical expansion in quantity of useful goods.

This

does not distinguish between use value and exchange value in its
traditional form.

The problem is more one of how created values

immigrate into the circle of exchange and how various forms of
equilibrium analysis can be usefully correlated with various ap
proaches to physical analysis for successful application to
various types of problems which transcend individual profit in
an exchange system.
Current economic development theory gives a superficial in
dication of assimilating Bohm-Bawerk's time analysis by the "ex
post-ex ante" analysis which is in terminological vogue.

This

technique is the experimental pragmatism of the past half century,
by which the past and present and analyzed and projected into the
future deductively.

It, however, involves the same contradictions

of classical British political economy which assumes that the eco
nomic value of an item is the correct measure of its potential.
This is not what Bohm-Bawerk assumes.

He assumes that the poten

tial is infinite, beyond appraisal, and that social value is
chronically augmented by the disparity between individual recog
nition of potential beyond the social recognition.

In other words,

capital is productive because individuals can deviate from current
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exchange values and, by insight, gain a rewarding surplus.

As

soon as this is recognised in the market as an acceptable basis
of production, however, it becomes a part of the equilibrium of
exchange value, and is no longer productive in a perfectly com
petitive economy.

The reluctance to formulate a theory with

faith in the future, and the tendency to cling to the sole
reality of the most recent present is illustrated in the follow
ing discussion by Hamberg on the "ex post-ex ante" characterization
of time series analysis:
Besides examining the ex ante and ex post considera
tions of economic units, the economists themselves apply
corresponding considerations. By alternatively investi
gating the plans, on the basis of given data, and the
result of their realization in a certain period, includ
ing the effect of this result on data at the beginning
of the next period, we arrive at a deductive sequence
analysis . . . It may apply to individual firms as well
as to whole communities. If the analysis is concerned
with an actual current development, there will be the
possibility of an empirical renewal of data, gradually
as new experiences occur. These apply to current re
search in economic development, which at the same time
forms new pictures of reality and revises its basic
theory.^
The defect of this approach may be illustrated by a super
ficial analogy.

In spite of how closely a driver studies the

highway just behind his car, and no matter how imaginatively he
deductively reformulates his anticipation of the future in terms
of the demonstrable past, the road ahead is still real, and is
under no obligation to follow a deductive projection of the care
fully analyzed past except in very broad terms of physical neces-

^Hamberg, D., Economic Growth and Instability (New York,
W. W. Morton & Co., 1956'), p. 171.
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sity.
Modern economic theory rests very heavily on the assumption
that the laboratory of economic analysis is the setting in which
choice is made and the analysis and synthesis of the nature and
results of choice within the framework of the circle of exchange#
Despite the undeniable fact of progress in technology and under
standing, demand and supply make up the dimensions subject to
choice.

They are, essentially, summations of social purpose on

the one hand and technology and understanding on the other.

Any

given purpose, desire, or technology is part of a social or
cultural definition in terms of its own static relations.

Purely

physically defined resource variations, however, are a reality
constantly upsetting any equilibrium, and are always subject to
deviation from any deductive prediction, particularly those re
quiring tight mathematical precision as opposed to general princi
ples of character and tendency.

We must recognize that economic

theory can never be precise unless resources or natural phenomena
are made precise by being counterweighted or depreciated or ap
preciated to fit into a fixed quantitative relationship in a
deductively stable circle of static analysis.

This may give

stability in money terms, terms derived from this equilibrium,
but never stability in terms of food, population, standard of
living, or military potential.

The necessary degree of insta

bility inherent in a developing economy in the absence of perfect
concomitant price and profit adjustments at an instantaneous
rate to keep the economy in perfect tune with its physical bases

is illustrated by the following comments by Hamberg:
If resources (or any other factor of production)
fail to expand as rapidly as capital, then ceteris
paribus, diminishing returns to capital will set in.
Diminishing returns must affect the capital coeffi
cient and consequently, the value of the accelerator*
Thus, in addition to neutral technical progress . . •
the assumption of a constant capital coefficient and
accelerator entails one of two such explicit assump
tions: that diminishing returns to capital are
avoided through resource developments keeping pace
with capital accumulation., or that technological
progress offsets declines in marginal productivity ^r
to the extent that resource development lags behind, J
Though this discussion does not clearly distinguish between eco
nomic value and resource value or the concomitant relationship,
if any, it does indicate that there is no basis for anticipating
equilibrium and stability except in terms of either a social
compensation for physical changes, or a fortuitous natural com
pensation for social changes.
A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Resource Values
Up to this point, the discussion has not drawn careful lines
of definition between such frequently used terms as price, value",
usefulness, technology, resource, and raw material.

Essentially,

there are two ideas implicit in the parade of terms cited, namely,
social or economic importance, and physical character.

It is im

material whether people refer to "getting fair price for fair
value" or to the "sufficiency of raw materials to fulfill the re
source requirements" of an industry.
A comprehensive development of current economic theory and
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technique in the area of space has recently been published.
Much work on transportation, time and scale, and raw materials
is being done* 1+7

Economic development theory is being applied

to many problems involving such factors in hitherto undreamed
of social laboratories in underdeveloped countries*
At the present time, definitions and statistical surveys
clarify the elements of the problem at any given time and in any
given case, but they do not build constructively toward a body of
theory because of the lack of a body of perspectives to give
broader meaning to particularized problems.

The blossoming of

our technical industrial economy has led to a tremendous burden
of social elaboration which involves expansions in training and
education, government and business organizations, and a timing
or synchronization of a multiplicity of simultaneous processes
which must mesh to guarantee smooth operation of the complex
machine that is our modern industrial society.

As purposes be

come more involved and specialization increases, the tendency
to relate problems back to general theory may lapse because of
the barriers to communication which tend to be built up between
specialized fields.

Too often, we are approaching new problems

with new specialized understanding but relying on an outmoded
concept of the relationships between our work and that of others.

^Ponsard, Claude, Economie et Espace: Essai d*integration
du facteur spatial dans 1 1analyse economique (Paris: Observation
Economique VIII, Sedes, 1956).
^?Isard, Walter, Location and Space-Economy (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1956). Isard considers natural resources neutral.
He treats space primarily in terms of transportation costs with
emphasis on geographical regions as units for a moving equilibrium analysis.
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This has tended to occur in economics between the areas of re
search in raw materials and standards of living on the one hand,
and exchange and value theory on the other.

Adding to the body

of definition will contribute little more than re-phrasing ac
cepted analysis of old problems in a changing situation.

The

need is for a more comprehensive conceptual framework which can
systematically include the body of analysis which has been de
veloped in western Europe and the United States in the last
century and a half.
One of the most effective steps toward new ideas is through
an examination of the old ones.

This is not to suggest that his

tory repeats itself, or that absolutely nothing new is ever
thought up.

However, the recorded ideas of exceptional minds

are full of perspectives that were either functionally meaningless
or socially unacceptable at the time they were propounded.

We

are also less likely to be awed with the veneration of current
ideas when we examine their childhood.
The history of thought concerning raw materials is particu
larly rich because our civilization has been carrying us further
and further away from a fairly recent epoch of almost total de
pendence upon the superficially abundant aspects of nature which
were subject to wasteful exploitation.

Although the area has

shrunk in its all-pervasive importance, the concomitant latitude
of choice with respect to human life has greatly enlarged.

Planned

or'Calculated individual and political choices have become character
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ized as economic problems.

However, these choices still rest

on a complex foundation of natural potential and exist in a
background of cultural tradition.

Culture may he only the

memory and confinement of the structures, physical and social,
of yesterday's choices.

The physical world is, on the other

hand, not dependent upon man for existence, although it is in
fluenced by him.

The physical world provides the changing

setting for man's choices, and is possibly one of the stimuli
for cultural or economic change.
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PART II
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS
Most discussions of the development of economic thought
begin with the writers of the eighteenth century, usually the
Physiocrats in France or Adam Smith in Scotland*

There is,

however, no dispute regarding the prior existence of economic
problems, or the prior existence of recorded thought concerning
such problems.
The ancient Greeks lived in a more complex society than we
tend to ascribe to them#

Moreover, they not only developed the

first recorded strides in theory applied to social and physical
problems;

they took a further step and developed methodology,

or the theory of how to derive, develop, or formulate theories*
They applied theory to their important problems, and it has
only been the assumption that they had no important economic
problems which has permitted the neglect of their economic
thought*
Interest in the classical world has grown beyond the con
fines of moral philosophy as archeological evidence has accumu
lated over the past century.

This evidence pictures the Greek

civilization vastly different from the formerly prevalent view
that the Greeks lived in a predominantly agricultural community
with only insignificant commercial activities*

It is now known

that the Greeks carried on large-scale commercial colonization,
extensive shipping, and industrial production in certain areas,
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not without attendant comples political and economic problems.
The records of this commercial activity and the methods of
dealing with the problems engendered by it have been filtered
through successive epochs of thought and economic orientation.
The Roman administrators, the Arab scientists, and the European
monasteries kept what they deemed valuable through storjay periods
of war and cultural change.

Later, the widespread commercial ac

tivities of the Italian city states revived interest in the cor
relation of science and philosophical speculation.

Leonardo da

Vinci's breadth of interests during this period was on a plane
with those of Archimedes and Aristotle.
That the Greek material which has survived has been mainly
that of the Socratic philosophers was given by A. A. Trever as
a reason for the supposed paucity of Greek economic thought:
Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative
unimportance of Greek economic thought is usually not
emphasized. It is the patent fact that almost our
only extant sources are the Socratic philosophers, who
represent avowedly a direct moral reaction against the
commercial spirit and money-greed of their age* Thus
the limited development of Greek economics, so far
from being an evidence of primitive economic conditions
in Greece, is a direct argument for the opposite.

Trever, A. A., A History of Greek Economic Thought (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 191^") § p. 21 • Trever's work is an ex
haustive collection of discussions in the surviving Greek literature
from the bibliographic point of view, but it presses the analysis of
the theory represented by these discussions into a rigid Ricardian
framework spiced with John Ruskin. The rich ore awaiting a modern
theorist in this field will require both an imaginative receptivity
to theoretical ideas and training in classical languages to re
translate much of the material in light of a fuller understanding
of its implications for economic history and theory. Without this
latter qualification, precise study and analysis is wasted on am
biguous phrasing in modern languages which can never do more than
roughly approximate the fine lines of theoretical discussion char
acteristic of the Greek philosophical tradition.
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Some of the fundamental differences between ancient Greek
and modern western European traditions and the social pattern of
Greek civilization must be briefly examined before surveying the
economic thought of the Greeks*
Literary Sources of Greek Economic Thought
A first consideration is the character of the literary rem
nants on which we rely*

Most of this material comes from the

fifth and fourth centuries B.C., from Socrates to Aristotle, with
subsequent commentaries.

Thi-s constitutes, the late Hellenic

period, i.e., ancient Greece prior to the death of Alexander the
Great in 521 B.C.

The literature of the subsequent Hellenistic

period, during which Greek culture was a.-.■■major influence from the
Indus to the Nile and up into the steppes of south Russia, was
largely ignored by the early Christian scholars, but the Arabs
utilized the scientific literature from this period.

Of course,

many fragments and exceptions discolor this generalization.

How

ever, our concern is with the pre-Socratic scientific material
and the Socratic and Aristotelian theorists.

From the writings

of Homer and Hesiod in the eighth century B.C. to the middle of
the fifth century B.C., the major writings were in the form of
poetry*

The impression one gets is that their preservation was

a result of form rather than the content, except for fragments
from the quotations and paraphrasings of the systematic "reviews
of the literature" in the Aristotelian type of discussion.
The Socratic and Platonic dialogue and the Aristotelian texts

65

were developed as seminar reports in Plato’s Academy and in
class notes from Aristotle’s lectures (the latter delivered while
the teacher strolled briskly, followed by his students).

The

copies of the careful discussions and often quibbling definitions
of the Platonic dialogues and their style were designed for re
use as teaching guides in an educational system that was pri
marily oral.

Aristotle’s texts, which require careful scholarship

to determine which parts are original and which were added by
later students "revising their notes," constitute an exhaustive
and well-rounded summary of theory on the subject of social rela
tionships in which politics and ethics are the two primary
disciplines.

Since most Greek economic exchange was regulated

by city ordinance, much of what we would call economic theory
today was expounded under legal and political theory, and the
rest was considered ethics.
Some Differences in Ancient Greek And
Western European Traditions

*

Another aspect of importance in understanding Greek thought
is the role of the citizenry in a tightly-knit city state with a
patriarchal or family philosophy of mutual obligation.

Although

this outlook excluded the growing number of slaves during the
sixth and fifth centuries B.C., it nevertheless was the founda
tion for a sense of civic duty to the full citizen to an extent
that its influence is difficult to understand today.

Part of

this was the military perspective of the Greek citizen.

Rostovt-
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zeff commented on the patriarchal and military aspects of Greek
civilization as follows:
Thus, the first duty encumb&nt on every Greek city
was to guarantee its citizens an adequate supply of
food for consumption and of metals and other materials
for the manufacture of tools and weapons and for ship
building. As regards military equipment it must be
remembered that war was endemic in Greece, and that
one of- the most urgent needs of an adult citizen was
to provide himself with a good panoply. His safety
and efficiency in war, as well as his social standing,
depended largely on this.2
When we consider that the equestrian or cavalry class was
composed largely of the nobility or agricultural aristocracy,
the heavily-armored infantry of the city merchants, and the mass
of the infantry and sailors of the urban and rural poor, we can
begin to understand how deeply ingrained was military status as
a symbol of economic position in the fabric of Greek political
life.

One can imagine the argument that arose during the fifth

century when Athenian power rested upon the strength of her
navy manned by the rural poor, with weapons furnished by the
state.

Without private ownership of weapons and accompanying

status, how could men be expected to take care of their equipment,
or feel a sense of individualistic duty in warfare?
A further contrast in the ancient world as compared with
our own was the relation of science and philosophy to the
democratic movement in the commercial city states and the eastern
Mediterranean.

2

The individualistic nature of war, trade, and

Bostovtzeff, M., The Social and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World. Vol. I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 19'4lY*
pp. 91-92.
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political power gave knowledge of a practical character a pre
mium on influence, and secrecy surrounded most knowledge of
navigation and cartography, as well as engineering and other
crafts and skills#
During the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., commercial ac
tivity and skilled craftsmanship on a large scale produced a
democratic ferment among the impoverished and displaced peasantry
who still retained full citizenship.

With the development of

large-scale commerce, secrecy became impossible, and the ex
ploitation of practical information and knowledge of a factual
nature had to be approached by exploiting the time factor.

Ex

ploitation of trade opportunities and material resources before
anyone else rather than secretly became a part of commercial
life*
The agricultural aristocracy managed to retain their wealth
by using slave labor on large estates for the production of olive
oil and wine for commerce, but they lost their position of social
leadership and respect.

Political individualism was being de

nounced, and the reaction of the nobility was to resort to per
sonal self-improvement

and moral justification.

The writings of

Heraclitus around 500 B.C. illustrate the view of the aristocratic
scientist and intellectual toward the army of sailors, potters,
smiths, and small traders who had no respect for individual no
bility of person, but rather concerned themselves with fair
grain prices and political rights.

These democrats seemed in

satiably greedy for material improvements.

Moreover, the aris-
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tocracy found that the Homeric tradition and Hesiod's writings
from the eighth century treated both the aristocrats and the
gods as petty, self-indulgent beings deserving of no honor and
respect not required by fear'of their physical power*

Heraclitus

wrote of the times:
The Ephesians deserve to be hanged, every one that
is a man grown, and the youth to abandon the city, for
they cast out Hermodorus the best man among them,
saying:— Let no one among us be best, and if one be
best, let him be so elsewhere and among others*
For what sense or understanding have they? They
follow the bards and employ the crowds as their teacher,
not knowing that many are bad and few good* For the
very best choose one thing before all others, immortal
glory among mortals, while the masses eat their fill
like cattle*5
The aristocracy suffered from the reputation their fore
fathers had built through several centuries of abuse and injustice.
In defense, they studied high-minded morality and the principles
of ethical conduct, as well as the nature of the world and the
purpose of human activity, concluding that the leadership of the
new self-denying, duty-conscious nobleman looking toward chronic
warfare to build character was the hope of the self-indulgent mob*
Far from being useless, however, this emphasis on knowledge and
moral reflection brought together all the available factual data,
and produced the basis for a surge of intellectual activity
which transcended its aloof parentage*

Windelband summed up

^Smith, T. F., Philosophers Speak For Themselves (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 193*OV p* 12.
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the importance of this period of speculation:
The emphasis falls primarily upon the lifting of
mere knowing to the plane of systematic knowledge, or
science. Not content with his storing of practical
facts, and with his fantastic speculations born of
his religious needs, the Greek sought knowledge for
its own sake. Knowledge, like art, was developed as
an independent function from its involvement in the
other activities of civilization. So, first and
foremost, the history of ancient philosophy is an
^
insight into the origin of European science in general.
There are two aspects of Greek life and scholarship which
pertain to their analysis of economic resources.

The first of

these is the advanced body of social forms built up to handle re
sources.

In some senses, these forms and their problems are

dramatically modern;
different.

in others, they are almost unintelligibly

Secondly, the types of mathematical and logical gen

eralizations with which Greek scholars dealt with problems in
parallel fields concerning which we have more data, and their
view of the applicability of forms of generalization from one
field to another may be helpful in providing a background for
understanding their economic ideas.

A brief survey of some as

pects of classical Greek economic history of the sixth through
the fourth centuries B.C. with a view toward understanding the
setting in which the fragmentary writings on economic theory re
lating to resources are to be interpreted follows*

Zj.
W&ndelband, W., History of Ancient Philosophy (New York:
Charles Scribner1s Sons, 190o), p . 1 ^Translated from the
Second German Edition by Herbert E. Cushman). Italics mine.

70

Early Economic History
The economic life of the eastern Mediterranean must be
viewed as a continuous process of growth and development over a
long period of time.

Because historians until quite recently-

relied largely upon the extant writings of Greek historians
such as Herodotus and Thucydides, the tendency has been to look
upon the Greek civilization as an isolated surge of development
unrelated to other cultures.

From archeological and other evi

dence, however, it is known that the commercial civilization on
the island of Crete during the second millennium B.C., the Minoan
civilization, and the Babylonian civilization built on irrigated
agriculture and the caravan routes across Asia Minor during the
same period, had accumulated a vast body of knowledge on which
we unfortunately have little detailed information or documenta
tion.
Of the Babylonian civilization, which had terminal caravan
cities on the Mediterranean coasts and a strange theocratic eco
nomic system where vast treasuries of the religious temples pro
vided the commercial capital for extensive banking and trading
projects, Rostovtzeff wrote:
Babylonia, with its long established civilization,
its highly developed agriculture, industry, commerce,
and banking, had a most complex and highly differentiated
structure • • • Centralization, planning, and control were
during thousands of years the salient features of its
economic evolution.5

^Rostovtzeff, M., op. cit♦, p. ?8.
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During the first half of the first millennium B.C. the
Phoenicians carried on the trade of the eastern Mediterranean.
The relation of the Phoenician ports to the Babylonian caravan
trade and to the Minoan island commerce of Crete, whose numerous
colonies were probably going into business for themselves as the
Cretan empire fell, provides a suggestion of the heritage of the
eastern Mediterranean.
We know that seventh-century Ionian Greek cities like Miletus
and Chalcis had long traded with settlements near the Black Sea
for metals and peltry, and it is suggestive that the archeologically documented Trojan War of Homer's Iliad of the early twelfth
century B.C. involved a city dominating the gateway to the Black
Sea at a point where the traders' galleys frequently camped wait
ing for favorable winds and currents.

Jason's search for the

Golden Fleece led him: into the same country.
As an illustration of the state of commerce in the seventh
century, it is worth noting that Nechos, Pharoah of Egypt from
610 to 59^ B.C., spent considerable effort in the latter part of
his reign in furthering an old project to build a canal from the
Nile Delta to the Red Sea.

The project was abandoned on the

advice of his hydrographers, who contended that the level of the
Red Sea was higher than that of the Mediterranean, and that the
fertile delta would be flooded by such a canal.

Around 596 B.C.

Rechos built a fleet and commissioned a force of Phoenician ad
venturers to circumnavigate Africa.

They started down the Red
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Sea and returned three years later through the Strait of Gibraltar,
g
having stopped seasonally to make a crop of grain for provisions.
The Ionian Greek city of Miletus at the mouth of the Maeander
River in Asia Minor was the leading commercial city near the
Aegean Sea during the seventh century B.C.

By the middle of the

seventh century, she was the parent of over sixty colonies in
the Black Sea area, and the lands between lying on the route.
The mainland Greek city of Corinth was among the earliest promi
nent Greek cities engaged in commerce with the Black Sea in the
east, and Italy and Sicily in the west.

At Corinth, ships were

dragged across the isthmus for a distance of five miles either
way on a skidway from the Aegean to the Adriatic, thereby saving
over two hundred miles of coasting around the Peloponnesos.
This trade stimulated craftsmanship with specialisation
among the coastal cities in bronze work, cloth manufacture,
pottery, and shipbuilding.

In the eighth century Hesiod com-

mented on the development of competition between artisans7 and
g

advised the raising of only one son.

This period was one of

expanding agricultural populations and increased manufacturing
for export.

The extensive introduction; of local coinage of

money in the commercial city states and the importation of grain

6

Breasted, James H>, A History of Egypt (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1910), p.
n

Trever, op. cit.. p. 14*
O
Myres, John L., Geographical History in Greek Lands
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 172-208"!!
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from the colonies in southern Russia stimulated the growth of
urban commerce#

The establishment of trading posts, or colonies,

became very important to even the less commercial cities like
Athens*

Linforth wrote of the period:

The general character of the seventh and sixth
centuries in the history of Greece is well known*
It was an age of colonization, of rapidly growing
commerce, of sudden riches and sudden losses. The
old traditional life of isolated Greek communities
was undergoing a transformation: the old noble
families embarked on new enterprises of money making;
the lower classes saw opportunities for advancement
which did not depend on the ownership of the soil.
The mass of the people began to be aware of hopes
and possibilities which had never before entered
their heads. The world was suddenly opened to them.
A spirit of adventure, an eagerness for a larger
and fuller life marked the whole age.9
An illustration of the extent of individualistic trading during
this period is provided by the trade across Asia between the
Scythians on the Black Sea and Mongol tribes with access to a
supply of gold at China’s back door.

Some fragments of a poem

by Aristeas from the seventh or sixth century indicate that a
Greek trader had travelled by land almost to the borders of north
China.

According to the poem, he brought back reports of the

Hyperboreans, who lived behind the north wind in settled agri
cultural communities with a temperate sea beyond them.^^
There is ample historical material on the pattern of com-

^Linforth, Ivan M., Solon The Athenian (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1919), p. 50*
■^See G. F. Hudson, Europe and China (London: Edward Arnold 8c
Co., 1931)* PP* 27-32 for a discussion of the extent of inland
trade across Asia during this period.
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mercial evolution in the city states of Greece as they wended
a stormy course between democratic and aristocratic principles*
Some of the best detail and earliest economic thought is pro
vided by the poems and legends of Solon, who was made Archon
of Athens around 39b B*C*

Solon's role in Athens is significant

because the economic situation in Athens at the time was char
acteristic of many Greek cities during the preceding century,
and of many more for two centuries to come*
In brief, Athens was situated close to the coast in a rather
poor agricultural district with a rapidly expanding population
which had evolved from herding to cereal production.

The in

habitants came in contact with traders of various countries and
commerce developed.

With the introduction of wealth in the form

of silver and gold coins which could be accumulated and con
cealed, the nobility began putting their poorer lands into
vineyards and olive groves to provide a cash crop.

The poor

found willing lenders of cash during the all too frequent years
of poor grain harvest in Attica, the district around Athens,
and debt became a social problem.

We cannot know the exact sys

tem of land tenure, but with the nobility controlling the judicial
structure, and with personal or physical liability for debt,
large tracts of land were being acquired by the rich from dis
possessed peasants and converted into vineyards, for which it was
best suited.

The peasants who lost their land through debt were

sold into slavery abroad, reduced to serfdom or slavery at home,

75

or forced into the city to join the labor force with produced
goods for export.

Many migrated to the colonies to get a new

start.
The political turmoil brought Solon to power.

His poems

describing the situation provide an economic perspective of
theoretical import.

Solon believed in a moral justice that

would triumph in the end, an idea similar to the old Homeric
notion of "Fate” which was preordained, and beyond the control
of the gods.

In Homer’s Iliad, Zeus weighed the "fates” of

Hector and Achilles on a balance to see which would be victor
ious.

Solon believed in a natural equilibrium of justice or

moral right that would emerge if given time.

Toward that end,

if political and economic forces were balanced so that nothing
would occur too rapidly, the process would permit natural reason
and stable legal government to prevail.

The following passages

from one of the longest fragments of Solon's poems are worth
quoting because of their economic description, and their funda
mental welding of economic, political, and legal problems into
one single problem of ethical and natural policy:
The ruin of our state will never come by the doom
of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal
gods . . . It is the townsfolk themselves and their
falsehearted leaders who would fain destroy our great
city through wantonness and love of money. But they
are destined to suffer sorely for their outrageous be
havior. They know not how to hold in check their fullfed lust, or, content with the merriment the banquet
affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in order.
They are rich because they yield to the temptation of
dishonest courses . . . They spare neither the treasures
of the gods nor the property of the state, and steal like
brigands one from another. They pay no heed to the
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unshaken rock of holy justice, who, though she be
silent, is aware of all that happeneth now or hath
happened in the past, and in course of time, surely
cometh to demand retribution. Lo, even now there
cometh upon the whole city a plague which none may
escape. The people have come quickly into degrading
bondage; and war destroyeth many in the beauty of
their youth. As if she were the prey of foreign
foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and con
sumed in those secret conspiracies which are the de
light of dishonest men.
These are the evils which stalk at home. Mean
while, the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded
with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign
lands . . . Thus public calamity cometh to the house
of every individual, and a man is no longer safe within
the gates of his own court . . .
In the latter part of the same poem, Solon continues:
These things ray heart prompteth me to teach the
Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness
worlceth more harm to the state than any other cause.
But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony,
and at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers;
it maketh rough things smooth, it checketh inordinate
desires, it dimmeth the glare of wanton pride and
withereth the budding bloom of wild delusion; it
maketh crooked judgements straight and softeneth ar
rogant behavior; it stoppeth acts of sedition and
stoppeth the anger of bitter strife. Under the reign
of law, sanity and wisdom prevail ever among men.1-*Solon was a military hero and a poet of great repute.

He

was an aristocrat, but he had travelled widely as a merchant, and
he sympathized with the lower classes.

His reputation was largely

gained from his defiance of a ban on discussion of Salomis by re
citing a hundred-line poem in the market place of Athens, and
thereby winning the leadership of a military expedition.

We

do not know the circumstances surrounding this event, but he

^ Linf orth, op. cit., pp. 140-1^3*
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apparently defied a death penalty in criticizing a decision of
the governing body of Athens*
Solon was made Archon for one year with extraordinary powers
to reorganize the constitution of Athens about 59^ B.C.

The

respect of the lower classes for his courage and honesty, and
the respect of the more reflective element of the aristocracy
which trusted his version of reason and morality led to this
individualistic approach to reform.

It took place in an epoch

when popular revolts were setting up tyrannies in many of the
Greek commercial cities*

These tyrannies were Napoleonic af

fairs, forceful seizures of power by democratic elements which,
lacking an organizational tradition, resorted to personal dic
tatorships.
of Athens.

Apparently Solon could have taken the tyranny
However, since the aristocracy knew he did not be

lieve in it, they preferred to grant him extra authority to
stabilize their position with as few sacrifices as necessary.
Backed by a set of emergency decrees designed to avert
revolution, Solon set aside all debts for which the liberty of
the individual was security, liberated slaves r/.wh©/; had been
reduced to that status through seizures for debt, and apparently
used public money to re-purchase citizens who had been sold
abroad.

During the term of his office, Solon revised the legal

structure and broadened the franchise.

However, class quali

fications for office holding were retained.

He developed a

system of judicial referendum which enabled the popular vote to
be the ultimate authority in judicial decisions.

The democratic
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process was successfully served by the custom of trying elected
officials at the end of their term of office.

Therefore, in

general, although representation was poor, the moral and states
manlike characteristics of the nobility were stimulated by a
kind of negative democracy.

This seems to have been Solon’s

answer to the problem of providing educated and trained leader
ship with a democratic sense of responsibility.

It is the

institution of regulation as applied in economic matters in
modern western European economic and industrial affairs.
Solon’s understanding of the course of economic development
is evidenced by his attempt to stop the abuses of the decaying
agricultural system.

At the same time, he took steps to stimu

late the growth of the commercial and industrial enterprises
which offered a means of providing for the unemployed and desti
tute.

His major acts in this direction were the minting of

Athenian silver coins and the adoption of the system of weights
and measures prevalent in the Aegean commercial basin to replace
the mainland system.

While the mina was the same in both systems,

the new system equated the mina to one hundred drachmae instead
of seventy drachmae as in the old system.

This had the effect of

creating inflation at the lower levels of the economy.

Indica

tions are that it was designed to reduce by thirty percent fixed
money rentals and charges and secured debts among the lower in
come groups where the amounts were specified in drachmae.
After Solon’s archonship, there ensued in Athens over thirty
years of fairly well balanced strife while she forged her new
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commercial orientation.

Solon, apparently dissatisfied with the

lesson ir. organization and collective action learned by the citi
zens of Athens, left a post-mortem in another poetic fragment:
If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of
your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil for
tune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men
to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this
course to a wretched state of servitude. Each man
among you, individually, walketh with the tread of a
fox, but collectively ye are a set of simpletons. For
ye look to the tongue and the play of a man’s speech
^
and regard not the deed which is done before your eyes.
This sarcasm was directed to the aristocracy who had the
power to elect the civic leadership.

The tyranny finally came in

560 B.C., but it came through Pisistratus, a kinsman of Solons,
and a man who understood Solon’s economic program.

He exiled the

most incorrigible landowners and redistributed their estates to
the landless, introduced viticulture on a large scale, and pro
vided government loans at low interest rates to facilitate the
transformation of the smaller holdings into olive orchards and
vineyards to further the more profitable export trade. 13

Athenian

exports grew, her industry expanded, her common people prospered
and became the backbone of her strength as she emerged as a mari
time power.
For fifty years after Pisistratus, Athens was ruled by
tyrants dependent upon the full mobilization of popular support

~*~^Ibid. . pp. lMf-1k5% Fragment XIV.
13

Marsh, Frank Burr, Modern Problems in the Ancient World
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 19^3T, p. 27* Also see Chapt.
Iy "Solon and the ’New Deal'," pp. 14-28, and Chapt. II, "Unem1

v j UT7U v

a w i i

4

ciuU

T j r r t t r » o 1

Xiiijy v x

4

B f«

g

ft

_

8o

to recapture control on several occasions.

Chronic warfare

increased in scale, and Persia closed in around the eastern
Mediterranean, conquering Egypt and crossing sporadically into
the base of the Grecian peninsula.

Finally, with the island

and coastal cities of the Aegean threatened by Persia, Athens
put all her state resources into a navy, and defeated the Per
sians in a naval battle in 480 B.C.

Combined with the dis

covery of silver at Laurion on the Attic peninsula near Athens
in 483 B.C., this development made Athens the commercial empress
of the Aegean.
In 4-7? B.C. the Confederacy of Delos was established under
the leadership of Athens.

Sparta, the strongest military land

force in the Grecian world, had no economic interest in the Per
sian empire beyond her own grain fields, but Athens had a dual
use for her fleet.

The fleet was to give mobility and protect

the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor and the islands.

It

partially maintained itself by piratical raids on Persian terri
tory along the coasts.

With protection, many smaller cities

preferred to pay cash dues to Athens and to let Athens provide
the ships and men to man them.

The peacetime fleet offered

cheap transportation for goods and stimulated trade by securing
14
navigation against all but the hazards of the weather.
Athens had now grown to a commercial center with colonies
in Sicily, southern Italy, southern Russia, and the coasts and

"^See J. B. Bury, A History of Greece (London: Macmillan & Co.,
Ltd., 1956), p. 328 ff., on the Confederacy of Delos.
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islands ringing the Aegean to which she could dispatch armies
on short notice.

Her silver coins with the owl on one side and

the goddess Athena on the other were the common currency of the
Mediterranean..

These coins were made from the produce of the

silver mines in the rocky ridges of Laurion where an estimated
labor force of from twelve to sixty thousand slaves worked on
a ten-hour day producing silver and lead for Athens. 1 5
A census of Athens in byi B.C. gave a population figure of
172,000 freemen and 1^2,500 slaves and metics (resident alien
craftsmen and merchants).

The census was fortunately taken just

prior to the subsequent plagues and the Peloponnesian Wars which
wrecked the Athenian empire.

This total population of 31*f,500

was not by any stretch of the imagination maintained by local
produce.

Practically all grain was imported, primarily from the

large number of colonies in south Bussia, and another major
staple, fish, was imported from the rivers of the same region. 17
Trade was atomized to a degree beyond our experience, with the
state controlling capital investment where large sums and
material quantity were important.

15
^See George M. Calhoun, The Business Life of Ancient Athens
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 135-172 for a
discussion of all aspects of the mines, the blighted industrial
districts of Athens, the regulated grain trade, and banking.
■^Bostovtzeff, op. cit., p. 96.
17Xbid., pp. 105-106.
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Athenian power was dependent upon the democracy, and her
control over the members of the confederation became nearly ab
solute by denying the right of secession.

Democratic parties

were supported over the agricultural-minded aristocracy which
feared the growth of commerce and Athenian domination.

The

policy of the state under these democracies was to permit small
business to flourish by regulating trade and fragmenting com
mercial processes so as to prevent monopoly and the growth of
an economic opportunity for the aristocrats to dominate commerce
with their agricultural wealth.
For example, most ships were owned by one man, or by partners,
leased by a merchant or captain under a bottomry contract which
provided for twenty to thirty percent interest, but did not re
quire payment if the vessel were lost at sea.

This combination of

marine insurance and short-term capital was provided by third
parties specializing in such operations, not by banks.

The mer

chant or captain could sublet cargo space on the vessel, and on .
return, the cargo was held by the financier for repayment.

How

ever, the merchant was responsible for sale of the merchandise.
In the case of grain, no grain wholesaler could buy or have in
his possession at one time more than fifty measures of grain,
which prevented anyone from cornering the market.
Athens reached the climax of her wealth and artistic achieve
ments under Pericles just prior to the Peloponnesian IVars of 431
to 401 B.C., and this period of warfare broke her control over
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the export markets of the Greek world.

However, her technology

and science as well as her prosperity continued throughout the
following century.

Socrates and Plato are remembered as the

intellectual giants of the latter part of the fifth century and
extending into the fourth.

During the Peloponnesian War the

colonies, probably long able, seized the opportunity to become
industrial exporters in their own right.

Athens traded power

with Sparta until the land and sea powers of mainland Greece
were neutralized in dual defeat, although Sparta, the land power,
nominally won.

Fourth-century Greece produced Aristotle and

Alexander the Great, and provided the cultural and technologi
cal impetus of the post-Alexandrian period.

Bostovtzeff wrote

of the economic life of this period:
After the Peloponnesian War, the ceaseless wars of
of early fourth century, and the repeated political and
social revolutions within the cities, the economic aspect
of Greece completely changed. Though still prosperous
and still increasing and improving her agricultural and
industrial production, Greece was now passing through
an economic and social crisis which gradually became
more acute . . .
The economic and social life of the time was marked
by two dominant features: the lapse of the mass of
the population into proletarianisra and, closely con
nected therewith, the growth of unemploymentj and
secondly a shortage of foodstuffs, which sometimes as
sumed an acute and catastrophic form.1®
This period of ferment produced the mature economic thought

l8Ibid., p.

9b
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of the Greek world.

Because of its traditions, social philosophy

was included in the study of politics and ethics, but as will be
apparent in our discussions of Xenophon and Aristotle, the area
of relationships specifically related to production and commerce
on an abstract level was recognized.

The economic setting is

clearly suggestive of very modern problems.

Before examining

the theories of Xenophon and Aristotle, it will be necessary to
survey in a cursory manner the intellectual history and theoretical
setting in which the economic ideas of the fourth century in
Greece were developed.
Early Natural and Social Philosophy
In the Preface to his compendium of the mass of ignored,
overlooked, and scattered data which gives ample contradiction to
the idea that the ancient Greeks were mere speculators and made
few scientific advances, Morris Cohen wrote:
The notion that natural science began in the seven
teenth century with Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, or
perhaps in the sixteenth with Copernicus, and that the
Greeks were mere speculators and the medieval thinkers
all sunk in theology and superstition is not merely an
established popular error; it has become a basic dogma
of modernistic philosophy and is even shared by some
professional historians. This error is largely sup
ported by the prevailing type of specialized education,
which trains students of nature to look at things ex
clusively from the point of view of current conceptions
and does not sufficiently equip them with philological
or historical methods to investigate how the world ap
peared to men at other times.^9
Clagett's recent work adds substance to the idea that the

^Cohen, Morris !<• and I. E. Drabkin, A Source Book in
Greek Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc•, 1948), p. vii.
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Greeks did indeed make a significant contribution to the develop
ment of science.

Regarding the contributions of the Greeks to

the structure of scientific theory, Clagett said:
Initially we must insist upon the general 'rational,'
critical, often secular and nonmythological tone that
the natural philosophers of the pre-Socratic period
gave to much of Greek thought and science. • •
Another distinctive feature of Greek thought that
emerged during the first period (600-^00 B.C.) was
the basic concept of a 'generalized' science as dis
tinguished from a set of empirical rules.
Clagett cited the development of geometry as characteristic of
this early period, but in dealing with the later Hellenistic
period when Alexandria was the center of Greek culture and sci
ence, he criticised Hero's ideas on experimental method contained
in his work on vacuums, observing that "it falls short in the
maturity and universality of its use of mathematical-experimental
techniques*"

21

Clagett characterized the Greek development of

optics as an example of the near-establishment of a completely
modern science since in this field empirical relationships were
analyzed and formulated mathematically, permitting theoretical
manipulation of the possibilities consistent with the experimental
evidence, even though the causes were not fully understood.
Characteristic of the beginnings of Greek science was a
naturalism and cosmological orientation which led the philosophers

20

Clagett, Marshall, Greek Science in Antiquity (New York:
Abelard-Shuman, Inc., 1955T, PP* 22-23,
21Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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to associate nature and man and physical and social processes
together as facets of a single universe.

Cherniss observed:

■From the sixth century E.C. Greek thinkers were
obsessed by the desire to establish relations among
all the entities and events of which they had cogni
zance*^
In reference to the pre-Socratic philosophers he continued:
Of their works we have only exiguous fragments and
reports at secondhand or third; but evidence enough
exists to show that even the Ionians, the earliest of
the 'pre-Socratics,' were not exclusively 'natural
historians' or 'physiologers' and that probably all ~
and certainly some ~ of them treated the physical :
origin of things as only the first chapter in their
investigation of the causes of the world of men in
which they l i v e d . ^3
Pre-Socratic thought, occuring as it did before philosophy
became involved and detailed to the point of requiring a special
ized vocabulary and formal background, reveals the clear roots
of the dominant formulations of even modern social and physical
thought.

Our understanding of the naked structure of theory is

improved and made easier to criticize.

According to W&ndelband:

The beginnings of scientific life that are thus
found in ancient philosophy are most influential upon
the entire development that follows. With proportion
ately few data, Greek philosophy produced, with a kind
of grand simplicity, conceptual forms for the intellectual
elaboration of its facts, and with a remorseless logic
it developed every essential point of view for the study
of the universe. Therein consists the peculiar char
acter of ancient thought and the high didactic signi
ficance of its history.2^
^ C h e r n i s s , Harold, "The History of Ideas and Ancient Greek
Philosophy," in Studies in Intellectual History by Boas and others
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933)* p. 22.

25Ibid.j p. 23
24
Windelband, op. cit.. p. 2.
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^ ---At -the-beginning of "this discussion, it is worthwhile to
note that Greek religious tradition had a rather open moral code
which revolved around, or within, a concept- of moderation.

The

principle tended to be that, given the extreme choices of be
havior, one could not go too far v/rong if he chose the inter
mediate course.

There was no necessary valuation of the

extremes as to how far they were from the moral mean, but rather,
whatever it happened to be, the "median" had a moral value.
This is the background for a habit of thinking in terms of an
equilibrium, or in terms of opposites as a way of formulating
problems.

We can also recognize in this moral tradition the

concept of equilibrium out of which logic grew, equating terms,
and subsequently the use of equations in detailizing problems
to give formulations that made known relationships applicable
to specific problems.

We do not know the age or the roots of

this pattern of thought nor its relationship to earlier mathe
matics.
The Ionian Nature Philosophers
The Ionian nature philosophers of Miletus were the first re
corded thinkers in our tradition.

They were Thales, probably

from 640 B.C. to 5^-8 B.C. and, according to tradition, a personal
friend of Solon;

Anaximander, probably 610 B.C., who left a

treatise behind;

and Anaximenes, 585 to

B.C.

25

^5see T. V. Smith, op. cit.. pp. 5-69. For general treatments
of the pre-Socratic period, see W. Wendelband, op. cit., and W. T.
Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co•, 1952),pp. 3*91•
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Thales is reported to have formulated a theory of the nature
of all things that involved a vast circulation with water or li
quidity as the common form, or equilibrium state.

He was aware

of the cycle of evaporation and precipitation, which he associated
with springs and silting at river mouths.

He assumed the gaseous

and solid states to be extremes in the circulatory system of
liquids, or water, but water was the basic stuff of nature, in
his view.

This approach is an important beginning because it

excludes all mystical or superstitious causes, and prepares the
way for observation and measurement as the avenues toward
scientific knowledge.

However, it is his ideas on circulation

and equilibrium which will interest us.
A surviving fragment of Anaximander's work indicates that
he abstracted his views from the simple physical elements, and
believed in a natural order or balance within circulatory systems
and between them, which he believed constituted a natural princi
ple which had application in natural morality and justice.

The

following is from a fragment of his writings quoted in T. V.
Smith's work:
The beginning of that which is, is the boundless,
but whence that which is arises, thither must it re
turn again of necessity; for the things give satis
faction and reparation to one another for their
injustice, as is appointed according to the ordering
of time.
The concept of "justice" or "injustice" is presumed to have had

Smith, o£. cit., p. 6.
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a common meaning of balance or lack of balance in a physical as
well as a moral sense*
Anaximenes had a different approach.

He assumed a develop

ment over time and therefore looked for the basic or generic
material, not as an equilibrium, but as a starting point.

He

assumed that air or gaseous matter was unlimited in quantity,
that motion existed without beginning, and that these two quan
titative elements caused a development of forms with varying
degrees of condensation, rarification and motion, thus making
up all quality or specific characteristics of natural phenomena.
He thought that the earth was suspended in air, and apparently
applied a principle of evolution to all things.
It is presumed that the Ionian philosophers applied their
concepts to social as well as physical process since natural
order and natural justice were prevalent notions in their period.
Of significance to us is the basic thought forms of circulation,
equilibrium within circulation, equilibrium between two balancing
circulations, the overall tendency to balance between opposites
that are temporarily out of equilibrium, and the idea that things
have an origin in a basic type of substance and grow and develop
over time within the limits of certain natural conditions.
Since this beginning struggle into abstraction, men have gone
over the same ground again and again, concentrating on more de
tailed problems, on narrower aspects, or on drawing tbgether the
accumulated ideas.

Each time they have worked over the same old

quilt with the same needle they have dug in a little deeper,
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picking up a second and then a third ply of the fabric of useful
understanding.
After the Ionians came several distinct lines of thought
which are important, but shakily incomplete as balanced theories.
Heraclitus
Heraclitus (probably around 500 B.C.) further refined the
Ionian philosophy and the pattern of thought which he established
persisted for a long time.

He abstracted the concept of circu

lation into an ultimate principle similar to the modern concept
of the indestructibility of matter.

He believed that the basic

elements of the universe are:

fire (energy), air (gas), water

(liquid), and earth (solids).

He considered fire to be the

common form of all these elements since they all are exchangeable
with it, but at the same time regarded it as a phase in their
balanced circulation.

He also incorporated the notion of

development or change of Anaximenes into his theory.

Windelband

summarized the significance of his outlook in modern terminology:
The physical application of these principles afforded
a thoroughgoing theory of the elemental changes in the uni
verse. Action and reaction take place in orderly suc
cession, and indeed in such wise that they are constantly
balanced in their results. Thus it happens that single
things have their appearance of persisting, when two op
posing forces temporarily hold each other in equilibrium,
as, for instance, the river SppearSoas a. permanent thing
because just as much water flows to a point as flows
from it. Heraclitus designated this rhythm of change as
the two 'Ways' which are identical . . .27
27
Windelband, op. cit., p. 55
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Heraclitus* view of things as everchanging and in constant
development, yet observable from a point, probably emphasized
space, and had overtones later of value in a moral sense.

It

is as simple and yet as complex an idea as the method of sur
veying used by the United States government in terms of town
ships and ranges from an arbitrarily selected point, lacking
a comprehensive formula for geoidetic deformation.

Much eco

nomic thought of the last tivo centuries is based upon the
arbitrary significance of "price" as a starting point for cal
culating production and distribution against a presumption of
a circulatory undercurrent.

In this connection, Heraclitus made

a casual reference by way of clarifying a sequence of ideas
which, had it been given as a statement of primary intent,
would have given him claim to being the predecessor of the Phy
siocrats in the theory of circulation:
This order, the same for all things, no one of
gods or men has made, but it always was, and is,
and ever shall be, an ever living fire, kindling
according to fixed measure, and extinguishing ac
cording to fixed measure.
All things are exchanged for fire, and fire for
all things; as wares are exchanged for gold, and
gold for wares.28
Heraclitus wrote a book on politics in which he applied the
principle of natural order to social relations.

The fragments

remaining of this work clearly reveal that he believed that jus
tice results from an equal balance of force, war and strife being
natural processes, and that the source of social stability is

28Smith, op. cit., p. 11.
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equilibrium.

He illustrated his idea by the example of a strung

bow, saying that the string pulls just as hard as the bow does,
and for the reason that the bow is pulling just as hard as the
string is.

This idea of an equal balance of forces was the

principle behind Solon's reforms of the previous century.

It

is a theory of evolution and equilibrium combined in a strikingly
modern analysis.

The point of importance to our discussion is

that this is viewed as a totally natural process, with no room
for human choice and therefore embodying no possible concept of
resources, or uses.
is natural.

Value is in process alone, and everything

The weak point that Heraclitus had to deal with

was the realization that,
Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men, since
their souls lack understanding.
It is not good for men to have whatever they want.
Disease makes health sweet and good; hunger, satiety;
toil, rest.^9
Such ideas pose the problem of the fallibility of human opinion
and the question of the relativity of values.

Heraclitus in

other passages expounded the idea that there is a clear order
of truth, but that it requires men like himself to understand it.
Earlier reference has been made to his attitude toward the lower
classes in the democratic cities.

Heraclitus needed a dependable

scientific measuring stick of natural phenomena since raw obser
vation obviously had its limitations.

^ I b i d ., pp. 10 and 12*
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After Heraclitus came new and more inclusive formulations
of the order or lack or order in the world, and of the methods
of studying it.

Here is the beginning of the problem of method

in forging theory.
The Pythagoreans
The Pythagoreans were an important religious and scientific
organization in the tradition of Xenophanes and Pythagoras from
the late sixth century.

These men believed in a mystic order,

a non-anthropomorphic god of order and consistency, and were
convinced that empirical investigation of order and relationships
was the avenue by which men could grow in understanding their god.
The Pythagorean societies frequently had much political influ
ence and may have been similar to medieval monasteries, but
they concentrated on studying mathematics, astronomy, and musical
harmony.

Working with geometry and proportions, they worked

out multiple relationships and dealt with harmonies of greater
complexity than equilibriums between two opposites.

Plato and

the Athenian moralists belittled them for not probing the mys
terious with their minds, and for spending so much time measuring
and counting things.
Parmenides and Zeno
Another branch of the growing tree of Greek theory is rep
resented by Parmenides of Elea (born about 513 B.C.) and his
pupil, Zeno.

These men are not distinguished from the Pythagor

eans by many of their contemporaries.

However, the views developed

by Parmenides and elaborated by Zeno are distinct from the mystic
empiricism of the later Pythagorean societies.
Parmenides took up the key point of method.

He concluded

that observation was inadequate, and that logical consistency
was the avenue to truth.

He was prepared to follow logic where-

ever it might lead with an almost mystic feeling for the validity
of mental processes in fathoming the truth about reality.

His

most important contribution was his readiness to doubt estab
lished assumptions and to follow a method in spite of apparent
conflicts with superficial observation.

Unfortunately, he

carried his views into a blind alley of absurdity, as evidenced
by the following passage:
Come now I will tell thee— and do thou hear my
word and heed it— what are the only ways of enquiry
that lead to knowledge.The one way assuming that
being is and that it is impossible for it not to be,
is the trustworthy path, for truth attends it . . . .
This beginning of a discussion on truth in one of Parmenides
poems illustrates his concern with what has come to be known as
the "metaphysical problem."

Parmenides denied the possibility of

change since, if all things exist or are, then everything that
happens to them is also in existence, and nothing new can be
created out of that which already exists.

He felt that the

notion that there might be new things created out of nothingness
was utter nonsense.

The possibility that a force could create

something which had not previously existed was equally nonsensi
cal to him.

Based on this assumption which specifically re

nounces evolution and sets forth a totally static base, deductive
5°Ibid., p. 15.
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logic can derive all answers about any relationships.

If

nothing can change, then there is no such thing as motion*
He had to deny both change of time and variability in space.
Ever since Parmenides, deductive logicians and mathematicians
have been searching for unchanging or static generalizations
which permit deductive answers closer to the line of common
sense observation than were Parmenides’ conclusions.

Some

change always crops up, whether from incomplete grasp of the
complexity of the body of static relationships, or from exter
nal or creative interjections; from which, we can never be ab
solutely sure.
Zeno elaborated Parmenides' work with his famous paradoxes.
He demonstrated logically that if Achilles chased a tortoise,
and every time the tortoise moved a given distance, Achilles
reduced the distance between them by half, Achilles would keep
halving the distance between himself and the tortoise, but
given a relationship with the tortoise in front, there could
be no change.

The argument requires the indulgence of one's

common sense to conceive of such infinitely minute divisions
of space, or infinitely small fractions of time*

In other

words, the backdrop of a larger measuring stick of time or
space has to be sacrificed when defining a relationship as
static between two things in isolation.

Aristotle and many

others were able to expose this argument, but it, and many like
it, sharpened the methodological wits of the Greeks, and
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emphasized the necessity for an empirical background for logic
and mathematical calculations from a static assumption. 31

Of

course* Zeno did not necessarily concede time or space differen
tiation since that would presume change or newness in structure
which, could not come into existence out of nothing;

and if it

already existed, then it was not new or was not change.
After Zeno came two reactions which fairly well filled out
the range of possibilities in scientific thought.

Heraclitus

had said that change was the nature of all things and relation
ships, and that permanence was like an imaginary point in a line,
or, at most, an equilibrium between two changing forces.

Par

menides and Zeno, on the other hand, had made everything so
permanent that any relationship was immutable.

According to

their view, logic can explain all if one assumes that the totality
of things possible already exists.

The various responses to this

type of thought are illustrated by Empedocles of Acragus in
Sicily (about ^90 B.C. to ^30 B.C.) who resorted to empiricism
and reunited logic and change.

Empedocles wrote:

But come, examine by every means each thing how
it is clear, neither putting greater faith in anything
seen than what is heard, norin a thundering sound more
than in the clear assertions of the tongue, nor keep
from trusting any of the other members in which there
lies means of knowledge, but know each thing in the way
in which it is clear.32

31Ibid., pp. 17-21
32Ibid., p. 28.
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In the same tone as Empedocles' poems, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (about 500 B.C. to *f28 B.C.) took a more noncommital po
sition.

He conceded an infinite number of things and an infinite

detail.

He believed that existence and non-existence are simply

degrees of mixture and separation, and that it is merely the
grossness of the human observer which leads him to characterize
things in terms of their most conspicuous element.

He contended

that change is only a shift in relationship or order of importance.
The idea is important because it introduced more subjectivism
into formal thought at a time when subjectivism grew up in oppo
sition to the objective religiosity of the aristocratic thinkers.
The Sophists
The Sophists were an important group of thinkers in the
fifth- and fourth-century Greek world, but they have been less
well remembered since they taught the democracy instead of the
aristocracy.

Protagoras of Abdera (*f8l to ^11 B.C.) is an

example of the first of the prominent Sophists.

He is reported

to have been a common porter, noticed and educated by the atomist
philosopher, Democritus.
Periclean period.

He was prominent in Athens during the

He earned the scorn of Plato because, not

having a private income, he charged money for teaching.
tagoras was a complete subjectivist.

Pro

One of his major works be

gins :
Man is the measure of all things, of things that are
„
that they are, and of things that are not that they are not.

35Ibid., p. 60.
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Protagoras represented the democracy, which had no moral
rationale for its objectives.

He therefore rejected any appeal

to objective reality which was presumed to have common moral and
physical meanings, and contended that everything is a matter of
choice and purpose to suit men, since men can have no concern
beyond themselves.

This body of Sophist philosophy characterized

by Protagoras represents the end of the search for natural prin
ciples of society and the frank acceptance of social life as an
arbitrary melee that man can make of what he will.

The change

of emphasis in political economy in the 1870's from objectivistic
classical theory searching for natural laws to subjectivistic
Austrian theory concerning itself with how the individual can
best improve himself against the background of a commercial econ
omy was a vastly refined reiteration of the same shift of emphasis
in social thought.
In the latter fifth century B.C., the sophistication and or
ganized mass of philosophy increased to a degree that makes its
casual summation impossible.

However, the objective and sub

jective views of social analysis had been developed by this time,
which furnished the basic thought patterns of subsequent philoso
phy and science.

Of great importance to economic theory is the

recognition of the importance of the Sophists, since their views
were accepted by the majority of the population and by the politi
cal leadership of the fourth century*
The most important single idea of this summary of the natural
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and social philosophy of the Greeks is that the absence of eco
nomic theory in the modern sense in fourth-century Greece was not
the result of the absence of commercial or industrial problems,
nor the absence of thought concerning these problems.

Economic

theory was developed, but it was couched in political, ethical,
and institutional forms.

In this respect the thought was some-

vvhat similar to the perspectives of V/. C. Mitchell, Thorstein
Veblen and J. B. Commons.

In the light of this, a summary of

the fifth- and fourth-century Greek thought on resources and
natural process and its relationship to policy and governmental
intervention in business will be more meaningful,
Greek Thought on Natural Relations and Human Choice
One’s assumptions regarding the order or pattern in nature
and the latitude of choice exercised by human beings, both indi
vidually and collectively, provide the foundation for any given
theory of resources.

Economic theory deals with the relationship

between choices that might be made, and the character of patterns
and choices that are made.
natural order*

This encompasses both free will and

However one defines the nature and source of

choice, these choices are made in terms of material or natural
quantities or processes.

It is this point of contact which

shapes the material significance of such things as standards of
living and capital goods, and in trying to understand the full
ness of the contact, it is necessary to examine both the theory
of nature which is the substance of economic concern as well as
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the theory of human alternatives and processes as the egocentric
focal point of our practical interests.

Greek thought was con

cerned with this problem, although their ideas were presented in
mythological metaphor or in involved abstract philosophizing.
In a seminar report given at Plato’s Academy a young man
named Critias attempted to summarize the moral religious view
of nature and human choice.

Of course, Plato edited all these

reports and is ultimately responsible for their contents since
he used them as teaching aids.

Critias presented the notion

that the gods use persuasion on man to lead him to live properly
on earth:
. . . but they considered us as a docile and obedient
animal; and, as if piloting a pliant ship; employed per
suasion for the rudder; and with this conception as the
leader, they governed the whole mortal race. Different
gods, therefore, being allotted, adorned different
places. But Vulcan and Minerva; who possess a common
nature, both because they are the offspring of the same
father, and because, through philosophy and the study
of arts, they tend to the same things, 1
— these, I say,
in consequence of this, received one allotment., viz.,
this region, as being naturally allied and adapted to
virtue and prudence.3^
The translator's note explained the metaphor employed as follows:
Vulcan is the divine power which presides over the
spermatic and physical reasons, or productive princi
ples, whibh the universe contains; . . . By Minerva we
must understand the summit . . of all those intellectual
natures that reside in Jupiter, the Artificer of the
world; or, in other wordsyshe is the deity which il
luminates all mundane natures with intelligence.35
3b

Plato, The Timaeus and the Critias or Atlanticus. The
Thomas Taylor translation, the Bollingen Series (New York:
Pantheon Books, 19^)* p» 233*
55Ibid*,
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This view represents the aristocratic tradition of a chosen
people in a chosen land with divine leadership, but with an area
in which error may be committed.

Divine leadership must be

discerned, however, and the Platonic solution was through rational
thought which, it was believed, would parallel the divine formu
lations and intent.

Thus, understanding was sought through

divine inspiration.

It was thought that by developing the nature

of the mind itself, reason would follow divine intent.

This re

ligious naturalism assumes that all knowledge will be revealed
through thought and mental exercise to develop the self-contained
propensities of the mind.

Everything, therefore, is a natural

resource in the purely natural sense, and the only choice re
maining to man is to spend more time contemplating so as to im
prove his receptivity to natural leadership.

This view represents

the extent of Plato's interest in practical knowledge.
In one of his dialogues, Plato presented the contrasting
views of Protagoras the Sophist.

The dialogue consisted of an

argument between Protagoras and Socrates which Plato recorded.
According to Plato's version, Protagoras lost the argument and
was ridiculed after resorting to quibbling definitions.

However,

Protagoras' views have a clarity of understanding which gives him
the upper hand in the judgement of history.
Protagoras' account of the accepted mythology went somewhat
as follows.

When Zeus, or Jupiter (the latter is the Latin tern)

created the earth, he passed out means of livelihood and defense
to all the animals.

However, he was careless in his apportionment,
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because he ran completely out of natural defensive mechanisms or
natural means of getting food while he still had one animal left.
This was man.

Out of sympathy for man, left naked and helpless,

Prometheus stole fire and the arts of metallurgy from Hephaestus
(Vulcan), and from Athene (Minerva), the intellectual and house
hold crafts.

Zeus has sole possession of political wisdom

(and, we may suppose, economics, as a subsivision thereof), so
Prometheus could not get any of that for man.

Prometheus was

severely punished by Zeus for imparting this bit of godliness
to man, but when Zeus observed that men had gathered into cities
to protect themselves and yet still fought each other, he de
cided that he had to save the situation.

Therefore, he gave men

a sense of justice which, according to Protagoras, was meant for
all, although the skills given by Prometheus had been selectively
distributed.

On this ground, Protagoras contended that justice

and political principles could be taught to all.

Socrates took

issue with this democratic assumption.
Concerning Protagoras' use of mythology in this argument,
it may be pointed out that one of his books dealing with the gods
began with the sentence:
As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either
that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are
the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity
of the question and the shortness of human life.36
After being read publicly in Athens, the book was burned in the
market place after all copies had been collected.

Smith, op. cit., p. 60.

Protagoras was
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considered a skeptic*
As to how man should approach the problems of society and
chart his course based on the limiting confines of natural ten
dency, Plato scornfully represents Protagoras as abandoning the
moral view in the following passage in which Protagoras states
his position regarding decisions pertaining to the art of so
ciety:
Would not the art of measurement be the saving prin
ciple; or would the power of appearance? Is not the
latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and
down and take the things at one time of which we repent
at another both in our actions and in our choice of
things great and small?
But the art of measurement would do away with the
effect of appearances, and showing the truth, would
fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth,
and would thus save our life. Would not mankind gen
erally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes
this result is the art of measurement?
Well, then, my friends, I say to them; seeing
that the salvation of human life has been found to con
sist in the right choice of pleasure and pains, —
in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the
greater and the less, and the nearer and the remoter,
must not this measuring be a consideration of their
excess and defect and equality in relation to each
other.57
Protagoras defined virtue as choice, and reasoned that if virtue
is rational knowledge, then virtue can be taught.

On the other

hand, he reasoned, if virtue is not rational, measurable knowledge,
then it cannot be taught.

38

Socrates was inclined to believe that

3^Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, Laws. Translated
by Benjamin Jowettl (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 125.
38Ibid., p. 130.
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virtue is more of a natural endowment*
It is important to keep in mind this definition of virtue
as the material valuing mechanism in political decisions, and the
fact that virtue was included under both politics and ethics in
discussions by the philosophers in ancient Greece*

Protagoras'

definition of virtue and his approach to its determination could,
almost with amendment, be substituted for the statement of value
theory in economics by a modern writer such as Lionel Robbins,
for example*
The Platonic tradition, which is the most cultivated of the
lines of Greek thought, by rejecting concern for an area to which
measurement should or could be applied, rejected social science
as such, and allowed only for investigations into the ordained
natural principles of the world.
mentalistic and mystical;

Plato's natural method was

he was inclined to believe that there

is no distinction between the social and the physical.

In this

context, sill social phenomena are natural resources, and the
definition of a resource is a tautology because there is no area
of choice, no leeway in which human decisions or evaluations
operate.

For example, Plato's view of the division of labor

was not an economic one, but a natural one similar to an analysis
of the differences between hands and feet.

The subsequent natural

ism of the eighteenth century may have been in the same tradition,
but it admitted an area of arbitrary social determination.

Trever

compared the ideas of Plato with those of Adam Smith on the divi-

105

sion of labor as follows:
The basis of this law Plato finds in the fact of
the diversity of natures, which fits men for different
tasks. In this he differs from Adam Smith, who be
lieves that the differences of natural talents in men
are much less than is generally supposed. Smith makes
the propensity to barter the source of specialization,
which, in turn, is based on the interdependence of
men. He thus considers the diversities in human na
ture to be the effect rather than the cause of the
division of labor. Plato, however, is probably nearer
the truth, since the very reason for mutual interde
pendence is diversity of nature.39
Our habit is to look at such relations in terms of static
equilibriums;

e.g., the degree of complexity of society is

equal to the degree of specialization and diversity of training
and ability, and the level of training, ability and specialization
is equal to the complexity of the society.

Each facet is a de

terminant of the other, just as Heraclitus' bow string pulled
just as hard as the bow pulled against it, and vice-versa.
However, most are prepared to concede that no given relationship
is born full grown, and most are prepared to question whether
any body of relationships is morally desirable as a permanent
state, instead of a course of development.

The trouble is that

if economic interdependence and specialization developed from
a lesser degree to a greater, they could not have always been
in equilibrium, and are not now.

Thus, some fractional genera

tive force, either a natural tendency or an external social pres
sure must have chroncially pushed interdependence or specialization,
and the tendency toward a static equilibrium between specialization
XQ

Trever, op. cit., p. 53*
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and interdependence drew the other factor along.
The impression is that Plato thought toward a full grown
naturalism, that diversity in nature held the potential for a
natural equilibrium ivith a concomitant degree of social com
plexity, and that the stable society was the harmonious balance
of social complexity with natural diversity and other natural
factors.

Thus, in Plato’s terms, natural stability was a

natural resource, just like iron ore, and the social advantage
was in working out the most harmonious and effective system
of utilizing this resource.

The later eighteenth century na

turalists perceived fewer complex naturalistic tendencies which
permitted variations in development with variations in result,
together with many less ideal conditions, which left much more
room for human initiative*
An example of modern thinking in this naturalistic vein
is the concept of a "natural state of nature" in parklands or
in forest areas.

This idea assumes a completely oriented, full

grown, stable state, with ideal properties inherent in the
isolated and unmolested "wilderness area."

Modern ecologists

recognize that there is less balance than constant change in
such an area, and that the complexity of the chain of causes
is difficult to predict unless an over-riding external force
such as fire or logging is introduced to control the "natural"
forces.

The surprisingly broad area of results that are af

fected by the acts of man and the animals he influences defies
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naturalistic definition as a balance or equilibrium.
generative forces can be called natural —

Only the

as long as they are

not understood well enough to be recognized as influenced by
decisions.
Early City Planning in Greece
The inclusion of the subject of city planning under a gen
eral classification of natural resources may seem incongruous.
However, in terms of Greek thought, it is conveniently explored
in connection with this subject.

Most philosophers whose major

works have been preserved left some comments on this subject.
Plato's Republic and his Laws are two of the most famous, but it
.will suffice for us to describe the first such theory, and to
indicate that the detailization and variations of the problems
involved constitute

a respectable body of data in itself.

Previous discussions have indicated that the eighth, seventh,
and sixth centuries B.C. were periods of overpopulation and com
mercial colonization in Greece.

Although many of these colonies

were probably no more than fortified trading posts, the intentional
promulgation of colonies as an adaptive measure to population pres
sure on the part of the city states must be presumed.

Along with

colonization, infanticide was used as a means of controlling popu
lation to some degree, and was advocated by moral philosophers
like Plato.

ifO

^fO
See Myres, op. cit., p. 91 on colonization; p. 197 on
Plato's idea of Mthe number of the state;M and p. 199 on infanti
cide and documentation of the practice.
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he elevation of colonial planning to the level of an ab
stract science is as consistent with the pattern of philosophical
thought in the Greek world as the development of theory in any
other area where problems were recognized.

The remarkable thing

about their approach is that city planning was not the attempt
to order natural tendencies to suit man's purposes, but the or
dering of man's relationships to suit the natural order.

It

was thought that the discovery of the natural order was the dis
covery of a useful element which would enable man to harmonize
himself with nature and to save himself the discomfiture of being
out of step with the natural order.

While many modern thinkers

accept varying degrees of natural order within which we must make
our choices, these Greek city planners thought in terms of an
all-pervasive natural order that was generally abstractable and
which should be approached in every detail for maximum efficiency.
Hippodamus, a native of Miletus, was the first recorded
thinker to propound a definite theory of city planning.

Aristotle

attributes to this man the invention of the art of planning cities,
along with a fondness for notoriety and eccentric mannerisms.

hi

Hippodamus planned the port city of Athens for Pericles in ^46 B.C.
He applied here, in planning the Piraeus, his principle of laying
out towns in broad, straight streets intersecting at right angles.
He also planned and was architect for the founders of the Anthenian colony of Thurii in Italy in

B.C.

He superintended the

Ifl
Aristotle's Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett.
(New York: The Modern Library, 19^3)* PP* 102-107.
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rebuilding of the city of Rhodes in *t08 B.C.

Lp

Aristotle recognized Hippodamus as the first person other
than a statesman to inquire into the best form of government,
but he found fault with Hippodamus* flexible concessions to
Sophism:
The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000
citizens divided into three parts — one of artisans,
one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of
the state . . .
He also enacted that those who discovered anything
for the good of the state should be honored . . .
. . . and it may sometimes seem desirable to make
changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences
have certainly been beneficial; Medicine, for example,
and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have de
parted from traditional usage. And, if politics be
art, change must be necessary in this as in any other
art . . . The analogy of the arts if false; a change
in a law is a very different thing from a change in
art. For the law has no pov/er to command obedience
except that of habit, which can only be given by time,
so that a readiness to change from old to new laws
enfeebles the power of the l a w . ^
Hippodamus* views on change and technology sound rather modern.
However, a careful analysis of the purely technical attitude
toward change reveals it to be an approach analogous to the de
velopment of new swimming strokes, or a better way to train the
body for a track meet.
The potential to understand human nature and to better adapt
it to the natural order was the problem which seems to have been

ho

Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. II (London: The Encyclopedia
Britansica Co. ; 19^1)» p • 585.
^Aristotle*s Politics, op. cit., pp. 102, 103, 109-106, and
106-107.
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the main concern of these men, and even Aristotle, the master of
careful, systematic thought, retained this orientation in most
respects.

Host of the early philosophers were credited with

various inventions.

Protagoras, the ex-porter, was alleged to

have invented an improved shoulder pad for carrying heavy loads.
However, such practical innovations seem to have been considered
as adjustments that harmonized natural possibilities and created
nothing new in nature, but improved the harmony of man and his
environment.

This concept of harmonious equilibrium is the basis

of static analysis, and although difficult to apply over varia
tions of time and space without closing one eye to increasing
deviations from reality, it was the type of analysis which the
Greeks developed to a very high level.
Considering population as an aspect of city planning, Aris
totle did not believe that the population of a city should be
just so many persons, as did Hippodamus, but rather a natural ad
justment to a natural relation of physical environment and human
society.

Aristotle thought the population should be large

enough to provide abundance, implying the full exploitation of
the standards of division of labor and specialization in existence:
In like manner, a state, when composed of too few,
is not, as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of
too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries,
as a nation may be, it is not a state, being almost in
capable of constitutional government.^

kh

Ibid.. p. 288.
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With this view of population size as an equilibrium between two
natural factors Aristotle concluded that the desired size of a
territory of the state should be large enough to support the
population, "temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of lei
sure

but small enough to be easily defended.

The preoccupation

with defense in all the discussions on city planning is an indi
cation of the primacy of defense considerations and the fact that
military strength and economic strength were not so nearly identi
cal in an age of non-industrial, individualistic warfare.
Aristotle thought that a city should be located in a balanced
position near the sea, with consideration given to other factors:
. . . if we could have what we wish, it should be
well situated in regard both to sea and land . . . This
then is one principle, that it should be a convenient
centre for the protection of the whole country: the
other it, that it should be suitable for receiving the
fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of
timber and any.other products that are easily trans
ported. ^5
The habit of phrasing relationships in terms of a group of oppo
sites and of harmonizing these in a common answer is conspicuous
in the writings of Aristotle.

In form, this method resembles the

simultaneous equations in algebra and proportions in geometry
which the Greeks of this period were studying as abstract
theoretical formulations.

Aristotle's reliance on relationships

freed his philosophy from the confines of naturalism.

The Sophists

went further and applied free choice to social processes on the

^Ibid., p. 289
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assumption that no purpose was preordained or natural.

Aristotle's

concept of natural control was that of a multiplicity of opposing
forces which produce natural harmony through fine balances:
Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revo
lution when the country is not naturally adapted to pre
serve the unity of the state . . . At Athens, too, the
inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than
those who live in the city, for just as in war the
impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break
a regiment, so every cause of difference, however
slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest op
position is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next
comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other
antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one
is this difference of place.
Although Aristotle generally concerned himself with equili
brium between aggregations of natural elements through the tech
nique of classification and harmonization of variables, he
occasionally recognized problems more in the realm of human
creation.

He advocated a balance of trade for his ideal city,

and in his specific economic discussions, as in others, he tended
toward an analysis of social development attendant with economic
activity which is difficult to define as natural order in the
static sense, but rather an equilibrium between a variety of
processes.

This achievement of recognizing an independently

growing social scheme of things increasingly less confined by
natural underpinnings is the essence of a more flexible position
for man and society and makes possible the consideration of

Ibid., pp. 216-217
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nature or natural resources as something apart from the totality
of all human problems.
Equilibrium Theory and Nature
It has been seen that the use of equilibrium analysis as
one of the methods of describing and understanding nature was
employed by the earliest Greek philosophers.

They also developed

ideas on the problem of change, circles of change, and of pro
cesses or circulations in equilibrium.

It is clear from the

fragments left by these writers that they considered these re
lationships to be natural realities, the discovery of which
would lead to understanding and improving the ability of man to
cope with nature.

As such, these discoveries were regarded

just as much as natural resources as would be the discovery of
the usefulness of water power.

The mental understanding was the

technological achievement, and the natural process being grasped
by this understanding was the equilibrium or circulatory nature
of the world.

The purpose of acquiring this knowledge tended to

be negative since it was sought for the purpose of avoiding
deviation from the natural order.
The idea of an equilibrium was developed first as a theory
of how natural relationships exist and was, therefore, a partial
theory of nature, or an incomplete notion of the total of rela
tionships.

The Pythagoreans added the idea of harmony, or a

multiplicity of elements in complex equilibrium.

The next stage,
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which Aristotle and his followers elaborated with varying degrees
of success, was the idea that equilibrium relationships are them
selves a method, an arbitrary structural framework applicable
to a body of isolated facts for constructing a theory of rela
tionships;

as such, equilibrium analysis is a theory for the

development of theory.

The later refinements proceeding from

this assumption have been widely accepted in the fields of
logic and mathematics, partially accepted in many of the natural
sciences, and struggled with in the complexity of the social
sciences.
Aristotle is distinguished for his meticulous classification
and systematization of all elements in the encyclopedic area of
his inquiries.

He habitually posed groups or aggregates of oppo

sites and ranked them in order of importance*

An indication of

his approach to the idea of this as a method for revealing and
understanding relationships, rather than the natural relationship
itself to be used for the purpose of revealing facts, is ap
parent in the following passage;
. . . we must not look for the same degree of ac
curacy in all subjects; we must be content in each
class of subjects with the accuracy of such a kind as
the subject matter allows, and of such an extent as is
proper to the inquiry.^7
After comparing the practical and theoretical interest in a right
angle by a carpenter and a geometer, Aristotle continued:

47
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics* Translated by J.E.C.
Welldon (London: Macmillan and Co,, 1934), Book I., Chapt. 7,
p , 17 •
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We must follow the same course in other subjects,
or we will sacrifice the main points to such as are
subordinate.
Theophrastus was a slightly younger contemporary of Aris
totle and successor in his school.

His works on plants are the

most important of his surviving documents, but he also wrote on
political and social subjects.

It is useful, for two reasons,

to review Theophrastus1 approach to certain problems in botany.
First, because his writings demonstrate the conscious use of a
common approach to both botanical and social problems, and
secondly, because a comparison of his theories with modern
botanical theory gives an insight into the continuities and
changes which have taken place in an area free of the complexi
ties of social science where men investigate themselves.

Theo

phrastus wrote in his work on plants:
Again the differences, both between the plants as
wholes and between their parts, may be seen in the ap
pearance itself of the plant. I mean differences such
as those in size, hardness, smoothness or their oppo
sites, as seen in bark, leaves and the other parts . . .
These then as has been said, are differences of
natural character, as it were, and still more so are
those between fruitless and fruitful, deciduous and
evergreen plants and the like. But with all the dif
ferences in all these cases we must take into account
the locality, and indeed it is hardly possible to do
otherwise. Such differences would seem to give us a
kind of division into classes, for instance, between
that of acouatic plants and that of plants of the dry
land . . * °

Ibid.
ilQ

^Theophrastus, Enquiry into Plants. Translated by Sir
Arthur Hort (New Tork: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), Vol. I,
pp. 29-31* (Greek and English).
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This probing into the possible bases for distinction be
tween plants and for a system of classifying vegetation generally
is indefinite as to whether the plant as a whole is the prime
unit, the characteristics of its different parts, or its zone
or habitat.

Moreover, it is not made clear whether these are

relationships to be discovered between natural entities, such
as a natural structure for handling these variations, or a
method for forcing a mass of data into artificial relationships
so that theories can be developed.

He proposed morphological,

specific, and geographical opposites as the possible generic
bases for classification or as a suitable structure for coordi
nating the data into a useful theory.
It is interesting to skip to the present and observe an
application of the same equilibrium approach in a novel way by
Edgar Anderson in what he calls a "pictorial scatter diagram.
Anderson used a system of defining five oppositions in a diverse
group which he wished to clarify.

He then plotted each sample

on a geometric grid with marks indicating these oppositions,
and obtained a pictorial impression for use as an aid in clari
fying relationships and in the formulation of theories of plant
distributions.

The scatter diagram is a technique, but the

equilibrium formulation is a method of dealing with relationships
for the purpose of devising theory.

50
Plants, Man and Life (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1952),
p. 9*f-102.
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Theophrastus made the following observations on acquatic
and dry habitats* demonstrating that he was conscious that he
was dealing with a method rather than a theory:
However, if one should wish to be precise, one
would find that even of these some are impartial as
it were amphibious • • . But to consider all these
exceptions, in general, to consider in such a manner
is not the right way to proceed. For in such matters
too nature certainly does not thus go by any hard and
fast law. Our distinctions therefore and the study „
of plants in general musb be understood accordingly.
Theophrastus was attempting to develop bases for classification
and theoretical analysis, and did not get into the area of rela
tionships between plants themselves.

He was aware of such

factors as the influence of open and closed forest growth on
the form and knottiness of timber, but his concern was with the
more comprehensive problem of determining whether the plants as
wholes, or their morphological or geographical characteristics
would be most useful for initial classification.

The method

was that of using equilibriums for equating opposites for
analytical purposes.

In modern botanical work with complex

associations among plants, we are still faced with the same
problem of how to treat the data.
H. A. Gleason outlined three current theories of plant
associations as follows:

(1) an organism or natural unit in

process, (2) a natural structure of natural relationships with
lesser variations within the unit of natural equilibrium, and
(3) a complex of interacting elements.

51 Theophrastus, op. cit., p. 33 •

He observed:
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The vegetational unit is a temporary and fluc
tuating phenomenon, dependent, in its origin, its
structure, and its disappearance on the selective
action of the environment and on the nature of the
surrounding vegetation.^
Gleason developed the thesis that since none of the species in
a plant association have identical spatial properties, distri
butions, or cycles of duration, that any association is an
arbitrary handful of changing elements

classified as a unit by

subordinating the changing

elements to a single, or a few

dominant species, with the

implication that their dominance is

determined by our interest in them.
The first of the theories of plant association which
Gleason mentioned neglects time and assumes a unit which is
constant over time, but which has existence as an equilibrium
in space.

The second assumes a group of processes in time

with a stable relationship, such as an equilibrium between cir
culatory systems.

The third theory assumes that the significance

of an association lies in the methodological process of defining
the relationships between the different elements.

Therefore,

the concept of an association as a static equilibrium is useful
as a methodological device.
This discussion of botanical theory illustrates the struggles
of the Geeeks, exemplified by Theophrastus, to apply the theory
of their day to complex natural phenomena, and of the strides

^ 2Gleason, H. A., "The Individualistic Concept of the Plant
Associationy'V The American Midland Naturalist, Vol. 21, Jan.May., 1959, p. 93*
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that were being made toward method as such.

It was indicated

that in the Greek world the investigation of nature was the task
of the philosopher, and that his province also included everything
from ethics, ambition and politics, to astronomy, anatomy, and
botany, as well as physics and mathematics.

The Sophists tended

toward an abstraction of theory from the natural and moral com
bination and dealt with choice as creative rather than as a
result of a low level of rigor in nature.

Their contribution

was invaluable because, until change in human society and eco
nomic relationships was accepted, the resource base was fixed
as a part of natural relations, and the study of resources for
policy purposes or planning could not be attempted.
Greek Thought on Economic and Social Development
Since Greek thought was largely descriptive and not con
cerned with change, the Greeks were able to accept wide variations
in 'customs without apparently being stimulated to inquire into
the significance of such differences.

Some of the most vital

social relationships were presumed to have been instituted by
individual lawgivers and were considered quite superficial in
regard to the order of nature.

For instance, the custom of in

fanticide was not considered objectionable even in areas where
the custom was not practiced.
Variations in custom, to an extent much broader than we
can easily imagine, were so casually accepted that they seem to
have stimulated little critical thought.

Discussions of com-
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parable and different customs were approached with the same
craftsmanlike attitude that a carpenter might apply to different
types of wood, and the notion of a common ideal or central moral
standard applicable to the whole world was not developed in rela
tion to customs*
When generalizations did come, they were in highly abstract
terms, remarkably parallel to those which were developed in
eighteenth-century Europe when the much larger national units
had been mentally assimilated, and comparisons between nations
and larger spheres of culture were beginning.

In terms of posi

tive comparison, the military results of a system of customs and
their effectiveness at avoiding civil strife were the two major
concerns of much Greek thought*

This is consistent with a life

where military defense and stormy social conditions within the
cities defeated much sense of continuity and kept planning
limited to the all-important problem of survival here and now.
A good example of the facility with which the Greeks dealt
with variations in custom and still concerned themselves pri
marily with natural law with little concern for the temporal
continuity of law is presented in the closing pages of Aristo
phanes* comedy, "The Clouds," written in the last part of the
fifth century B.C.

In this comedy, a son, preparing to beat

his father, rejects the parental plea that the principles of
filial piety have natural sanction, and asserts that the natural
conduct of the animals contradicts this concept of filial duty:
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’But the law nowhere admits that fathers should
be treated thus.'
'Was not the legislator who carried this law a
man like you and me? In those days he got men to
believe him; then why should not I too have the
right to establish for the future a new law, allow
ing children to beat their fathers in turn? . • •
But look how the cocks and other animals fight with
their fathers; and yet what difference is there be
tween them and ourselves, unless it be that they do
not propose decrees.'53
Though this passage is from a flippant comedy satirizing the
Socratic philosophers and their ability to argue themselves into
any position, it demonstrates the sophisticated casualness with
which a popular theatre could deal with custom within an ac
cepted framework of naturalism and of order in nature.
This discussion should shed some light on the apparent
paradox of an awareness of economic variation, in the sense of
change that did not,, somehow, incorporate a realization of time,
and the passage of time as a natural phenomenon.

The natural

order was considered static, and therefore the natural process,
of itself, could not be the cause of change.

Change was a

lateral process, related to quantity and harmonies, but was ap
plied to summaries of factual events and their explanations,
though change over time was strangely ignored.
One of the earliest references to the conditions of social
development is to be found in Critias' paraphrase of Solon's
53
"^Aristophanes, The Eleven Comedies. Vol. I. Translated
by the Tudor Publishing C ~ (n.d.), p. 373* "The Clouds.”
5^See John L. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philoso
phy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 193-196,
for Aristotle's view that time is essentially a statement of
motion for the measurement of space.
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ideas on intellectual development.

Solon was represented to

have left a statement that people concern themselves with and
discourse on necessaries and do not study history and the re
lated fields until these necessaries are supplied and they can
gather into cities.

55

This suggests that Solon attributed

social theory to the development of leisure and urbanization.
It is not a theory of production in the modern sense, but
can best be viewed as a statement of a fact, or an absolute
potential in a given body of relationships, rather than thought
tied to concern with changes in productivity.
Later, in the writings of Thucydides, the historian of the
Peloponnesian Wars, we see an example of this static type of
development theory, and a clue to its consistency with the
pattern of much Greek philosophy.

Most accounts refer to ori

gins and process, but here we have a specific reference to the
fact that in ancient times there was no accumulation and that
wealth was at a low level.

However, it is apparent that Thu

cydides did not regard accumulation and wealth as self-perpetuating
or creative, but rather the result of a natural equilibrium in
volving social and physical, forces:
The richest districts were most constantly chang
ing their inhabitants, . . . For the productiveness
of the land increased the power of individuals; this
in turn was the source of quarrels by which communities
were ruined, while at the same time they were more ex
posed from attacks from without. Certainly Attica, of
which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom

^Plato, Critias, op. cit. , p. 2j4.
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from civil strife and therefore retained its original
inhabitants.56
Thucydides thus contended that accumulation was the result
of an equilibrium between natural wealth and two social forces,
military invasion and civic unity.

Moreover, civic unity was

a balance between greedy individuals and the degree of cooperation
required by the productivity of the soil in order to sustain es
sentials.

Thus, the apparent paradox, that a physically poor

city accumulated more because it was better organized and stronger
against intruders;

hence, intruders were less interested.

The

stability of the population over time was a result of these bal
ances.

There was a natural equilibrium inherent in the character

of the people, the effort required for a living, the nature of
the country, and the potential for organization.

Thucydides1

example of a poor city, Attica, was a cultural center in the Age
of Pericles, and in the mid-fifth century held an empire con
trolling the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black
Sea.

According to Thucydides, her secret was not wealth, but a

fortuitous balance of natural forces which stimulated organiza
tional strength.

This detailed thought on organization, and the

clarity with which economic organization was theoretically and
practically developed, deserves emphasis.

Organization was the

key to the early approach to the exploitation of natural resources.
Since the Greeks had given considerable attention to organi
zational problems, it was to be expected that the division of
labor would have been included in their discussions.

Plato, it

^Thucydides. Translated by Benjamin Jowett (Boston: D.
Lothrop Co., i 8$3), Vol I , p . 2•
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will be remembered, held that the division of labor was an organi
cally natural or god-given phenomenon.
knowledge it as the basis of trade.

He did, however, ac

Insofar as value is the

result of exchange or potential for exchange, resources there
by acquire their significance.

However, if as Plato suggests,

exchange is natural and completely controlled by natural.'ability,
then the value of goods produced by skilled hands is also the
subject of natural value in the same sense as raw materials.
Xenophon, on the other hand, regarded the division of
labor as a source of productivity resulting from organizational
achievement, an idea consistent with his other works:
. . . but the food that is sent from the king's
board really is much superior in the gratification
also that it gives. That this, however, should be
so is no marvel. Tor just as all other arts are
developed to superior excellence in larger cities,
in the kitchen that same way the food at the king's
palace is also elaborately prepared with superior
excellence. For in small towns the same workman
makes chairs and doors and plows and tables, and
often this same artisan builds houses, and even so
he is thankful if he can only find employment enough
to support him. And it is, of course, impossible for
a man of many trades to be proficient in all of them.
In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many
people have demands to make upon each branch of in
dustry, one trade alone, and very often even less
than a whole trade, is enough to support a man; one
man, for instance, makes shoes for men, and another
for women, and there are places even where one man
earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by
cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers to
gether, while there is another who performs none of
the operations but only assembles the parts. It fol
lows, therefore, as a matter of course, that he who
devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of
work is bound to do it in the best possible manner. 57
^Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 2 vols. Translated by Walter Mil
ler. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 191*0, p. 333* This work is
a romantic account of the idealized ruler of Persia. In it, the
monarch explains that he avoids accumulating more wealth than he
can properly handle by using the surplus to build good will.
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This interpretation tacitly assumes a social theory of skill
and division of labor, whatever its cause.

The emphasis, how

ever, is on the value of specialization as a creative force,
A theory of social enhancement of individual power through
specialization is suggested.
Plato’s,

This is not a natural theory like

It is a theory of a compensatory social consequence of

group living resulting in enhanced individual ability.

It is a

description of how man is improved in his power to meet nature
in the form in which it exists.
Xenophon’s views on exchange have also been preserved in
one of his dialogues.

The dialogue is written in the style of

the Platonic School as a review by Socrates to a friend of a
discussion which he, Socrates, had held with a wealthy agricul
tural aristocrat with a reputation for wisdom and justice.
Xenophon’s definition of ’’goods” is given in the review:
&

’You seem, then,' said Socrates, 'To mean by goods
something serviceable to the owner?' . . .’If then,
a man buys a horse, and does not know how to manage
him, but falls off him, and receives some injury, is
the horse not a part of his goods?' . . .'So, then,
with regard to sheep, if a man, from not knowing how
to manage sheep, suffers loss by keeping them, the
sheep would not be a portion of his goods' . . .
'The same things, then,' continued Socrates, 'are
goods to him who knows how to make use of them, but
not goods to him who does not know; . . .(after
pointing out that flutes which a man cannot play would
not be goods under this definition) unless, indeed,
he sells them.'5°

58Ibid.
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It is clear from this exchange that Xenophon rejected the
idea of a natural value in raw material itself, or even in native
ability.

Later in the dialogue he asserts that knowing how to

sell a thing is an appropriate use, and that a thing's value is
dependent upon one's ability to use it or sell it.

Thus, the

underpinnings of value were dependent on the acquired training
of some individual to fully exploit an item, and the possibility
of reaching him through a social process of exchange.
The relation of specialization and exchange, as reverse
sides of a coin, may be illustrated as follows.

If ten men live

in a circle of contact and only one of them knows how to train
and handle horses, then if any one of the men is able to acquire
a horse, even if he himself cannot ride it, the horse still has
the potential value attributed to it by the most skilled horse
man in the circle.

The size of the group permits and stimulates

specialization, and exchange facilitates its growth through the
shifting of goods from the one who cannot to the one who can make
use of them.

Thus, Xenophon concluded that the ability to sell

and the readiness to buy are the measures of value.

Exchange

value is, in this view, simply the aggregation of individual use
values and the expression of these values in specialization.

This

is a view in the Sophist tradition, where society and man are the
measure of all things.

It is a relatively modern view, even ex

celling many modern analyses in the clarity of exposition of use
and exchange value.
the analysis.

However, there is a peculiar limitation to
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In the second chapter of his Oeconomicus, Xenophon reviewed
Socrates* speculations on the material basis of wealth.

He re

corded that Socrates had maintained that an individual is
wealthy only insofar as he has a surplus over his needs, and
that the requirements of a wealthy man like Critobulus, for in
stance, were such that he was perpetually short of assets with
which to meet civic assessments, whereas he, Socrates, had a
surplus over his requirements.

Thus, the idea of absolute ma

terial wealth through the accumulation of a body of material re
sources was rejected in the analysis in favor of relativity as
the basis for comparison.
Xenophon's outlook assumed a perfectly neutral nature.
There Was no concept of economics over time, and his approach
was static in its assumptions of relationships.

Moreover, no

units or periods of time were defined artificially and absorbed
into the static theory as in modern static analysis.

In his

discussions on agriculture concerning the two field cycles of
fallow and cropping and rotation practices, the time element
was not considered any more significant than the aging of
humans or the growth of children.

His neglect of the time ele

ment is not surprising, of course, since even in modern economic
theory, the problem of how to handle time has not been completely
solved.
In passing, it is interesting to note Plato's description
of erosion and falling water tables, though the importance of
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such processes did not creep into his economic analysis:
. . • and the plains, which are now denominated
Phellei, were then full of fat earth, and the moun
tains abounded with woods of which there are evident
tokens even at present. For there are mountains which
now only afford nutriment for bees, but formerly, and
at no very distant period, the largest trees were cut
down from those mountains . . .
This region, too, every year enjoyed prolific rain,
which did not then, as now, run from naked earth into
the sea, but being collected in great abundance from
lofty places, and preserved for use in certain cavities
in the earth, diffused copious streams of fountains
and rivers to every part of the country.59
In his Laws, Plato

discussed ideal forms of

organizationofthe

state and recommended conservation practices on a civic scale,
primarily as a means of keeping military trainees busy at constructive work such as road building and erosion control. 60
Xenophon's purpose was to explain how one may improve his
exploitation of his surroundings.

It is individualistic in

that other people and society were not excluded as fit subjects
for exploitation, but the lines of society and social relations
were generally considered as part of the natural order.

Xenophon

had to deal, with slavery and the land as the two main elements of
production of primary importance in Greece.

Although he neglected

time as a factor in his analysis, Xenophon found ample room for
planning at the quantitative and spatial level, or in terms of

Plato, Critias. op. cit., p. 235“236» For other descrip
tive data on the erosion problem in middle eastern civilizations,
see Tom Dale and Vernon G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955)* especially pp. 88108 on Greece.
The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. 2, Laws, on. cit.., pp. 522523.
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what modern economists would call programming and economics of
scale:
Or even if a person be utterly ignorant what the
ground can produce, and has had no opportunity of
seeing either fruits or plants from it, or even of
hearing from anyone a true description of it, is it
not much more easy for anyone to make trial of the
earth than a horse or a man? For it exhibits nothing
for the purpose of deceit, but sets forth plainly and
truly, with the utmost simplicity, what it can do and
what it cannot.61
And further:
'However,' said Ischomachus, 'it is possible to
ascertain, from looking at one's neighbor's ground,
what it can bear and what it cannot, if v/e only ob
serve the corn and the trees upon it; and when a
person has learned this there is no further use in
fighting against nature, for he would not obtain a
greater supply of provisions by sowing or planting
what he himself might require, than by sowing or
planting what the earth would of its own accord
produce and nourishI62
Xenophon delighted in order and advance planning, and his
• favorite example of the benefits to be accrued by order was that
of a galley.

He described a Phoenician galley in detail as a

masterpiece of efficient, well-ordered utilization of space and
neatness.

He illustrated his regard for order by having the

characters in the dialogue point out the source of their strength
and effectiveness as being the unison of the crew and the orderli
ness of their actions in a confined space.

Also, he had Critobulus

explain to his young wife that the source of beauty and pleasure
in a chorus of singers and dancers was the unison and coordination

6lXenophon1s Minor Works, The Oeconomicus, op. cit., p . 1^-1•
^Ibid. i p. 128.
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of their actions;
There is indeed nothing, my dear wife, more useful
or more creditable to people than order. A chorus of
singers and dancers, for instance, consists of a number
of persons; but when they do what each of them happens
to fancy, all appears confusion, and disagreeable to
behold; but when they act and speak in concert, the
same persons prove themselves worthy of being seen and
heard.°3
At the beginning of Oeconomicus Xenophon took up the question of
the nature of the art of management;
'Tell me,' said ho, Critobulus, 'is domestic man
agement the name of an art, as that of healing, or of
working in brass, or of building? . . . And as we can
specify concerning these arts, what is the business of
each, can we also specify concerning domestic manage
ment, what is its business?'
'It is possible, then,' said Socrates, 'for one who
knows this art, and happens to have no property of his
own, to earn money by managing the house of another,
as an architect earns money by building a house?'
'Yes, doubtless,' said Critobulus, 'he might earn
a large sum of money, if, taking a house under his
charge, he can fulfill the duties which it requires,
and augment the value of it by adding largely to its
resources.'
•But what is it that the term house gives us to
understand? . . . It seems to me,''replied Critobulus,
'that everything a person has, even though it be not
in the same country with the possessor, is comprehended
by the term house or personal property. ' ^
This definition of management cannot be limited to exclude com
mercial management or business ventures generally.

However, it

does not, as Xenophon developed it, include many of the aspects

63Ibid,, pp. 73-76.
fih

Ibid., pp. 103-10**.
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of business with which we deal today*

Xenophon's inquiry was in

the areas of orderly and planned programming and harmonizing of
men with men, natural material with natural material, and men
with natural material.

These three areas seemed to constitute

the subject matter of the art of organization;

it is limited to

organization, not over varying periods, but in the horizontal
direction, over areas, numbers and quantities*

Trade was highly

atomized and regulated, and subordinated to defense and subsis
tence.

Moreover, prices must have been quite variable and

dependent on local customs and laws, as well as on.supplies at
markets.

No attempt to begin a study of economics from price

analysis would have been very practical under these conditions.
The non-commercial influences were too strong and too numerous
to make a purely commercial analysis significant.

Exploitation

of nature and human propensities, however, offered a clear field
that was general enough, and included the level at which shortrun production under undependable circumstances could be analyzed
for benefit.
Another treatise of Xenophon's, written toward the end of
his life, set forth his recommendations for the financial im
provement of the condition of his home city, Athens*

Xenophon

began the work with a chapter describing the geographical posi
tion of the city, her climate, and communications.

He concluded

that the city was in a favorable commercial position, and that
she should develop her position as a trading center.

He men

tioned certain improvements in social relationships with merchants,
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and recommended the suspension of a mercantilist policy then in
effect prohibiting foreigners from selling for cash, a measure
apparently designed to protect Athens against an unfavorable
balance of trade.

His approach to these problems is consistent

with the theory or order and planning which he developed in
The Oeconomicus:
To effect such augmentations of the revenues, it
is not necessary for us to be at any cost but that
of philanthropic ordinances and careful superintendence*
For securing whatever other revenues seem likely
to come to us, I know that there will be need of a
fund.6^
The final part of this passage suggests the concept of production
based upon capital, but the idea was not developed further.

He

considered capital useful merely as a means of facilitating per
sonal relationships and organization.

He suggested as capital

improvements better hotels for visiting merchants and public
galleys available for hire by the trip.
Later in this work he directed his attention to the silver
mines at Larion.

Here, he thought, there should be established

a fund of capital to permit public acquisition of slaves to lease
to the mining contractors to facilitate larger scale enterprises,
since many were short of capital.

This recognition of the mines

as being different from other forms of production reflects keen
economic understanding, and would seem to indicate that he

65

Xenophon*s Minor Works, op. cit*, "On the Means of Im
proving the He venue of the State of Athens," p. 2f?l.
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attributed some value to silver beyond social or exchange con
siderations.

Here he hints at, but is unable to master, the

time factor or the much wider spatial effectiveness of money
values or metals generally.

His writing on the silver mines

stands, nevertheless, as the first recorded economic discussion
of a natural resource and the economic relations of its ex
ploitation in our tradition of economic thought;

and it reveals

his recognition that there are some peculiar characteristics of
this type of economic development:
Nor does the space of ground that is dug for silver
appear to be at all diminished, but to be perpetually
extended in a wider circuit . . . At the present time
too, no one of those who have slaves in the mines is
diminishing the number of them, but is indeed contin
ually adding to it as many as he can; for when but
few are engaged in digging and searching, little treasure
is found, but when many are employed, a far greater quan
tity of silver ore is discovered; so that in this occu
pation alone, of all those that I know, no one envies
those that extend their operations. All persons that
have farms would be able to say how many yokes of
oxen, and how many workmen, would be sufficient for
their land, and if they send into their fields more
than are necessary, they consider it a loss; but in
the mining operations for silver, they say that all
are constantly in want of workmen. For the conse
quence is not the same in this case as it is when there
are numbers of workmen in brass and when, as articles
made of brass necessarily become cheap, the workmen
are ruined nor is it the same when there are excessive
numbers of blacksmiths; or as when there is abundance
of corn and wine, and when, as the fruits of the earth
are cheap, agriculture becomes unprofitable, so that
many farmers, quitting their occupation of tilling
the ground, betake themselves to the employments cf
merchants, or innkeepers, or bankers; but, in regard
to the silver mines, the more silver ore is found, and
the more silver is extracted, the greater is the number
that devote themselves to mining. Of furniture, when
people have got enough of it for their houses, they do
not much care for buying additional supplies; but

13^

nobody has ever yet had so much silver as not to
desire an increase of it; and if people have superr
abundance, they hoard it, and are not less delighted
with doing so than with putting it to use,°°
Xenophon went on to suggest, by v/ay of explaining the dif
ferences enumerated between mining and other forms of production,
that silver can be used in times of disaster to buy necessities
when no barter can be arranged, and to buy luxuries in times of
plenty#

We would attribute to him an explanation in the vein

of his own theory:

that silver is transportable, that it is

a common medium of exchange;

therefore, it has infinite possi

bilities of spatial distribution, and is consequently completely
fluid as a common medium for organization and harmonization.
We should note that Xenophon did not think in terms of mining
operations as being more successful when financed over longer
periods, but only on larger scales.

Modern thinkers would char

acterize silver as being subject to accumulation which permits
planning and extension over time rather than in area.
Aristotle and the Climax of Greek Theory
Aristotle's writings may be considered the high point in
abstract thought from the third century B.C. into the eighteenth
century.

His massive body of detailed surveys provides more

thought forms and possibilities than most thinkers can assimilate

Ibid., pp. 253-255.
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or apply to new situations.

His ideas were the foundation of

European education until well into the nineteenth century.

His

influence is a product of both the systematic nature of his work
and the wide range of his contributions to such diverse fields
as Scholastic philosophy, theoretical physics, and statescraft.
After Aristotle, the culture of the Mediterranean world be
came vastly more complex.

The Alexandrian Empire and, later,

the Roman Empire, broke down the localized tradition and indi
vidualism which had permitted much of life to appear as natural.
Choice and policy became dominant.

Zeller wrote of this period,

dominated by the Stoics, the Epicureans and Skeptics, and later
the Christians:
An age like this did not require theoretical knowledge. It required to be morally braced and strengthened.
. . . these three Schools, however else they may differ,
at least agree in two fundamental points — in subordi
nating theory to practice, and in the peculiar character
of their practical philosophy.68
And further:
Through all the Schools runs the common trait of refer
ring everything to the subject, of withdrawing every
thing within the spere of mind and of the inner life,
one consequence of which is to press into notice prac
tice rather than speculation, another being that the
satisfaction of this want can only be had in internal
self-consciousness, and in a mental equilibrium at
tained by the exercise of the will and the cultivation
of the intellect, 9
^7Zeller, E., ^he Stoics. Epicureans and Skeptics. Trans
lated by Oswald Ruchel (Revised Ed*, London: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1880), p. 16.

68Ibid., p. 19.
69Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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In Aristotle's writings we find the theoretical forms, but
not the separation of social from natural science, nor the at
tempt at such a distinction approached by Xenophon in his
practical discussions.

The necessity of framevrorks of theory

for investigative purposes is undeniable, but Aristotle carried
his theory into areas where facts and measurements and organiza
tional potential still needed two thousand years to mature and
accumulate.
Aristotle's Natural Values
Aristotle began all his inquiries with the premise that
truth is a question of fact, and can be discovered:
. . . because with what is true, all things which
really are are in harmony, but with that which is
false the truth very soon jars.7°
On this assumption, we find that a fact is its own justification,
and that anything that exists obviously encounters nothing in
compatible with its existence, for if it did, it would not so
exist.

Thus, we can agree with Aristotle that there is some

kind of harmony by definition in the fact of harmony:
And again, you must not demand the reason either
in all things alike, because in some it is sufficient
that the fact has been well demonstrated, which is
the case with first principles; i.e., starting point
or first principle. And of these first principles
some are obtained by induction, some by perception,
and some by a course of habituation, in others, in
different ways.71
7°Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle. Translated by D. P.
Chase (^ew York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950), p. 14.
71lbid., pp. 15-14.
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Aristotle found the basis of all society and the state in the
basic fact of the harmonious transaction.

According to him,

there are four equilibriums which are the basis of human society.
These four equilibriums are those between man and woman, master
and slave (ruler and subject), parent and child, and that of ex
change between people.

He contended that these relationships

between people exist and will persist, and as such, are harmonious,
natural, and embody truth*

He reasoned that these relationships

obviously satisfy the demands of both parties equally since they
exist and are repeated, implying balance and harmony.

It is

evident that this theory is just as sound as any modern theory
of the balance of nature in botanical investigations.

Aristotle

explained the basis of these equilibriums and the transactions
inherent in them in purely naturalistic terms, not in terms of
development as Xenophon had done in his attempt to eaqplain spe
cialization as a result of urbanization.

Aristotle wrote:

He who thus considers things in their first growth
and origin, whether a state or anything else, will ob
tain the clearest view of them . . . Wow nature has
distinguished between the female.and the slave. For
she is not niggardly like the smith who fashions the
Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing
for a single use, and every instrument is best made
when intended for one and not for many u s e s . 7 2
This natural diversity Aristotle thought to be the basis of com
plimentary or equilibrium relationships, exchange being one of
these.

72Aristotle's Politics, op. cit., p. 63.
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There was tradition, expressed by Xenophon, to the effect
that wealth could be created by skill.

As was mentioned pre

viously, this was the first attempt toward a theory of natural
resources, or a theory which permits the treatment of nature
as a field in which man can apply technique and benefit from
better techniques.

Aristotle expressly rejected this view as

he built up a systematic theory from equilibrium analysis*
Although he realized that people have certain natural desires
based on physical processes, he felt that all natural desires
are stable and satiable.

Money was developed to facilitate

trade, but the accumulation of money is not natural, Aristotle
thought, since money only has a natural function as a common
term for items in trade*
that shoes have two uses:
sold in commerce.
The

He illustrated this point by saying
that of being worn and that of being

The first use Aristotle considered natural.

latter use, he maintained, is natural only when the purpose

of the exchange is to get shoes to the wearer or to obtain some
thing for the seller which he needs for his own use, even if
money is use^ in the transaction.

Thus, Aristotle considered

capital accumulation unnatural:
The same may be said of all possessions, for
the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it
arises at first from what is natural, from the cir
cumstance that some have too little, others too much
(of different things). Hence we may infer that re
tail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting
wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to ex
change when they had enough.73

73Ibid., p. 67
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This point bears careful analysis since it

questions the

assumption that equilibrium can be consistent with capital ac
cumulation.

As Aristotle saw it, the accumulation of wealth

had no reference to its use in satisfying the needs of the in
dividual concerned.

If there were ways of getting more wealth

than one needs for his individual uses, then disequilibrium
would result since the other party would be getting less than
he needed for his uses.

Likewise, Aristotle could not accept

profit since, if there is an equilibrium, both sides would
make the same profit, and that would be self-contradictory.
Since Aristotle regarded exchange as a process whereby parties
voluntarily demand other goods slightly more than a surplus of
goods they have so that mutual advantage results to both parties,
he did not see any created value or organizational gain in this
process.

As he believed it to be natural to start with, nothing

new could result.

In Aristotle's view, the art of getting wealth

is the art of incurring disequilibrium, an unnatural state of af
fairs.

He argued that the process of getting money to satisfy

natural needs by exchanging natural products is one thing, but
that the art of accumulating money above the value of this which
is traded, or needed, is a sign of disequilibrium, a withdrawal
from the social process of exchange for personal greed, and
jarring to the harmony of nature.

Everything in this system

is static, including his view of natural resources, or fruits
of nature:
For political science does not make men but takes
them from nature and uses them, so too, nature provides

3A0

them with earth or sea or the like as the source of
food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager
of a household, who has to order the things which
nature supplies — he may be compared to the weaver
who has not to make but to use wool, and to know, too,
what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and
unserviceable , . . But strictly speaking, as I have
already said, the means of life must be provided be
forehand by nature; for the business of nature is to
furnish food for that which is born, and the food of
the offspring is always what remains over of that from
which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting
wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.7^
Aristotle’s Theory of Choice and Creative Exploitation
Any treatment of resources must include a theory of a source
of increment, or an addition to that which is in use or in func
tional existence.

Equilibrium analysis excludes the existence

of changes in relationships, or shifts, and consequently ex
cludes the idea of resources.

As pointed out above, Aristotle

placed natural produce in the area of a natural equilibrium and
analyzed human society, including individual productivity, as
part of the same continuous equilibrium.

These ideas were set

forth in an age of individualism and artistic creation.

Zeller

described the individualism of the times at the intellectual
level as follows:
In the play of political life, throwing everyone
on himself and his own resources, in the rivalry of
unlimited competition for all the good things of life,
the Greeks had learned to make free use of all their
mental powers*75

7b

Ibid., p. 71.

75Zeller, op. cit*, p. 15*
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To explain the phenomena of human creativity, which did
not fit well into his natural equilibrium, Aristotle turned
toward the character and individual aspect of man for the source
of progress.

This course seemed reasonable in view of the in

stability in economic and monetary processes and the chronic
warfare of the fourth century, which made individual wealth
very insecure.

The individual and his own virtue, or character

and ability, seemed to offer the best investment for surplus
energy which simultaneously contributed to the welfare of the
community,

Aristotle had to recognize that reason or delibera

tion is exercised by man alone and that it is this faculty which
raises him above the other animal6. Desires are natural, but
reason is introduced to effectuate those desires.

Thus, reason

does not change nature, but merely enables man to manipulate
himself subjectively to ude alternative means of adapting to
nature.

Ends are not the subject of reason or choice;

they are

naturally determined, but means offer some room for alternatives
But we do deliberate respecting such practical
matters as are in our own power (which are what are
left after all our exclusions).
I have adopted this division because causes seem
to be divisible into nature, necessity, chance, and
moreover intellect, and all human powers.
And as man in general deliberates about what man
in general can effect, so individuals do about such
practical things as can be effected through their
own instrumentality.
Again, we do not deliberate respecting such arts
or sciences as are exact and independent. . . but we

Ib2

do deliberate on all such things as are usually done
through our own instrumentality, but not invariably
in the same way; as, for instance, about matters connected with the healing art, or with money-making;
and, again, more about piloting ships them gymnastic
exercises, because the former has been less exactly
determined
. .
So then, deliberation takes place in such matters
as are under general law, but still uncertain how in
any given case they will issue, i.e., in which there
is some indefiniteness . . «
Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means
to Ends. No physician, for instance, deliberates
whether he will cure . .
This passage from Aristotle is so consistent with modern
marginalist theory as represented by such economists as Lionel
Robbins that it deserves attention.

The chief difference in

Aristotle's theory and that of modern marginalist theory is
that Aristotle considered choice a passive or negative thing
as it applies to nature, in which he included society.

The

laws of nature and society he thought to be in a state of
equilibrium, so that choice could be applied only to ordering
the few alternative means available.

According to his view,

the only way man can improve the implementation of choice is
for him to improve his mind and character
soul, as Aristotle would put it.

or, to develop his

In his illustration of the

weaver, Aristotle indicated that man might learn more about
the characteristics of wool, but that his chief job was that
of becoming a better weaver since wool and weaving were the

^The Ethics of Aristotle, op. cit., p . 5^•
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limits of nature already set for him*

This excludes technology

and capital, but leaves room for the development of human skill,
which offers an unending avenue of improvement*
It will be remembered that Xenophon found an unlimited
area for the application of knowledge and capital in scale of
organization and the ordering process in his casual descriptive
work.

Aristotle could not avoid descriptive material, and yet

he ignored the obvious fact that improvements in skill can
change material productivity and upset the equilibrium of ’’Ends.'5
In his equilibrium of exchange, he avoided this problem by
being completely subjective.

He let the seller's valuation of

his own offering depend on his own demand for it as compared
with his demand for the object he sought in exchange.

Therefore,

demand is completely determined by one individual for both sides
of the equilibrium, and any shift in skill or ability involves
no upset of the equilibrium.

Any exchange is a result of the

equality of the personal equilibrium of demands of the different
parties to the transaction.
In postulating an "End" (the accumulation of virtue, which
is not materially limited by the order and equilibrium of nature),
Aristotle developed a system of relativity or proportional com
parison to relate this extra factor to material goods, namely
goods of the body (physiological necessities) and external
goods (material instruments of life like tools and conveniences). —
Virtue includes that which makes man superior to the animals, the

i^

power of reason.

As Aristotle defined it, virtue is choice in

the only area of uncertainty and therefore the only variable re
source.

The value of virtue is improved by mental and moral

training:
Thus it is clear that household management attends
more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things,
and to human excellence more than to the excellence of
property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of free
men than to the virtue of s l a v e s . 77
Aristotle recognized that the practice of virtue is dependent
upon such material preconditions as food, shelter and social or
ganisation, and these he incorporated in the natural equilibrium.
Although not taken account of in his formal theories, he also
recognized that practicing the art of wealth getting leads men
to deviate from natural equilibriums.

He recounted the story

of Thales, for example, who got a monopoly of the olive presses
in his district by leasing them all cheaply the winter before a
bumper crop.

According to Aristotle, he did this to prove that

philosophers had practical knowledge and, incidentally, made a
tidy profit.
Deviations from the natural equilibrium tend to be con
trolled by the state through ordinances, such as those on price
control, but a basis of comparison was needed to arrive at just
value.

For this purpose, Aristotle worked out a marginal, analysis

or a proportional system of comparatives which, except for the
inclusion of virtue, is a precise statement of the marginalist
form introduced in the late nineteenth century.

Philip Wicksteed

77Aristotle, Aristotle*s Politics, op. cit., p. 75*

2A5

specifically commented on this fact in his pioneering work on
marginal analysis:
Wow I conceive that the application of this dif
ferential method to economics must tend to enlarge
and harmonise our conception of the scope of the study,
and to keep it in constant touch with the wider ethical,
social and sociological problems and aspirations from
which it must always draw its inspiration and derive
its interest; for if we really understand and accept
the principle of differential significances we shall'
realise, as already pointed out, that Aristotle's
system of ethics and our reconstructed system of eco
nomics are twin applications of one identical princi
ple of law, and that our conduct in business is but
a phase or part of our conduct in life, both being
determined by our sense, such as it is, of differen
tial significances and their changing weights as the
’ ‘
"
hich they are the differences expand
Wicksteed was dealing with an equilibrium or harmonic relationship between material factors which vary in their material
components, but somehow retain a constant, mutual orientation.
This is a static analysis and, in the same way in which Aristotle
dealt with nature, limits choice to means within a predetermined
equilibrium of ends.

However, Aristotle did not admit variations

in material components in the harmony of nature as did Wicksteed.
Instead, Aristotle dealt with development and growth as being
limited to the boundless potential of virtue.

Since absolute

quantitative measurement was inadequate for dealing with this
quality, Aristotle employed a relationship involving the infinite
potential of virtue and the maximization of returns from two

'wicksteed, op. cit., pp* 779^780
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material classes of goods, i.e., goods of the body and external
goods.
Aristotle considered these two classes of goods as being
naturally constant in value or absolute in relation to the
individual, even if some men are perverted enough to try to accumulate external goods beyond their usefulness.

Wicksteed

drew on proportionality or relative values because he found
the material substance of the harmony of values of material
goods subject to change, although he felt the harmony was
stable.

Thus, for his

from the assumption

type of measurement,

ratiosderived

of equilibrium or harmony were the only

stable economic dimensions.
Aristotle stated his analysis in the following terms after
pointing out that all must have three kinds of goods:

goods of

the body, external goods, and goods of the soul (courage, tem
perance, justice and prudence):
. . . and this is not only matter of experience, but,
if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accord
ance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a
limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful
are of such a nature that where there is too much of
them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no
use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the
greater it is,
is also of greater use,
if theepithet
useful as well
as noble is appropriate
to such subjects.
No prodf is required to show that the best state of
one thing in relation to another corresponds in degree
of excellence to the interval between the natures of
which we say that these very states are states: so
that if the soul is more noble than our possessions

14?

or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us,
it must be admitted that the best state of either has
a similar ratio to the other. 79
We must credit Aristotle with formulating a system for
analyzing an unlimited potential in relation to an equilibrium
or balance of forces.

This is infinitely more difficult in the

social sciences than in the natural sciences.

In his works in

physics and metaphysics, Aristotle was thorough and coherent in
his development of a theory of the circulation of energy as the
basis of substance and form, thus combining change and circula
tory equilibrium.

Such ideas underlie the principles of the in

destructibility of matter and* the conservation of energy, which
permit mathematical analysis of natural phenomena.

In another

sense, Aristotle was more advanced in his social theories be
cause he grappled with a principle of infinite possibility which
is the necessary rationale of the existence of change.
Aristotle’s Equilibrium Analysis
Aristotle's theory of equilibrium needs special attention
because it is the avenue by which Greek equilibrium analysis
reached European education and influenced social philosophy.
This influence from Greek thought is still a vital force today.
"^Aristotle, Aristotle's Politics, op. cit., p. 279* It
will be noted that the concluding sentence of this passage con
tains a statement of subjective demand resulting in a constant
ratio of maximum values, although two are inelastic and the last
is infinitely elastic as to quantity usable. This is an ab
straction which perhaps transcends J. R. Eicks' two lines of
demand theory. See J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 195&)» Chapt. II, "The Measureability of Utility," pp. 8-15, especially pp. 10, 11, and 12.
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The "checks and balances" of the American constitution, for
example, and the tradition of hearing both sides in a law suit
before judicial decision are ideas drawn from Greek equilibrium
theory acquired through the medium of Aristotle's writings*
Theories of climax in vegetation, the balance of nature, and
circulatory equilibriums such as the theory of the carbon cycle
are also in the Aristotelian tradition*
In an earlier section, pre-Socratic philosophy was traced
through its primitive formative period when the basic pattern
of analysis was being developed.
of philosophy was:
material facts;

The sequence in the development

first, the analysis of things as organic or

second, as processes or sequences of change;

third, as balanced patterns of change with repetitive characteris
tics suggesting circular flow;

and fourth, as circulations in

balance between one another, or equilibriums between circular
equilibriums.
sought.

Through all these stages, equilibriums were

Later, change was recognized as disturbing the equili

brium, and a further equilibrium was sought beyond it which more
fully explained the known facts or processes.

The techniques

of pure equilibrium analysis which denied change and assumed
complete predictability were set forth by Parmenides and his
successor, Zeno.
In his investigations in the physical sciences, Aristotle
improved his equilibrium theories by searching out the cause of
the motion or changes within any given circulation, at least to
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the point of the "unmoved mover,"

However, in his theories on

politics and ethics, he built a hierarchy of equilibriums in
which change was excluded on the assumption that the equilibriums
were based upon a beginning foundation of voluntary transactions
which precluded any demand for change.

Since the primary ap

proach to resource analysis has been through economic theory,
and since economic theory has relied very heavily on equilibrium
analysis, the characteristics and limitations of equilibrium
theory should be kept in mind when attempting to apply the theory
to resource problems.

Aristotle presented the simplest repre

sentation of equilibrium theory, and for that reason, his theories
most clearly illustrate the basic limitations of that approach
in their sharpest form.
First, Aristotle assumed that exchange was created by a
natural diversity, and took place through the voluntary partici
pation of parties equally capable of refraining from the exchange.
He placed all human relationships, however unequal in fact, in
natural equilibriums.

Thus, by defining social relations as

equilibriums, he could then analyze them from this starting point.
Equilibrium, for him, was a fact, not a tool of thought or an
hypothesis used for convenience in research.

As Parmenides

demonstrated, anything can be analyzed with equilibrium assump
tions which do not incorporate the concept of change, but such
analysis leads to conclusions incompatible with reality.
Equilibrium in exchange, in Aristotle's theory, was based
upon the equality of subjective demand by a party for both the
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goods he had, and the goods he wanted.

Thus, if a man valued

his surplus agricultural produce exactly the same as he valued
a pair of shoes, the values would be in equilibrium automati
cally and exchange would be possible.
value was natural and universal;
was also natural.

This internal individual

therefore equilibrium value

Aristotle regarded money as an artificial

creation which facilitated exchange and permitted latitude of
time and place in transactions.

He believed that the natural

equilibrium between the usefulness of goods was the same for
all men, though he did foresee the possibility of fraudulent in
dividuals deviating from natural values in trying to accumulate
money with no relation to naturally-determined utility.

This

accumulation was fraudulent since, by definition, it violated
moral and legal sanctions.

Since exchange in Aristotle’s

system was based upon the equality of the goods to the trader
himself, there was absolutely no room for profit.

Thus, when

a shoemaker wished to trade shoes and the housebuilder wanted
shoes, the natural demand was the same in both their natures;
therefore the just price would be the same for both of them.
Any deviation from this equilibrium price Aristotle regarded
as a deviation from justice and virtue, which could be cor
rected only by an impartial party, a judge, who could "feel”
the natural price without being influenced

by

personal
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greed*
Max Lerner's characterization of Aristotle might well have
been written about Greek thought in general:
But while he ransacked all the storehouses of
knowledge open to him at the time, the Faustian im
pulse was not yet in him. That was to come with the
age of conquest. Knowledge was for him a way of ac
commodating ourselves to the world rather than a way
of conquering it, as it was with the scientists of
the seventeenth century. It was a form of adjustment,
not a form of action.81
So powerfully driven were the Greeks by their naturalism that
they could not shake off the idea that man's course is pre
determined and that he must of necessity conform with the mold
set for him by nature.

It may be that even yet we have not al

together shaken off the naturalism which pursued the Greek phil
osophers.

SO

The Ethics of Aristotle, op. cit•, pp. 107-137» See es
pecially pp. 118-120, where demand price and the concomitance be
tween equilibrium and exchange are elaborated. Using the mean or
the proportion as the basis of equilibrium, Aristotle derived
price in money terms from the equilibrium where seller A 1
Seller B : : A's goods C : B's goods D* Thus, A times D equals
B times C. A judge does not find equilibrium price by equilibrat
ing the demands of the offerers; he finds just price by deduction
from the equilibrium. However, since immoral deviations are just
as likely to go one way as another, just price is average price
or mean price between those asked by the parties in the trans
action, generally speaking.
8lLerner, Max, in his introduction to Aristotle's Politics,
op. cit., p. 16.
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PART III
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THOUGHT ON WEALTH, NATURE, AND MAH
At this point we shall glance only briefly at the great
medieval meander into introspective moralization before again
taking up the thread of economic thought related to natural re
sources with the blossoming of mercantilist thought.
The medieval period was primarily characterized by mystic
and moral exposition until Saint Thomas Acquinas, perceiving
that the lure of heresy had led too many souls astray* retraced
the path and again took up the method of systematic thought in
his search for intellectually satisfying proofs of religion*
The doctrine of the church now required the best of the systematic
thought of the past to sustain it* and Aristotle the Philosopher
became almost as authorative as the New Testament,

After a

period of relative-neglect, his works were again studied and com
mented upon by all the great scholars.

Acquinas* however, was

interested in economics purely from the moral standpoint* and
his works bear the marks of the period when narrow moralism and
faith served as the basis for reflective thought.

Becker char

acterized the, era of Saint Thomas Acquinas as follows:

i

Theology related and expounded the history of the
world. Philosophy was the science that rationalized
and reconciled nature and history. Logic provided
both theology and philosophy with an adequate methodo
logy* ".As a result, we have, among innumerable other
works, the Summa theologica, surely one of the most
amazing and stupendous products of the human mind. It
is safe to say that never before or since has the wide
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world been so neatly boxed and compassed, so com
pletely and confidently understood, every known
detail of it fitted, with such subtle and loving
precision, into a consistent and convincing whole
One of the advances of the period, perhaps born of the or
ganizational vastness of the Roman Empire and the Roman Church,
was a tendency to look at the economics of the world on a
greatly enlarged scale.

The development of trade and the widen

ing of contact between peoples may have been a contributing
factor.

For example, in about 1360 a Frenchschoolman* Nicole

Oresme, wrote a discussion on the origin of exchange.

He was

a translator and commentator of Aristotle, and was familiar in
detail with Aristotle's work;
was different.

however, his pattern of emphasis

He did not take up the idea of individual dif

ferences in human skill advanced by Plato;

instead, he elaborated

on Aristotle's statement that different individuals have a little
more of one thing than another.

He enlarged this idea to a

naturalistic concept that geographical diversity causes dif
ferences of produce, such as between shepherds and wheat farmers,
concluding that natural diversity over space creates the natural
specialization which results in trade.
trade, but regional trade.

He referred, not to city

2 Exchange was still considered

natural, but instead of being tied to individual variations of
'management and skill resulting in a little more or less of dif-

^"Becker, Carl L., The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Cen
tury Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932")"* pp.
10-11 .
^Monroe, Arthur E., Early Economic Thought (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950) p." 81.
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ferent goods in different hands, it was related to different
natural regions and to different types of economic activity in
these regions.

The natural basis was still there, but Oresme's

theories required less exact process to be tied to nature by
logic and reason and encompassed a more generalized outlook
than did Aristotle's*
The Birth of Mercantilist Thought
Two main shifts in emphasis characterize mercantilist
writers.

The first was the recognition of a new economic unit,

the nation.

The unit of concern was no longer the individual in

pursuit of virtue and wealth;

the economic health and wealth

of the nation became the concern of economic writers for the
first time.

The second shift was a consciousness of an unlimited

source of wealth, over and above the natural sources, through
the expansion of trade.
Writing in 1613, while serving a prison term for a coinage
violation, an Italian intellectual, Antonio Serra, produced a
tract on the process of increasing wealth*

Although he fastened

on gold and silver as the ingredients of wealth, he was quite
aware of the function of goods.

Serra eliminated from consid

eration special causes of wealth such as an influx of money re
sulting from natural fertility as a basis of export.

He was

searching for the social process which leads to wealth, not
natural wealth.

He defined this social process as:
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The common factors are divided into four chief
classes: quantity of industry, quality of the popu
lation, extensive trading operations, and regulations
of the sovereign. They will be called common factors,
because they may occur in any kingdom; and the com
bination of them in any place, though it raise nothing
in excess of its own needs, but must procure' every
thing from abroad, and though it had no mines of gold
or silver, will surely make it abound in these m e t a l s .3
Serra*s direction was outward, toward an unlimited source of
wealth by the expansion of certain activities involving trade,
completely above and beyond nature.
The same emphasis is to be found in the writings of Thomas
Mun, writing in England in 163O:
The revenue or stock of a Kingdom by which it is
provided of foreign wares is either Natural or Arti
ficial. The Natural wealth is so much only as can
be spared from our own use and necessities to be ex
ported unto strangers. The Artificial consists in
our manufactures and industrious trading with foreign
commodities, concerning which I will set down such
particulars as may serve for the cause we have in
hand.^Natural Law in the Eighteenth Century
We tend to lose sight of the persisting influence of natur
alism in the brilliant surge of scientific thought during the
eighteenth century.

The French philosophers and encyclopedists,

erudite and insatiably curious about everything, gave an im
pression of absolute devotion to science.

^Ibid., pp. 14-6-1^7
^Ibid., p. 172.

They were iconoclasts,

1%

pulling down the house of Saint Thomas Acquinas;

yet they re

tained an abiding faith in a completely knowable world subject
to natural laws, albeit allowing for a great deal more room for
debasement and corruption (and, incidentally, for more improve
ment) than the saintly Thomas.
One of the most influential books of this period was Mon
tesquieu's Esprit des Lois, published in 17^8 at Geneva.
was particularly popular in England.

It

The idea of a natural

system of law underlying principles of science, justice, govern
ment and economics was commonly accepted in this period,

and

Montesquieu's book was the theoretical exposition of this faith*
Jefferson's and Paine's natural rights of man, European natural
law, and British natural price are all eighteenth-century trans
lations of Greek naturalism into an expansive nationalistic com
mercial environment.

Montesquieu's classical education is re

flected throughout his work in such ideas as the balance of
power, and in his constant references to Aristotle and various
Latin classics. 5
Montesquieu discoursed on the application of natural law
to everything from climate and soil to slavery and justice.
His habit of tracing everything back to a coherent whole pattern
evidences his background in classical naturalism and in Scholastic

5See Lawrence Meyer Levin, The Political Doctrine of Mon
tesquieu's Esprit des Lois; Its Classical Background. Publica
tions of the Institute of French Studies, Inc. (New York:
Columbia University, 1936).
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absolutism.

However, the national, outlook of the mercantilists

and the widening perspective which had been developing during
the preceding centuries are also apparent:
Mankind by their industry, and by the influence
of good laws, have rendered the earth more proper for
their abode. We .see rivers flow where there have been
lakes and marshes: this is a benefit which nature has
not bestowed; but it is a benefit maintained and sup
plied by nature.®
In his discussions of the relation of nature to civiliza
tion, Montesquieu cited Holland, Egypt and certain provinces in
7
China as being areas essentially made habitable by man.
He
paraphrased Thucydides' illustration of Attica as owing her
-liberal government to an infertile soil, and his idea that fer
tility encourages invasion and a desire for absolute government:
Countries are not cultivated in proportion to
their fertility, but to their liberty; and if we
make an imaginary division of the earth, we shall be
astonished to see in most ages deserts in the most
fruitful parts, and great nations in those where
nature seems to refuse everything.°
One can easily see that Montesquieu did not allow his in
quiry into social and natural relationships to jar his faith in
the natural order.

It did not interfere with scientific thought

and careful scrutiny of facts as it had with Saint Thomas.
This was because Montesquieu's faith in the natural order was

Montesquieu, Baron de, Charles de Secondat, The Spirit of
laws. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 38 (London: Ency
clopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 125.
7Ibid., p. 126.
8Ibid., p. 125.

l^B

simply the faith that everything would make sense in a clear,
coherent picture if the subject were pursued just a little
further.

As long as he never quite arrived at the full natural

harmony he sought, this faith provided the inspiration of the
Scholastic without the fetters of a world presumed finite,
changeless, and completely understood.
In contrasting the thirteenth and twentieth centuries,
Becker illustrated the middle position of the eighteenth:
With the best will in the world it is quite im
possible for us to conceive of existence as a divinely
ordered drama, the beginning and end of which is known,
the significance of which has once and for all been re
vealed* For good or ill we must regard the world as a
continuous flux, a ceaseless and infinitely complicated
process of waste and repair, so that 'all things and
principles of things' are to be regarded as no more
than 'inconstant modes or fashions,1 as the 'concur
rence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting
sooner or later on their way.' The beginning of this
continuous process of change is shrouded in impenetrable
mist; the end seems more certain, but even less en
gaging. 9
Becker assumed less natural order in modern physical sciences
than Montesquieu did in society in the eighteenth century:
But the intelligent world is far from being so well
governed as the physical. For though the former has
also its laws, which of their own nature are invariable,
does not conform to them so exactly as the physical
world. This is because, on the one hand, particular
intelligent beings are of a finite nature, and conse
quently liable to error; and on the other, their
nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they
do not steadily conform to their primitive laws; and
even those of their own instituting they frequently
infringe. 3-0

9

Becker, 0£. cit., p. 12.

■^Montesquieu, ojo. eft., p. 1.
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Montesquieu regarded commerce in general as one of these
loosely confining lavrs of nature which is productive of many
advantages.

Customs and knowledge from different countries

are carried by commerce, and the movable surplus of one country
is traded for that of another so that the mutual advantage of
both avoids the necessity of advantage or profit from the trans
action, and peace is encouraged.

He pointed out Holland's ad

vantage of having domestic forests and quarries because ships
could bring back timber and marble as ballast at cost.’*’^'
Consistent with his view of this national benefit from
commerce, Montesquieu advocated the need for a balance and
freedom of trade, so that natural principles could govern the
process without advantage accruing to special groups or classes.
He espoused a laissez-faire policy of free trade:

that business

interests should not interfere with the free flow of commerce.
Montesquieu regarded commerce as a natural resource, and be
lieved that constraints and restrictions upon it by special
interests should be stopped by the government*

The merchants,

the guilds, and frequently the nobility as well as the crown,
were the violators which needed regulation for national benefit
to accrue from the natural process of commerce:
The freedom of commerce is not a power granted to
the merchants to do what they please: this would be
more properly its slavery. The constraint of the mer
chant is not the constraint of commerce. It is in the

11Ibid., pp. 146, 148

l6o

freest countries that the merchant finds innumerable
obstacles: and he is never less crossed by laws than
in a country of slaves.1^
Montesquieu's view of the orderliness of the laws of all
things and his faith in their being knowable

is behind the

scientific courage of the eighteenth century.

People were con

fident that they could find out how things fitted together, and
not the least of the incentives was the anticipation of gaining
individual glory as the definitive authority in some field of
science.

With the assurance that there was only a narrow gap

between natural law and the variables of physical and social
processes, men sought the overall view of the stable relation
ships or equilibriums which made life conform to natural purpose.
The Foundation of Natural Value
Although the seventeenth century was buoyed by a spirit of
expansionism and of new and vast perspectives in society and the
physical sciences, the Greek influence was still strong.

Con

sistent and thoroughgoing explanations had to be developed which
defined the relationship of all things to all others.

One could

start with the basic dictum everyone took for granted, Aristotle's
first principles, or one could start with the discovery of a
great natural unit or equilibrium and deduce from it back to the
details, making due allowance for small areas of free agency and
human frailty in following nature's laws.

1 2 Ibid., p. 14-9.

l6l

The tremendous expansion of trade had stimulated men to
look beyond the problems of virtue and morals.

They looked

abroad for riches and necessities, and began to think in terms
of large provincial agricultural areas as potential units of
commerce.

From the fourteenth century when Oresme looked to

esqsansive geographic differences for the cause of exchange and
commerce and Etien Marcel was leading the merchants of Paris
to dictate policy to the throne, France developed as a national
unit with increasing consciousness of the importance of commerce.
This broad outlook was still rooted in the certainty of a totally
knowable world, and the assurance that logic and observation
could provide an intelligible explanation of all things was still
bolstered by natural and moral truisms.
Thomas Hobbes’ writings furnish an example of this trend.
He tried to apply the principles of Gallileo’s physics directly
to social law and political theory of the state*

Hobbes* idea

was that natural law, when applied to all things, made the organic
relationship or material things real, not only at the foundation
of relationships, but as the essential character of the new and
most important social unit, the national state.
In the latter eighteenth century, the Physiocrats or "Economists” as they were called in France, approached national economic
problems from two directions*

First, they tried to build up a

body of underlying material relationships which were thought to
comprise the essentials of commerce and wealth*

Secondly, led

by Quesnay, they took the overall economic process and analyzed
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it as an equilibrium of circulating values*

These two approaches

are essentially the modern micro- and macro-economic approaches*
The Physiocrats' application of these approaches to explain the
economic processes as they saw them was the first elaboration of
a body of theory designed to give a comprehensive explanation
of national economic processes.

The theory retained the idea of

natural value derived from the physical properties of nature as
the sole and total source of economic wealth and values.

It

contained a concept of natural resources and assigned the basis
of wealth and value to these resources.
development;

It was not a theory of

too many unassimilated developments had taken

place while the rigid Scholastic framevfork of philosophy ignored
the challenge.

Eighteenth century economic theory was an at

tempt to explain what was happening, and why it was happening.
It retained an overtone of Greek philosophy;

i.e., that nature

must be understood so that man could better adapt himself to it
insofar as possible.
As men in the eighteenth century tried to look at their
problems in terms of generalizations which fit the scale of
life of their day, they struggled to build up a new framework
of relationships.

One of the simplest ways to start the con

struction of a theory of the general commercial process was to
build upward from the fundamental organic relationship.

The

old Greek ideas of organic nature, the natural equilibrium,
the circulation and the circulatory systems in equilibrium were
still a basic part of the classical education of the times.
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In what Monroe described as "the most important work on
economics before the Wealth, of N a t i o n13s Hichard Cantillon
attempted a systematic survey of the nature of commerce in his
Essai sur le Commerce , building from the first principles of
nature.

For Cantillon, the productivity of the land was the

source of wealth.

The value of human labor, he thought, could

be defined by establishing the basic equation of man to natural
production.

Cantillon postulated that it took about twice the

natural produce of the land required for a man’s subsistence to
support a family and perpetuate the population.

On this as

sumption, human labor could be measured in terms of the produce
of the land required to sustain and perpetuate the human in. his
effort.

Further, if human labor could thus be valued, then all

products could be valued in natural terms by computing the labor
and land equivalents which go into them.

Cantillon noted that

supply and demand involved slight variations in price, but this
he assumed was secondary to value, and not the issue.

However,

Cantillon qualified his ironclad material and natural definition
of value derived from the productivity of nature by interjecting
considerations of standards of living:
In order to understand this better, it is necessary
to know that a poor Peasant can support himself, at the
lowest calculation, on the produce of an Acre & a half
of land, living on bread & vegetables, wearing clothes
of Hemp, & wooden shoes . . .
This is why I did not specify how much Land corres
ponds in value to.the work of the humblest Peasant or
Laborer, when I said that it was worth twice the produce
of the Land which serves to support him; for that varies
"^Monroe, op. cit., p. 2^6.
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according to the standard of living in the different
Countries. In some southern Provinces of France, the
Peasant lives on the produce of an acre & a half of
Land, & there his labor may be estimated as equal to
the produce of three acres. But in Middlesex County,
the Peasant ordinarily spends the produce of 5 to 8
acres of Land, & thus his work may be estimated at
twice that.l^
Cantillon chided some of the English writers who had re
ferred to this par between land and labor without treating it
as a basis for analysing the relations of the economy or as a
cause or first principle underlying exchange.

He believed that

v/ithin any given nation where the standard of living is fairly
uniform, the equilibrium of values could be deemed constant, and
that the produce of the land could serve as the measure of ex
change values as expressed through the organic cost of physical
human labor.

Cantillon's essay was written between 1730 and

1734, although it was not published until 1755*

This preceded

Francois Quesnay's Tableau Economique by three years and Turgot's
Reflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses by
only a little over a decade.
Turgot was a prominent French statesman of the period, and
had reached the position of finance minister when his attempt to
institute free trade by breaking the monopoly of the guilds on
production led to his downfall in 1776*

^he movement for national

control and domestic freedom from commercial privileges in the
hands of the guild masters was the heart of the liberal free trade •

lifIbid., pp. 234-255.
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philosophy of that day.

The guild masters had served the pur

pose of governing the productive economy during the years of
feudal instability, but with the development of the national
state, their industrial monopolies obstructed the growth of
commerce and limited the production of goods.

The theoretical

foundation for the free trade philosophy was that of the order
of nature, i.e., the natural value of goods based upon their
equation to the value of the produce of land.

By deriving the

value of labor from its necessary relationship to the produce of
the land, Cantillon arrived at what he considered the natural value
of goods.
Turgot developed the same view in his Reflexions, but recog
nized another problem in the equation.

According to his view,

the natural produce of the land is the expression of nature, and
so the land must be valued in a given ratio to the value of its
produce.

Other commodities are valued as they are equal to the

labor or land productivity, and the value of their source is equal
to the same ratio of the product of the land to the land itself.
Turgot illustrated this idea as follows:
Land is always the first and sole source of all
riches; it is land which, as a result of cultivation,
yields all revenue; it is land also which furnished
,
the first fund of advances prior to all cultivation . .
All classes of work in agriculture, industry or
commerce require advances. Even if the earth, were

15Ibid., p. 553
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cultivated by hand, it would be necessary to sow
before reaping; it would be necessary to live until
after the harvest. The more elaborate and vigorous ^
cultivation becomes, the larger the advances are , ■
These excerpts suggest that Turgot regarded the productivity
of the land as a first principle, or prime permissive factor.
This idea did not, however, prevent him from recognizing that
accumulation has an important role in development, but this was
not his major concern in his efforts to free French commerce
from the restrictions which prevented its growth and the full
development of the potential for specialization and utilization
already inherent in her agricultural wealth.

His reliance upon

agriculture as the prime source of wealth is not surprising since
France was and still is relatively rich agriculturally.

See de

scribed the importance of French agriculture as-follows;
. . . the predominance of rural property ownership
and of agricultural production constitutes a permanent
characteristic of French civilization, which survived
even in the nineteenth century, in spite of the progress
of industry. Consequently the equilibrium was never
destroyed, as it was in England and has been in Germany
today, to the advantage of industrial production and to
the prejudice of the rural sections . . . France remained
essentially an agricultural country, and even today it
_„
is not losing its character as an agricultural democracy.
Turgot stated that land produces a surplus above the material
input required for its cultivation, and he attributed the source
of value to this natural surplus.

Thus, the source of the material

l6Ibid.. p. 352.
17
See, Henri, Economic and Social Conditions in France During
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 233.
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requirements of progress and change were still inherent in the
natural order.

Turgot believed that this natural surplus was

the yardstick by which all other values could be measured.

Thus,

his value system was based on natural wealth, or a resource.
The raw existence of nature is valuable insofar as it produces
a surplus over the cost of working the land.

This surplus produce

of nature is the positive contribution which adds something new
and, as such, is a resource, or a source and measure of value.
Labor is equal in value to the amount of natural produce required
to support a laborer;

sheep are equal in value to the given

quantity of natural produce required to raise them.
problem of a par between produce and other items.

Here is the
If an acre of

land will produce four bushels of grain above all costs, this
four bushels is the natural surplus which provides the material
requirements for further production.

Therefore, all produce is

equal in value to the amount of other products which require the
same amount of natural capital for production.
constant in exchange.

This ratio is

Of course, a constant standard of living

is assumed in order that labor may be so equated.
Additionally, the problem of the ratio between the value of
the surplus produce of the land and the exchange value of the
land itself had to be faced.

The problem is that the price of

land, which is a social thing, is a function of supply and demand,
not nature.

This ratio between the social right of ownership and

the value of the natural produce of the land Turgot called "the
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penny in the price of land.”

This was apparently a popular term

of the day for the ratio between the annual surplus of the land
and its market value.

It was reasonable that the value of the

net product of the land be determined from its natural material
relations and that the sales price of the land be a function of
this relationship when we consider that this phase of value was
more obviously institutional in a period of complex legal tenures
and varying degrees of titles in land.

This circumstance con

founded the market price of land as an index of value.

Turgot

found that land sold for the twentieth to the thirtieth penny;
that is. for twenty to thirty times the net product or revenue
of the land, varying somewhat with supply and demand.
Turgot’s natural productivity theory based on the material
relationship of nature to society furnished a basis for the de
termination of value above and beyond the complicated pattern of
feudal and guild rights.

The introduction of a measurement in

terms of a natural surplus above subsistence was a blow to the
bullionists and mercantilists of the day who had contended that
the wealth of a nation was to be determined by the amount of
precious metal in a country.

Not only was nature the source of

life, but nature was the source of the accumulation which per
mitted expansion of the natural potentials of commerce and
efficiency.

Therefore, free trade between nations and within

nations would promote the natural order and permit natural wealth

Monroe, op. cit., p.
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to be put to its natural uses as it was accumulated by man from
nature.
This was the first theory to incorporate the idea of a
beneficent nature so popularly associated with the term natural
resources today.

According to the theory, all surplus above the

cost of subsistence is initially a gift of the bounty of nature 5
therefore, nature is the source of increasing wealth.

The net

product or revenue from nature above the cost of cultivation or
exploitation permits the accumulation of advances for more effi
cient use in society if this potential making possible commerce
and re-investment in the land is not interfered with.

The roots

of this theory of natural value go back to the Greeks, but the
emphasis on land was a contribution of the eighteenth century*
This basic theory of the natural product has survived as a popu
lar and academic concept of value through the legal and theoretical
traditions of all agricultural nations.

Because of the wide ac

ceptance of the idea, the limitations of the theory have posed
a problem in much subsequent economic theory.

Two approaches

which have been employed to handle the natural value of the pro
duce of the earth are (1) to treat it as a free good, and (2)
when scarcity makes it a subject of economic valuation, to assume
that the price mechanism evaluates the social importance of the
material quantities involved.

This second method is based on

the assumption that if society and commerce are free and governed
by natural principles, the price mechanism will adequately discover
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the natural value, and that all the social potentials of natural
resources will be taken account of in the equilibrium price of
a free market.
The body of macro-economic theory developed by the eighteenth
century natural order economists has been influential in France
and the United States to the present day, along with classical
British political economy.

This macro-economic approach based

on the productivity of nature system of value was framed by
Quesnay into a formula for national policy and comprehensive
analysis.

Adam Smith added a new emphasis to this framework with

a synthesis which gave it meaning in the setting of the industrial
revolution, but in the process he omitted the idea of the produc
tivity of nature.

This ommission left natural resource analysis

a stepchild of economic theory.
Quesnay and National Equilibrium Analysis
Francois Quesnay was a physician, and it may have been his
initial work on the blood system which led him to work out an
organic analysis of the national distributive system.

In the

tradition of his day, he found the basis of material quantity in
the produce of the land, and this he found to circulate through
the economy in a balanced system of exchange as long as free
pricing was allowed to regulate natural exchange processes.
with Aristotle, Quesnay believed that fair exchange would not
allow profit.

Any income by the mercantile or manufacturing

As
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classes in excess of their costs of production he regarded as a
drain on the product of the land, which could only be spent for
luxury goods.

He viewed capital as productive only if spent on

the land to assist nature in yielding her bounty;
in his view, was capital productive^

nowhere else,

Leo Rogin explained this

point as follows:
It should be noted that while the cultivators are
referred to as the productive class, it is not their
labor but the land which is conceived to be the source
of the surplus. The surplus is a free gift of nature.
It is this doctrine of the produit net which constitutes
the distinctive feature of Physiocratic theory, and it
is to the demonstration of this doctrine that the
Tableau is primarily dedicated.^9
Quesnay's Tableau Economique was essentially a balance sheet
showing the equilibrium or national exchange between the various
classes of society:
ists.

farmers, landed proprietors, and industrial

Although Quesnay

and just exchange would

believed that the natural order of society
not permit profit or the creation of

wealth, he was aware that wealth in the form of movable property
could be increased.

This net increase he attributed to the surplus

bounty of nature, and he thought the only productive use for it
was re-investment in the cultivation of the land, or in the aiding
of nature to produce.

In his Observations Importantes Quesnay

postulated a multiplier effect of re-investment in land by which
the amount of surplus was continually augmented.

Although a

point of economic maturity is indicated when the absolute potential
of nature is approached and additional capital can no longer fur
ther the production of a surplus, the concentration on the usefulness
o£. cit., p. 20.
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of surplus in perpetuating itself, and the primary importance of
surplus above the equilibrium of natural exchange is the im
portant economic contribution of this systematic theory of the
national economy.
The ideal of perfectability in society was implied in
Quesnay's third Observation

20

in his statement that a maturity

or optimum state of the bounty of nature can be achieved by re
investment of the net surplus in natural development, and in a
reserve for contingencies resulting from natural variations,
21
The sixth Observation
ad\Fanced the idea that following the
natural course of furthering the produce of the land stimulates
man to plan ahead in anticipation of nature, with the implication
that this course is the sole source of virtue as well as net
profit,

Quesnay1s incorporation of the idea of a natural surplus

in his generalized view of a national circulatory system drew to
gether the concept of equilibrium with that of change in economic
theory.

His analysis was one of an equilibrium in process for

the purpose of explaining how change and accumulation could still
occur within the equilibrium.

This is different from the Greek

concept of equilibrium in which the equilibrium was regarded as
natural, and change had to be denied except in its non-material
form, i.e., the accumulation of virtue.

Moreover, Quesnay recog

nized the productivity of capital, or at least the existence of a
20

Quesnay, Francois, Oeuvres Economiques et Philosophiques de
F. Quesnay (Paris: Jules Peelman Cie., 1888), p. 31$•
21 Ibid. , pp. 322-324-.
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choice between using accumulated capital in a sterile way, for
luxuries, or in a productive way, for assisting nature to fulfill
her natural potential to produce.
The existence of a variable, that is, an element which can
be augmented or lost, is, of course, the source of man’s interest
in substances, economically speaking.

That which is a fixed part

of a natural order of things is not a resource, even though it
is subject to abuse by man or exists in limited quantities.

From

the point of view of man generally, if there is a fixed fund or
flow of a given substance which is habitually used up or is not
accumulated, it cannot confer greater or lesser benefit, and is
no more a resource than the sun shining or the average rainfall.
Quesnay did not assert that society can change its material
gain from nature by social or technical changes which would be
essentially human productivity making use of a neutral nature,
but rather that natural productivity can be taken advantage of
by man.

He developed an analysis of the economy from the most

significant social unit of the day, the nation, and used national
accounting hypotheses and equilibrium techniques in a modern way.
His contribution was the recognition of the possibility of ma
terial change in the quantity of goods in the total economy.
His equilibrium was not between fixed quantities of goods, but
between relationships.
Quesnay emphasized that material goods, as used or as accu
mulated, are the only true significance of exchange, and that the
balance of international trade had to be in material goods.

The

l?k

theoretical structure for his economic analysis was built upon a
natural resource theory of wealth;

in it, all facets of production

were measured by and secondary to natural productivity which he
assumed to have an existence of its ovm, external to human ex
ploitation, and therefore suitable as a scientific measurement
for social values*

In his theory it is this natural wealth which

supports man, but it is the surplus above what he uses at his
standard of living which constitutes the resource of economic
interest.

This net product can either be misused or be put to

natural use, and it is the resource of economic progress and de
velopment, the foundation of a continuous process of economic
change.

This aspect of Quesnay’s theory was a break with the

natural equilibrium of the Greeks, and was taken up by the out
standing theorists of the next two centuries.
Adam Smith and Human Productivity
In many details of outlook, Adam Smith stands out as the
representative of the Sophists in the eighteenth century moral
order of nature.

It was he who reasserted in his time that

"man is the measure of all things."

Looking back from the twen

tieth century, The Wealth of Nations appears to be the beginning
of a period rather than the climax of one.

From the point of

view of the development of resource theory, The Wealth of
Nations was a major synthesis from which followed two lines of
divergent thought, one emphasizing agricultural production and
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the ideological tradition of the Physiocrats, and the other em
phasizing the potentiality of human beings to make of nature
whatever capital and ingenuity will permit.

These two lines of

thought have since been wedded by analysis of the monetary ex
pression of their influence on the economy, and the analysis
of price from the industrial and commercial points of view.
In his general equilibrium or macro-economic approach,
Adam Smith revealed himself a true child of the natural order
school of the eighteenth century.

He assumed balance or equili

brium in nature and society to be the object of development and
change, that economic processes tend toward a balance, and that
this balance tends to serve the best interests of society.

He

might have looked toward change itself as the logical state of
things rather than change toward a beneficial equilibrium of
interests, but the idea of directionless change was inconceivable
to the natural order faith of the eighteenth century.

He wrote:

The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of
the different employments of labour and stock must, in
the same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or con
tinually tending to equality.22
This tendency toward an equilibrium Smith believed to be caused
by the competitive shifting of individuals from less productive
enterprises to more productive ones.

Thus, material increase for

the individual and for the nation as a whole takes place within
an ordered tendency toward an equilibrium*

This pursuit of self-

interest, assisted by an invisible hand, creates the equilibrium
22

Smith, Adam, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1957)Y P* 99*
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and the material benefit to the nation:
• * • and by directing that industry in such a manner
as its produce may be of the greatest value, he in
tends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote
an end which was no part of his intention.^
Adam Smith's theories were deduced from the assumption of
an inherent equilibrium in nature;

otherwise he could just as

well have postulated a constant tendency toward disequilibrium.
This would have been consistent with his theory of individual
first principles of the relation of man to nature.

The invisi

ble hand could just as well have been the force which leads men
to disturb equilibriums by changing rates of productivity and
upsetting the possibility of order and equality in the profits
of stock.

However, Smith held strongly to his faith in natural

order and in the naturalness of an equilibrium between processes,
as did Quesnay.
In his views on the individualized relationship between man
ana nature, Smith revived the Sophist anthropomorphic measurement,
and breathed Aristotle's boundless creativity of the human spirit
into the Physiocratic concept that material wealth was subject to
accumulation.

However, the deciding factor in the relationship

of man to nature is what man can obtain.

In Smith's view, man

must get what he can as a result of his own effort and ability;
thus, value is a product of human ability.

Therefore, surplus

is determined in its critical degree by human effort, and re-

23Ibid., p. 4-23.
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sources are a product of the value man bestows upon them by his
effoi't in making them available.
On specialization and the division of laborT Adam Smith
felt that the tendency to barter and trade is the cause of ex
change, that it stimulates specialization and improved skill
which, in turn, increases the practical value of barter and
trade.

Thus, exchange and specialization are mutually stimu

lating developments spurred on by the properties of the human
being, and augmented and made profitable through the ability
of accumulated knowledge and skill to result in greater pro
ductivity and greater adaptation of nature to man's needs.

One

can see Xenophon's idea that skill results from specialization
and Aristotle's infinite potential for personal self-iritprovement
joined with the recognition of the potential for commerce.

Thus,

Adam Smith's main thesis was that man, as a result of his individual
potential, creates his own wealth.

This is essentially the same

theoretical explanation of unlimited change which the Greeks could
not apply to the material world.

Adam Smith could not quite apply

it to society:
The annual produce of the land and labour of any
nation can be increased in its value by no other means,
but by increasing either the number of its productive
labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers
who had before been employed . . . The productive powers
of the same number of labourers cannot be increased,
but in consequence either of some addition and improve
ment to those machines and instruments which facilitate
and abridge labour; or of a more proper division and
distribution of e m p l o y m e n t . 2 4

24

-

Ibid.. p. 326
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In a purely human theory of the creation of surplus, human
labor, organization, and skill become the natural resources
which man can exploit.

The world of nature in which he lives is

subject to a natural equilibrium, and thus cannot be a source of
increment.

If natural materials are scarce, value is attributed

to them by man, and the socially-conferred rights of ownership
of these materials give value to the rights, not to the natural
materials of themselves.

Otherwise, the goods of nature are

equilibrated, evenly divided or distributed equally among the
population by the process of free exchange, and every person has
access to his material needs as a result of his personal contri
bution to the social value, not as:,a result of any positive action
of nature.

One might say that Smith completely dissolved the

field of natural resources into the study of the social processes
connected with the creation and distribution of wealth:
^he most abundant mines either of the precious
metals or of the precious stones could add little to
the wealth of the world. A produce of which the value
is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily
degraded by its abundance . . .
The value of the most barren lands is not diminished
by the neighborhood of the most fertile. On the contrary,
it is generally increased by it. The great number of
people maintained by the fertile lands affords a market
to many parts of the produce of the barren, which they
could never have found among those who their own produce
could maintain.^5
Adam Smith's analysis introduced a complete shift from the Greek

25Ibid., pp. 173-174.
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thought in which nature was the creative force and men adjust
as best they can to a natural equilibrium;

his idea was that

there is a neutral balance of nature and that human beings by
their efforts create their own wealth.
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CONCLUSION
This brief examination of the ways in which men at dif
ferent times have viewed themsel\res and their surroundings
and the ways in which they have tri6d to explain man's rela
tionship to the physical world has shown that much of man's
thought on these things during the period surveyed has been
colored by his preoccupation with forms of equilibrium.

Further,

the tracing of equilibrium theory from its simplest roots has
revealed its limitations as a method for formulating a theory of
resources.

The most fatal of these limitations is that the method

can properly be applied only to static relationships and hence
will lead to conclusions inconsistent with reality if applied to
an area, the fundamental characteristic of which is change.
The stability which is inherent in any concept of equilibrium
implies that resources are a part of a state of affairs.

Dis

tinctions between society and nature are irrelevant under this
assumption of stability;

therefore, any theory of natural or

physical resources is also irrelevant.

The refinements of

cycles and sub-balances within equilibrium theory to incorporate
larger units of time, scale, and institutional practice developed
in nineteenth-century economic thought did not overcome this
limitation, and the method's application to resource analysis is
the same.

The first step toward a theory of resources, then,

would seem to be the abandonment of the equilibrium approach.
It may then be possible to discover new horizons in a world
where unlimited change is recognized rather than one in which

l8l

change is directed toward a necessary equilibrium*
The basic relationship between nature and man was origi
nally conceived by the earliest Greeks as an organic or quanti
tative relation between natural materials in process, with man
included as just another element.

With the introduction of

interest in the abstract nature of the problem, the existence
of a natural equilibrium was assumed, but some form of creativity
was recognized.

Three basic forms of creativity were developed

in early economic thought.
The first of these was indicated by Xenophon in showing that
the detailized organization of a given unit or dimension of ac
tivity could result in an increase in productivity above the pre
viously existing balance.

The further implementation of this

idea reached fruition in theoretical developments after Thomas
Acquinas.

It was seen that expansion of the spatial unit, or

extensive as opposed to intensive, organization of space yielded
an unlimited source of productivity as national trade and colonial
interests grew.
The second of the creative processes was an elaboration of
the organic and material relationships viewed from the standpoint
of man.

The natural balance between man and nature had no in

tensive direction for the Greeks, except in terms of household
management and efficiency.

This was an idea closely entwined

with the spatial intensification of Xenophon.

However, writers

in the eighteenth century developed the extensive property of
nature.

The Physiocrats' theory that nature produces an organic,
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measurable surplus above its natural balance with mankind sug
gested an organic or material boundlessness or possiblity of
expansion and accumulation from the bounty of nature.

This

theory is rather nebulous, and was tempered by Quesnay*s as
surance that a potential equilibrium or maturity to the expan
sion of natural surplus can be reached, but it is, nevertheless,
an example of a concept of creative expansion beyond a defined
framework of equilibrium, and an approach to change as a natural
process.
The third concept of creativity developed during this per
iod was that initiated by Aristotle and limited to the intensifi
cation of the human mind.

Adam Smith turned this infinite course

of change and creativity outward into extensive material change
in terms of productive relationships and technology.

This theory

stressed the material and productive potential of individuals,
and postulated material surplus or accumulation as the permissive
factor for human creativity.

However, this productive potential

of human beings was confined within a national equilibrium which
presupposed certain limits and intensive features of human possi
bility.

Smith’s theory dwarfed the relevance of abstract space„

and material quantity as measures of value.
^hese three formulations have common elements in an equili
brium of natural relations and possibility for change through in
tensification and extensification, which are both creative pro
cesses.

The process of intensification is subject to deductive

formulation from a presumption of equilibrium at some given level
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or unit, but extensive possibility requires projection into, the
undeterminable*

This produces a disquieting sense of unscientific

inexactness that has disturbed the longing for a potential balance
or order of nature which is still with us from the eighteenth cen
tury;
The assumption of a stable equilibrium and logical detailization from this equilibrium makes the distinction between sources
of value irrelevant.

According to equilibrium theory, value is

a state of affairs, whether a product of spatial organization,
organic relations and material quantity, or human knowledge and
ability.

The theory assumes that the constant flow of relation

ships can be measured at any given point and the same results ob
tained.

The most convenient point has been the money price of all

things.

Thus, value and all theory can be related to price, with

no further inquiry into distinctions between sources of value or
non-existent external change.
The concern with change introduces an interest in the source
of change, however, and the change in human appraisals and the
possible changes in natural fact give new axes to value which
must involve an explanation of how price follows, not how it
measures value, and introduces the need for a theory of how re
sources change in their natural or physical content, their spatial,
and their human or technological significance.
The nineteenth century introduced the fourth element of
time.

Time was not considered a natural fact or constant for
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purposes of abstraction by Aristotle.

Plotinus in the following

century was the first of the early philosophers to insist that the
passage of time was an absolute physical process introducing cornpletely new time at all sequential moments.

This, in itself,

is a mortal blow at the foundation of the equilibrium hypothesis*
However, creativity and production were analyzed through the
time of Adam Smith in terms of the most pressing limiting factors,
and planning of time, in its intensive and extensive facets,
awaited an era of greater capital accumulation to achieve signi
ficance in the order of importance of economic theory of potentials.
It would seem that any theory of resources and their analysis
must be tied to changes from equilibrium or "net product" as
the Physiocrats conceived it.

No special significance attaches

to any given element of the economy as long as it is in static
relationship to the rest of the elements of the economy.

Two as

pects of analysis of change which have been developed up to the
present are:

(1) natural or organic change and development or

evolution; and (2) the purely human or mental development of tech
nological and scientific grasp.

These two elements operate within

the intensive and extensive exploitation of the spatial and tem
poral constants, and make up a set of factors for development
theory and resource analysis.

The order of importance of these

factors in any given situation, and the concomitant relationship
or pattern of consistence between various degrees of one and the
other make up a body of theory which should be explored initially
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in a systematic survey of the literature of the nineteenth cen
tury for ideas and formulations dealing with the problem of de
velopment and natural relations between change and patterns of
physical and social circumstances.
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